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Considerable dispute over the goals of the antitrust laws has sur-
faced in scholarly commentary on the subject.' While it is unani-
mously agreed that Congress enacted these laws to encourage
competition, disagreement continues over Congress' ultimate goals.2
The importance of this debate was eloquently expressed by Judge
Robert Bork:
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a
firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law-what are
its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we give. Is the
antitrust judge to be guided by one value or by several? If by
several, how is he to decide cases where a conflict in value arises?
Only when the issue of goals has been settled is it possible to frame
a coherent body of substantive rules.3
The prevailing view is that Congress intended the antitrust laws
only to increase economic efficiency.4 Others, however, contend that
Congress was largely motivated by a number of social, moral, and
political concerns.5 This Article presents a third view, one suggested
1. For excellent summaries of the arguments regarding the wisdom of a large number
of possible antitrust goals, see Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic,
Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977); The Goals
of Antitrust: A Dialogue On Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965). For the history of this
debate, see Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377,377-82 (1965).
2. Nor has the Supreme Court resolved this problem. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330 (1979). The Court has stated on different occasions that the antitrust laws
have a variety of goals. The Court has never made clear which goals were meant to prevail
under what circumstances, or how conflicts among competing goals should be resolved.
Judicial uncertainty over the goals of the antitrust laws can be illustrated by Chief Jus-
tice Burger's opinion in Reiter. Some of the Court's language implies that the antitrust
laws contain a strong preference for consumers: "It is in the sound commercial interests of
the retail purchasers of goods and services to obtain the lowest price possible within the
framework of our competitive private enterprise system.... Here, where petitioner alleges
a wrongful deprivation of her money because the price of the hearing aid she bought was
artificially inflated by reason of respondents' anticompetitive conduct, she has alleged an
injury in her 'property'... . [The treble-damages remedy was passed] as a means of pro-
tecting consumers from overcharges resulting from price fixing." Id at 339-43.
In the middle of this proconsumer pronouncement, however, the Chief Justice stated
that the legislative debates "suggest that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
'consumer welfare prescription"' (citing R. BORK, THE ANTrIRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)).
442 U.S. at 343. Of course, Judge Bork concluded that the "consumer welfare
prescription" embodied in the antitrust laws includes economic efficiency and excluded
any concern with wealth distribution or any preference for consumers. R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX ch. 2 (1978). (Judge Bork wrote the sources cited in this Article
while he was still a professor.)
3. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 50.
4. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPALS AND THEIR APPLICATION 149 n.2 (1980); R. BORK, supra note 2; R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECIVE, (1976) (Judge Posner wrote
most of the sources cited in this Article while he was still a professor.)
5. Historian Richard Hofstadter wrote that "[t]he goals of antitrust were of three
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by the antitrust laws' legislative histories. 6 This Article will argue that
Congress passed the antitrust laws to further economic objectives, but
primarily objectives of a distributive rather than of an efficiency na-
ture.7 In other words, Congress was concerned principally with
preventing "unfair" transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with
market power. This Article will also demonstrate that Congress
intended to subordinate all other concerns to the basic purpose of
preventing firms with market power from directly harming
consumers.
The efficiency view has been espoused by a number of leading
commentators, who argue that the relevant legislative history and
cases reveal only one goal, the maximizing of economic efficiency.8
The use of social, political, or other nonefficiency criteria in antitrust
analysis, they conclude, is not only unwise policy, but completely
without legal foundation.9 Sound analysis under this view consists
solely of determining and implementing those actions within the
scope of the antitrust statutes that maximize economic efficiency. 10
kinds. The first were economic; the classical model of competition confirmed the belief
that the maximum of economic efficiency would be produced by competition, and at least
some members of Congress must have been under the spell of this intellectually elegant
model, insofar as they were able to formulate their economic intentions in abstract terms.
The second class of goals was political; the antitrust principle was intended to block
private accumulations of power and protect democratic government. The third was social
and moral; the competitive process was believed to be a kind of disciplinary machinery for
the development of character, and the competitiveness of the people-the fundamental
stimulus to national morale-was believed to need protection." R. HOFSTADTER, THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 199-200 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE].
6. This Article will not, however, discuss what the goals of antitrust policy should be.
It will merely attempt to ascertain the goals the Congresses that passed the antitrust laws
were attempting to further.
7. For an explanation of the distributive and efficiency effects of market power, see
infra text accompanying notes 23-58.
8. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4; R. BORK, supra note 2; R. POSNER,
supra note 4. Efficiency is defined and distinguished from other possible goals of antitrust
policy infra at text accompanying notes 33-61.
9. One leading exponent of this view is Judge Bork. In chapter 2 of The Antitrust
Paradox, he analyzes relevant legislative history with this question in mind. He concludes
that there is no support in the legislative history of the antitrust laws for the use of other
factors, and that the cases which indicate otherwise are incorrect. In addition, he identifies
reasons apart from his analysis of the legislative history for eschewing objectives other
than efficiency. R. BORK, supra note 2; see also remarks of William Baxter, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice: "The sole
goal of antitrust is economic efficiency." Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1982, at 28.
10. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 8-22 (Judge Posner agrees with Judge Bork
that antitrust laws should be used only to enhance economic efficiency, but differs with
him over which actions will best achieve this. Compare, for example, Posner's approach to
predation analysis, id. at 184-96, with Bork's approach, contained in R. BORK, supra note
2, at 144-60.).
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A second group of analysts believe that in addition to enhanced
economic efficiency, various social, moral, and political goals were
important to the antitrust laws' framers. These goals include
promotion of small business and creation of entrepreneurial
opportunity," encouragement of local control over business,12
prevention of industrial concentration, 13 and the reduction of the
political influence of large firms and promotion of individual liberty.14
Not surprisingly, these commentators often disagree over the specific
values to be considered,15 and the nature of the role these goals
should play.' 6
The view expressed in this Article is that the antitrust laws were
passed primarily to further what may be called a distributive goal, the,
goal of preventing unfair acquisitions of consumers' wealth by firms
with market power. It should be stressed, however, that Congress did
not pass the antitrust laws to secure the "fair" overall distribution of
wealth in our economy or even to help the poor.17 Congress merely
wanted to prevent one transfer of wealth that it considered
inequitable, and to promote the distribution of wealth that
competitive markets would bring. In other words, Congress implicitly
declared that "consumers' surplus"'8 was the rightful entitlement of
consumers; consumers were given the right to purchase competitively
priced goods. Firms with market power were condemned because
they acquired this property right without compensation to consumers.
11. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else
Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191 (1977).
12. Id.
13. Arnold, The Economic Purpose of Antitrust Laws, 26 MISS. L.J. 207,207-08 (1955).
14. Blake & Jones, supra note 1, at 382-84.
15. Compare, e.g., Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051
(1979), with Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, id. at 1076.
16. For example, Pitofsky, supra note 15, and Schwartz, supra note 15, disagree about
whether noneconomic values should play a role only when the efficiency considerations
are neutral or whether they can be balanced against efficiency considerations.
17. On balance, however, the redistribution effects of the antitrust laws probably favor
the poor. See infra note 37. See also Elzinga, supra note 11, at 1194-96.
18. Consumers' surplus is the difference between the maximum amount that a con-
sumer would pay and the price that he or she actually pays. Suppose that widgets are
priced at $2.00, the competitive price. Marginal consumers of widgets would be willing to
pay only this amount. Some consumers, however, would particularly desire widgets and
willingly pay more-as much as $3.00. These consumers receive $1.00 in consumers'
surplus when they purchase competitively priced widgets. If a monopolist gained control
of the widget market and raised the price of widgets to $3.00, marginal consumers would
no longer purchase widgets, and nonmarginal consumers would lose their surplus. The
widget monopoly would acquire $1.00 of monopoly profits at the expense of widget
consumers. For a more detailed definition, see E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS:
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 15 (4th ed. 1982); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE
78-81 (1966).
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This Article contends that the antitrust laws embody a strong
preference for consumers over firms with market power.19
The Article begins by defining possible economic goals of the
antitrust laws. Turning to the specific antitrust statutes, the Article
first analyzes the legislative history of the Sherman Act to
demonstrate Congress' motivations.20 The Article next examines the
legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act, concluding
that its prohibition against "unfair methods of competition" could be
restated, with only some restriction in its intent or meaning, as a
prohibition against "unfair" transfers of wealth 21  A similar
interpretation is then developed for the Clayton Act and its major
extension, the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act.22 Each of these
discussions focuses upon Congress' distributive or wealth transfer
goals, but also discusses Congress' efficiency goals and other goals so
as to place the distributive objectives in proper perspective.
Following the legislative history discussions, the Article uses the
example of a horizontal merger to illustrate some of the differences
that would result if distributive goals, in addition to or instead of
efficiency goals, were considered in antitrust analysis. Incorporation
of Congress' distributive goals into antitrust analysis would cause the
antitrust laws to reach many more mergers and other monopolistic
practices than does the present quest for efficiency in antitrust
decisions.
19. Thus, although Congress was strongly interested in increasing the size of the eco-
nomic "pie" when it passed the antitrust laws, it was even more interested in ensuring its
"fair" ownership. It should also be observed that all purchasers were to be protected,
whether they were resellers, farmers or ultimate consumers. See infra note 123 & text ac-
companying note 137.
20. This Article will attempt to demonstrate that the Sherman Act was passed despite
the possibility that its enforcement might impair, to a small degree, the efficiency of trusts,
the form of industrial organization that in 1890 was thought to be most efficient. It argues
that the legislative history shows that the Sherman Act was passed for a number of
purposes: preventing monopolistic transfers of wealth from consumers to trusts,
encouraging corporate productive efficiency in order that consumers would receive these
benefits as well, reducing the social and political power of large aggregations of capital,
and providing opportunities for small entrepreneurs. Congress' more minor goals were
not, however, meant to interfere significantly with the right of purchasers to buy
competitively priced goods.
21. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was charged, in § 5 of the Act, with
preventing "[unfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1914). The legislative
history of the Act shows that certain methods of competition were considered "unfair,"
but not primarily because they might interfere with economic efficiency. Congress, in a
single phrase, condemned both monopolies and fraud as "unfair" methods of competition
primarily because each "unfairly" transferred wealth from consumers to firms with market
power.
22. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976), is not discussed.
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Economic Effects of Monopoly Power: A Brief Overview
The observation that monopolies23 cause increased prices and re-
duced output is hardly new. This conclusion finds expression in early
English common law2 4 and in classical economic theory. Adam Smith
noted that "The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly
understocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell
their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their
emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above
their natural price."25  By the time the Sherman Act was passed,
economists were able to prove that a monopolist pursuing its own
best interests would normally follow this course of conduct.26
Modem economists have, of course, made many important ad-
vances in the theory of monopoly.27  The most important
development may be the modem analysis of the implications of
monopoly self-interest, long recognized as including higher prices and
restricted output. These effects can be divided into three categories.
The first, allocative inefficiency, describes the misallocation of
resources, which diminishes the total wealth of society. A second
effect is a transfer of wealth from consumers to monopolists. The
third involves the effect of monopolies, and antimonopoly statutes, on
23. In this Article, the term "monopolies" will normally be used to include both in-
dividual firms with market power and cartels and trusts acquiring or exercising market
power. This Article makes no distinction between single-firm and multifirm market power
unless expressly noted.
24. See W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA ch. 2 (1965). Even
the Bible recognized the impact of monopolies. See Isaiah 5:8 ("Woe to those that add
house to house/ And join field to field/ till there is room for none but you/ To dwell in the
land"); Proverbs 11:26 ("He that withholdeth corn, the people shall curse him: but blessing
shall be upon the head of him that selleth it."). For an elaborate discussion of the biblical
attitude toward market power, see A. LEVINE, FREE ENTERPRISE AND JEWISH LAW
(1980), especially chapter 2, "Monopoly and Restraint of Trade."
25. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 61 (Modern Library Ed. 1978) (1st ed. 1776).
26. For example, in his influential 1890 book, Princples of Economics, Alfred P. Mar-
shall demonstrated that a monopolist will reduce supply to maximize profit: "The
monopolist would lose all his monopoly revenue if he produced for sale an amount so
great that its supply price, as here defined, was equal to its demand price: the amount
which gives maximum Monopoly Revenue is always considerably less than that. It may
therefore appear as though the amount produced under a monopoly is always less and its
price to the consumer always higher than if there were no monopoly." 1 A. MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 484 (1st ed. 1890). Interestingly, Marshall also observed that
the monopoly price nevertheless can be lower than the competitive price, particularly in
the long run, because the monopolist can increase innovation without risking having to
share the benefits of any advances made, be more efficient, waste less in advertising, or
have greater access to capital. Id
27. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18, chs. 10 & 11 (2d ed. 1975); F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ch. 2 (2d ed. 1980).
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firms' productive efficiency. These three categories, the economic
effects that might have caused Congress to legislate to prevent firms
from obtaining or increasing market power, are examined here.
Allocative Inefficiency
Monopoly pricing reduces the total amount of wealth in society.
Because a monopolist produces less than would be produced under
competitive conditions,2 some resources that would otherwise have
been used to make the monopoly product will instead be used for
other purposes, ones that consumers value demonstrably less.29 This
misallocation of resources results in diminished satisfaction of
society's wants, and thus, in terms of what society values, a reduction
of society's total wealth. This effect is termed "allocative
inefficiency. ' 30  Elimination of monopoly pricing would, ceteris
paribis, increase society's total wealth and, therefore, increase
consumer satisfaction.31
Economists have almost universally condemned the allocative
inefficiency resulting from monopoly pricing.32 Before one can
28. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18, at 277-92; F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at ch. 2; G.
STIGLER, supra note 18, at 78-81.
29. Firms operating in a competitive market are forced to use their resources in a man-
ner that consumers desire most. Any deviation from competitive price and output
decisions will result in consumer demand being somewhat less satisfied.
30. For a diagrammatic illustration of allocative efficiency, see infra text
accompanying notes 290-91. For a formal proof that monopoly pricing leads to allocative
inefficiency, see E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18, at 277-92; F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at
ch. 2; Stigler, supra note 18, at 78-81.
31. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18, at 277-92; F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at ch. 2;
Stigler, supra note 18, at 78-81.
32. In particular it is condemned by scholars of both the "Harvard" and "Chicago"
schools of analysis. See Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1214 (1974); see also 4
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4; R. BORK, supra note 2; R. POSNER, supra note 4.
This unanimity of views explains the prominence of allocative efficiency in the
antitrust literature. While it is theoretically very significant, there is evidence that it may
be quantitatively less important. The first estimate of the loss to the American economy
caused by monopolistic misallocations was presented by Arnold Harberger in 1954. If the
results of Harberger's estimates were expressed in terms of 1982 dollars, they would be
equal to approximately $12.00 per person per year. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource
Allocation, AM. ECON. REV. 77 (1954). This estimate is based upon a variety of
assumptions. It is hardly surprising that other economists arrive at different estimates,
some of which are lower than Harberger's, while others are larger (some even by a factor
of 50). Scherer's review of the evidence puts the figure "between 0.5 and 2 percent of the
gross national product [between approximately $50 and $200 per person per year] with
estimates nearer the lower bound inspiring more confidence than those on the higher
side." F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 464 (footnote omitted). The more important question
is what the magnitude of this loss would be if there were no antitrust laws to act as both
deterrent and corrective systems. It may be impossible, however, to formulate a
meaningful estimate of this figure.
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understand why it is consistently viewed as "bad," however, the
welfare criterion that will be used as the appropriate standard must be
defined.
Modem economists almost universally use "Pareto optimality" as
the appropriate welfare criterion.33 Under this standard, a change
that harms no one and improves the lot of at least one person in his or
her own opinion is considered an improvement.34  The most
commonly used version of Pareto optimality, however, recognizes
that virtually any change is likely to harm at least one person. Thus,
a Pareto improvement is usually defined to include a change that
would benefit at least one person and would, through the use of
transfer payments, simultaneously eliminate any harm to others.35
Because all modem economic analysis is based upon this, or upon
some other subjective welfare criterion, it must be observed that
every result of "objective" modern economic analysis is, in some
philosophical sense, subjective. 36 Economic theory has established
that monopolies cause allocative efficiency and therefore violate
Pareto optimality. Monopoly pricing, as measured under Pareto
optimality, thus harms social welfare, unless some other characteristic
of monopolies creates offsetting advantages.
In summary, monopoly pricing leads to allocative inefficiency
that virtually every antitrust scholar criticizes as harmful to society.
We now turn to a discussion of the other effects of monopolies and
33. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18, at 57-8, 440, 459; E. PHELPS, ECONOMIC
JUSTICE 12 (1973); F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 595-96.
Other welfare criteria exist, see E. PHELPS, supra, at 12, and a few economists and
philosophers reject the Pareto principle, considering it inadequate or irrelevant. For
example, some believe that it is impossible to hold liberal (or libertarian) values, and at
the same time accept the Pareto principle. See Peacock & Rowley, Pareto Optimality and
the Political Economy of Liberalism, 80 J. POL. ECON. 476 (1972); Sen, The Impossibility
Of A Parelian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970). Like all welfare criteria, Pareto
optimality ultimately is subjective; no one is compelled logically to accept it or its
economic implications. As all modem economic analysis is based on one or another
subjective welfare criterion, philosophically the results of any such analysis inherently are
subjective. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Pareto optimality represents the
theoretical underpinnings of almost all modem economic analyses of the effects of
antitrust actions.
34. V. PARETO, MANUAL D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (1909). There are several
variations and restatements of this principle. See, e.g., E. PHELPS, supra note 33, at 12.
35. E. PHELPS, supra note 33, at 12. In fact, many economists assume that a transfer
payment can be made so that all or most losers will be compensated. For this reason they
ignore distributive results. Other economists recognize that certain public policy actions
inevitably help some people and hurt others, and decline to make the necessary interper-
sonal comparisons of utility. For a superb general discussion of the disinclination of "posi-
tive" economists to consider distributive effects, see Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science
or Politics, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980).
36. See supra note 33.
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antimonopoly statutes.
Transfer of "Consumers' Surplus" from Consumers to Monopolists
The most visible and obvious result of monopoly pricing is a
transfer of wealth from purchasers to the monopolist; consumers
become poorer while the monopolist becomes richer.37 The relative
size of the transferred wealth and the allocative inefficiency will vary
considerably from case to case depending upon a number of factors.38
Under market conditions most likely to be encountered, however, the
transferred wealth usually will be between two and forty times as
great as the accompanying allocative inefficiency.39 Thus, the
redistributive effects of market power generally exceed the allocative
inefficiency effects by a substantial amount.
The two principal effects of monopolistic pricing, the transfer of
wealth from consumers to monopolists and the decrease in allocative
efficiency, are different in one fundamental manner: the latter repre-
sents a decrease in society's absolute wealth, while the former merely
redistributes that wealth. As Professor Williamson has observed,
"[t]his [redistributive] transformation of benefits from one form (con-
37. Scherer concludes that "the redistribution associated with monopoly for the entire
economy is... probably between 2 and 3 percent of GNP." F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at
471. Comanor and Smiley, in Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth, 89 Q.J. ECON. 177
(1975), report that, if there had been no monopoly profits, the share of total personal
wealth controlled by the wealthiest 2.4% of American families in 1962 would have been
reduced from 40% to somewhere between 16.6 and 32%. Id. at 191-93. See the discussion
in F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 472-73.
It should be noted that wealth redistribution caused by monopolies does not always
transfer wealth from poor consumers to rich stockholders. Monopolized products almost
always will be purchased by at least some consumers who are richer than at least some
stockholders. On balance, however, the redistributive effects of the antitrust laws would
seem to favor the poor. But, as the legislative histories indicate, the legislators passing
these laws were concerned with preventing transfers from consumers to monopolists and
did not premise these statutes on redistribution from rich to poor. See infra notes 110-23,
181-90, 267-74 & accompanying text. This redistributive process will also, of course, affect
the total distribution of wealth in our society. For example, a yacht cartel with numerous
stockholders might help to even the distribution of wealth, while a cartel that sells to poor
people would probably act to skew the distribution. Questions concerning the fairness of
the redistributive process are, however, different from questions concerning the initial or
final distribution of wealth that the process produces.
38. These factors include the shape of the demand curve and the amounts by which the
monopolist restricts output and raises prices.
39. Under certain standard assumptions the wealth redistribution can be shown to be
exactly twice as large as the allocative inefficiency. These assumptions include a straight
line demand curve and constant marginal costs. See Schmalensee, Another Look at Market
Power in Antitrust, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1805 (1982). Under circumstances more likely
to be encountered, the wealth transfer probably will be much larger relative to the
allocative inefficiency. See Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger
Enforcement, 91 YALE L.J. - (1982).
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sumers' surplus) to another (profit) is treated as a wash under the
conventional welfare economics model."40
Nevertheless, this transfer of wealth raises a very controversial
question: is the transfer a "good," "bad," or neutral result of
monopoly pricing? The value-laden answer in large part is
determined by whether anyone is thought to be entitled to the
economic benefit of the "consumers' surplus." Under monopoly
pricing, some consumers' surplus is acquired by the monopolist.
Depending on one's perspective, one can be entirely indifferent to the
result, or one can conclude either that the monopoly is "unfairly
taking" property from consumers, or that the monopoly is only
reaping its just reward.41
The redistributive effects of monopoly power are clearly good or
bad only with respect to the assumptions and welfare criteria that are
used to evaluate them. Condemnation of the direct consumer impact
of monopoly power is therefore normally and properly termed
"subjective" or a "value judgment," because it is based upon a
preference for consumers over monopolists.
This Article argues that Congress decided that consumers were
entitled to the benefits of a competitive economic system. Consumers
were deemed entitled to the "consumers' surplus" because Congress
regarded the competitive scenario as the normal one.42 Monopoly
pricing represented a change from the norm which Congress
condemned as an "unfair" taking of consumers' property.43
This congressional decision does not, moreover, violate the
important principle of Pareto optimality. Before one can evaluate an
improvement under the Pareto principle, the initial distribution of
entitlements or property rights must be defined. 4 Assuming that Con-
gress decided consumers were entitled to consumers' surplus,
condemnation of monopolistic extractions of wealth does not violate
Pareto optimality because the monopoly is unfairly taking property
40. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699,
711 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Williamson, Economics Revisited]. Areeda and Turner
similarly wrote that their analysis of Williamson's merger example "assumes that the
income transfer from consumers to producers is neutral." 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 4, at 149 n.2. Landes and Posner wrote that "fw]e ignore possible distributional
objections to monopoly, as both controversial and difficult to quantify." Landes & Posner,
Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937,954 (1981).
41. We could conclude, for example, that in order to provide firms the incentive to
compete vigorously, we should permit them to earn monopoly profits.
42. It appears that Congress considered the distribution of wealth that would result if
there were no monopolies as the more nearly "just" distribution. See infra notes 114-22,
181-90,267-75 & accompanying text.
43. Not all of the consumers' surplus is taken by monopolies. Some is left with the
consumers; some is destroyed (allocative inefficiency).
44. See supra note 33 & accompanying text.
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from consumers and, as a practical matter, no compensating transfer
payments by monopolists to consumers are made.45 Condemnation of
monopoly pricing can thus be justified as the only practical method of
preventing monopolies from "unfairly" taking property that, in the
view of Congress, belongs to consumers.46
Even if a condemnation of monopolistic transfers from
purchasers to producers does violate Pareto optimality, this violation
would not undermine the thesis of this Article. Pareto optimality, on
which the condemnation of allocative efficiency is based, is itself a
subjective standard which almost every modern economist is willing
to accept.47 No member of Congress, however, when subjectively
designing or voting for any antitrust law, was, or is, under any
compunction to be held to the Pareto principle. Similarly, it may or
may not be wise social policy to design antitrust laws to prevent
certain transfers of wealth; the decision, however, belongs to
Congress.48
In summary, considerable controversy exists over the proper
treatment of monopolistic transfers of wealth. This Article contends
45. Nor does allowing monopolization constitute a taking of property that could be
substantially, even if not completely, rectified by transfer payments. If it could be shown
that allowing monopolization helped 90% of society, and if 90% of the consumers harmed
by monopolization could be compensated through transfer payments, society would
almost certainly not condemn monopolization even though, strictly speaking, the change
from competitive to monopoly pricing was not a Pareto change. The existence of allocative
inefficiency, however, makes it extremely difficult to show that allowing monopolies
generates more benefits than losses. Further, as a practical matter, the only way to make
these transfer payments is through government regulation of the monopoly or through a
complicated taxation and rebate plan, actions that are likely to cause so much waste and
inefficiency that any gains from permitting monopolies would be dissipated. As it cannot
be shown that most consumers would be compensated for their lost consumer surplus, the
policy presumption should be in favor of allowing them to keep their property.
46. Further, the antitrust laws might not violate Pareto optimality if society believed
that one way to prevent revolutions or the spread of communism or fascism was to prevent
monopolistic transfers of wealth. See infra notes 125-42,275-84 & accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18 at 457-60; E. PHELPS, supra note 33, at 12;
F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 595-96.
48. It is possible that many congressional actions violate the Pareto principle. For ex-
ample, suppose that Congress believed that, in certain circumstances, a poor person
valued a marginal dollar more than a rich person. Congress might judge that society as a
whole could be made better off by taxing the rich to provide welfare payments. Congress'
desire for equality or other notions of justice might at times prevail and override its desire
for efficiency. Pareto optimality also might be rejected if Congress believed that the
existing distribution of wealth was not a "fair" one. For example, suppose that a certain
business practice, without taking any wealth away from anyone in absolute terms,
produced a large increase in the yearly GNP, but gave the increase to the richest .01% of
the population, or, alternatively, only to white Americans. Further, suppose that transfer
payments, as a practical matter, could not be made. This business practice would satisfy
Pareto optimality and yet, in the eyes of many, could be socially undesirable.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
that Congress believed consumers were entitled to products priced at
competitive levels and to the opportunity to buy the quantity of
products a competitive market would offer. The Article argues that
when Congress passed the antitrust laws it condemned the use of
market power to interfere with these property rights or entitlements
out of an explicit antimonopolistic, proconsumer bias.49
Productive Efficiency and Inefficiency
Monopoly power most directly affects the allocative efficiency
and wealth distribution throughout our economy. However,
monopolies have a host of other effects, positive and negative, on the
productive efficiency of an economy.50 Whereas allocative efficiency
concerns overall placement of resources in the economy, productive,
or technical, efficiency refers to individual firms' use of their
resources in the most effective manner. Productive efficiencies,
whether in innovation, purchasing, manufacturing, marketing,
distribution, or transportation, are crucial to any economy.51
Firms' desires to become monopolies can lead to important pro-
ductive efficiency gains. The desire to earn monopoly profits often
motivates businesses to compete energetically, to lower costs and
prices, and to improve the quality of their product. Additionally, two
or more firms often desire merger or combination to take advantage
of large scale or multiplant economies, thereby improving their own
efficiency and competitive posture. Any statute that, for other
reasons, forbids or discourages mergers, the formation of monopolies,
and even cartels, sacrifices these important advantages to some
degree.
However, monopolies can simultaneously negatively affect pro-
ductive efficiency. Sir John Hicks observed in 1935 that monopolists
"are likely to exploit their advantage much more by not bothering to
get very near the position of maximum profit, than by straining them-
selves to get very close to it. The best of all monopoly profits is a
quiet life." 52 More recently, other economists have written that
inefficiencies result when a monopolist is shielded from hard
competition,5 3 and that waste is caused by non-price competition to
49. Congress believed that consumers, in other words, were entitled as a matter of
right to the range of options that free competition would produce.
50. Productive efficiency is probably that type of efficiency which most commonly
comes to mind when one thinks of business efficiency.
51. For more complete definitions of productive and allocative efficiencies, see E.
MANSFIELD, supra note 18, at 1, 4-6; F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 13-21.
52. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3
ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935).
53. See, e.g., Liebenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency," 56 AM. ECON. REV.
392 (1966). Professor Liebenstein argues that the motivations and incentives of workers
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obtain monopoly profits.54 Similarly, some evidence suggests that the
existence of monopolies might curtail overall research and
innovation55 or lead to other undesirable economic consequences.56
As this brief discussion demonstrates, monopolies both positively
and negatively affect the productive efficiency of our economy. It thus
becomes very difficult to know when the existence of monopolies, or,
conversely, the existence of antitrust statutes, ultimately benefits soci-
and managers are different when their firm does not have to face competition: "In
situations where competitive pressure is light, many people will trade the disutility of
greater effort, of search, and the control of other peoples' activities for the utility of
feeling less pressure and of better interpersonal relations. But in situations where
competitive pressures are high, and hence the costs of such trades are also high, they will
exchange less of the disutility of effort for the utility of freedom from pressure, etc." Id. at
413.
Similarly, monopolies can create "organizational slack" by tolerating inefficiency and
waste. Without the discipline of competition, monopolies may have less incentive to cut
waste and to search for ways to reduce costs. They may have the discretion to make only a
comfortable profit and to tolerate a substantial amount of "fat" in their organizations and
thus further waste society's resources. Some economists believe that it is "eminently
plausible" that inefficiencies resulting from weak competitive pressures "are at least as
large as the welfare losses from [allocative inefficiency]." See F. SCHERER, supra note 27,
at 466.
54. Judge Posner hypothesized, "[A]n opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer
payment in the form of monopoly profits will attract real resources into efforts by sellers
to monopolize, and by consumers to prevent being charged monopoly prices. The costs of
the resources so used are costs of monopoly just as much as the costs resulting from the
substitution of products that cost society more to produce than the monopolized product."
R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 11. Judge Posner theorized that part or all of a firm's
monopoly profits could be dissipated by its wasteful nonprice competition to achieve or
protect its monopoly. In addition, he pointed out that this effect might also cause
consumers or actual or potential competitors of the monopolist to waste resources as well.
Id. at 11 - 12; see also Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807 (1975). Professors Caves and Porter similarly believe that monopolies may
channel their competitive activities into activities such as advertising to create entry
barriers that help to preserve their monopoly position. Caves & Porter, From Entry
Barriers to Mobility Barriers: Conjectural Decisions and Contrived Deference to New
Competition, 91 Q.J. ECON. 241,245-54 (1977). Of course, many economists do not believe
that this occurs to a significant degree and believe that monopolies consequently continue
to enjoy their full monopoly profits. See supra note 37. But if this effect does occur, some
or all of the resources that otherwise are thought to be transferred from consumers to the
monopolist instead would be wasted by the monopolist and would increase the absolute
cost to society of monopoly power. See generally Rice & Ulen, Rent-Seeking and Welfare
Loss, 3 RESEARCH L. ECON. 53 (1981).
55. See, e.g., Kamien & Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey, 13 J.
ECON. LIT. 1 (1975).
56. Some believe that monopolies overpay their executives or rank-and-file
employees. See the discussion of those and other allegations in F. SCHERER, supra note
27, at 471-73. It is even possible that monopolistic redistributions of wealth might
adversely affect employee-consumers' sense of justice and their feeling that they are
obtaining their fair share of society's wealth. If so, the accompanying frustration could
deaden work incentives and lead to a loss in productivity.
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ety.57 Further, because monopolies also create allocative inefficiency
and affect society's distribution of wealth, an overall welfare-analysis
of the desirability in various instances of permitting firms to obtain or
retain monopoly power becomes extremely complex and involves
subjective judgments that transcend conventional economic analysis.58
However modem economists may resolve the issue, it is clear
Congress has determined that, in certain circumstances, firms should
be prevented from obtaining monopoly power. Keeping in mind the
catalogue of possible economic effects of monopoly power and the
possible economic reasons that Congress might have condemned
these firms when it passed the antitrust laws, the following sections of
this Article will examine the legislative histories of the major antitrust
statutes to discern the true underpinnings of congressional intent.
Congressional Goals
It is axiomatic that when the words of a statute are clear and un-
ambiguous, courts need go no further in their interpretation of that
law.59Ambiguous, doubtful, or undefined words or phrases require in-
terpretation, however, by reference to the statute's legislative
history.6° Examination of a legislative history generally seeks
determination of legislative intent regarding particular applications of
the statute. The analysis often goes one step further in an attempt to
determine what legislative intent "would have been" had Congress
considered situations never actually contemplated.61
57. Even if monopolies benefit society by resulting in a net increase in society's wealth,
and side payments (through the tax laws, for example) in theory could be made which
would leave consumers better off despite the redistributive effects of monopolies, one
could still justify having antitrust laws on the ground that side payments are, as a practical
matter, too difficult to make.
58. The difficulties of analyzing the efficiency and distributive effects of monopoly
power are illustrated by presenting an analysis of a horizontal merger that might yield pro-
ductive efficiencies yet lead to a firm with monopoly power. See infra notes 287-309 &
accompanying text.
59. "[W]hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of
the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations
drawn... from any extraneous source." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490
(1917).
60. Indeed, even the term "legislative history" needs clarification. The term can mean
a narrow analysis of the history and progress of a bill in a legislative assembly. Alterna-
tively, "legislative history" can mean an analysis of the condition of the times when the bill
was passed, and an analysis of the factors which led to its passage. This Article uses the
latter definition. For a more complete discussion of courts' reliance on legislative histories
in interpreting acts, see Limbaugh, Historic Origins of Anti-trust Legislation, 18 MO. L.
REV. 215, 215-17 (1953); Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1982).
61. For example, in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975), a case involving
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The antitrust laws are among the least precise statutes enacted by
Congress. The central terms, including "competition," "unfair meth-
ods of competition," "conspiracy in restraint of trade," and "monopo-
lize," are inherently vague and not self-defining. 62 One commentator
has observed that antitrust legislation has, perhaps more than any
other field, stimulated the courts to consider, as an interpretative aid,
the history of the era that gave rise to the legislation.63
It is not possible to ascertain with certainty the original goals of
the antitrust laws. Not only are there conflicting statements of legisla-
tive purpose, but it is often difficult to decide whether certain state-
ments represent isolated, unimportant views64 or infrequently
mentioned but nevertheless significant motivating factors.65
antifraud provisions of the Security Acts, Judge Friendly noted: "We freely acknowledge
that if we were asked to point to language in the statutes, or even in the legislative history,
that compelled these conclusions, we would be unable to respond.... Our conclusions rest
on case law and commentary... and on our best judgement as to what Congress would
have wished if these problems had occurred to it." Id. at 933 (emphasis added). As Judge
Bork noted, "[a] legislature may never address the issue of ultimate policy goals and yet
write a law whose various categories and distinctions can be explained only by a particular
policy. That policy may then quite legitimately be said to have been intended by the
legislature, even though not a single member articulated it even to himself. A system of
classifications has implications, and the legislature must be taken to intend not only what it
says but also what is implied by what it does." R. BORK, supra note 2, at 57.
The Supreme Court, in Minnesota Mining v. N.J. Wood Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1964),
quoted an earlier statement by Justice Holmes: "[I]t is not an adequate discharge of duty
for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore
we shall go on as before." Id. at 321 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st
Cir. 1908)).
62. No attempt will be made here to list those cases in which the courts have examined
the legislative history of the antitrust laws in order to ascertain what Congress "would
have wished" if the problems had occurred to it; such a list would be unbearably long.
Good compilations of cases which examine the legislative histories of the antitrust laws, as
well as comprehensive legislative histories of the antitrust laws can be found in E. KITNER,
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATUTES (1978); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955); 1 A.
TOULMIN, TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
INCLUDING ALL RELATED TRADE REGULATRY LAWS 1-23 (1949).
63. Limbaugh, supra note 60, at 217.
64. An example of just such a remark in the FTC Act legislative history would, hope-
fully, be where Senator Kenyon quoted Senator Martine for the proposition that
"everybody should be permitted to kill one lawyer and not be punished for it." 51 CONG.
REC. 13,196 (1914).
65. Although it may be assumed that the legislators meant what they said during the
floor debates, their statements might at times mask their true intentions. Further, some
statements can be best classified as political rhetoric. For example, legislators might have
stated that they condemn monopolization out of a concern for consumers when they
actually were more concerned with providing small businesses fair opportunity to
compete. Some Congress members might have supported weak antitrust legislation in
order to protect large predators from stronger remedies. For a cynical view of relevant
economic history see G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1973).
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Therefore, this Article cannot hope to resolve every conflict, but it
does attempt to generally reconcile the evidence to determine the
common spirit, goals, policies, and purposes underlying the antitrust
laws, and to develop an appropriate decisionmaking theory with
which to analyze antitrust cases.66 This judgment will by necessity be
relative instead of absolute. We can only make our most informed
decision as to Congress' true intentions. And, although current
antitrust decisionmakers have some degree of discretion in
interpreting the antitrust laws, this discretion must be bounded by
Congress' desires. This examination of congressional intent proceeds
chronologically, because the earlier antitrust laws, and the Sherman
Act in particular, laid out Congress' most fundamental antitrust
policies.
The Sherman Act
From the language of the Sherman Act,67 its legislative history,68
and the history of late nineteenth century America,69 it is clear Con-
gress was concerned about those activities of trusts and monopolies
that unduly restrained trade or caused a monopolization of interstate
66. As Judge Bork noted in his examination of the legislative history of the Sherman
Act, the task of ascertaining legislative intent should not be "an attempt to describe the
actual state of mind of each of the congressmen who voted for the Sherman Act but...
merely an attempt to construct the thing we call 'legislative intent' using conventional
methods of collecting and reconciling the evidence provided by the Congressional
Record." Bork, Legislative Intent and The Policy of The Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. 7,7
n.2 (1966). Since most legislation is passed by a coalition whose members have very
different interests, a complete reconciliation of every legislator's views is often impossible.
For the purposes of this Article, the historical methodology will be as follows: The
statements that support a particular goal or policy will be identified, and given weight ac-
cording to the relative importance of the speaker, and the strength of his sentiments. They
will be balanced against opposing or contradictory legislative statements. If this calculation
reveals a preponderance of evidence which favors a particular policy, then it will be as-
sumed that the policy can be ascribed to Congress as a whole. If, however, there are only a
few comments by less important legislators on a particular issue, the remarks will be cited
but then ignored and it will be assumed that Congress did not articulate a policy toward
that issue.
67. The Sherman Act condemns "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States .... "
Sherman Act, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)). It provides
punishment for "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States.... ." Sherman Act, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
68. For comprehensive sources on the legislative history of the Sherman Act, see E.
KITNER, supra note 62; H. THORELLI, supra note 62; A. TOULMIN, supra note 62; Bork,
supra note 66.
69. See infra notes 125-42 & accompanying text.
April 1999]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
commerce. It is equally clear that with the Sherman Act "'Congress
was dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and
monopoly, which it sought to prevent."' 70 These truisms do not,
however, reveal why Congress passed the Sherman Act, or what goals
it attempted to implement. If the goals of the antitrust laws are to be
understood, the crucial issue is the explanation behind Congress'
effort to protect competition.71
This Article first attempts to demonstrate that the legislative his-
tory of the Sherman Act reveals a total lack of concern for allocative
inefficiency. Trusts and monopolies were condemned principally be-
cause they "unfairly" extracted wealth from consumers. Productive
efficiency also was an aim of the Act. Congress wanted the economy
to function efficiently primarily to provide consumers the benefits of
free competition. This section demonstrates, however, that in
balancing the competing considerations, Congress condemned firms
with monopoly power despite their acknowledged efficiencies, and
with the knowledge that this condemnation might not maximize
society's economic efficiency. Indeed, the evidence suggests that
Congress was unwilling to subordinate its distributive-based distaste
for trusts and monopolists to the goal of corporate efficiency when
the efficiency gains would be retained by the monopolist. Moreover,
this Article contends that the legislative history shows that Congress
passed the Sherman Act because it believed that trusts and
monopolies possess excessive social and political power, and reduce
entrepreneurial liberty and opportunity.
70. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951) (quoting
A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943)). As the
National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures succinctly stated:
"'[T]he chief aim of government litigation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act is the
dissipation of persistent monopoly power." NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF
ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, 1 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL 158 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NCRALP REPORT].
71. A fascinating illustration of the intense debate over the goals of the Sherman Act
is provided by Inglis v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981). The
court held that "[t]he relevance of the economic tests [for predatory pricing] so developed,
however, must then depend in large part on whether allocative efficiency is a primary goal
of the antitrust laws. As we see those goals, they are limited to the preservation of
cdmpetition, and while one may assume that enhanced competition will lead to
improvements in allocative efficiency, this may not always be the case.... Similarly, the
search for allocative efficiency may lead one to accept conduct that is plainly
anticompetitive. In any event, our objective is set by the antitrust laws and it concerns
primarily the protection of competition." 652 F.2d at 936 n.20. Later, the court added that
"[t]he antitrust laws were designed to protect competition, not solely to improve allocative
efficiency." 652 F.2d at 939-40 (footnote omitted). Six months later, the same panel voted
unanimously to amend its opinion by deleting all of the quoted material! Inglis v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., Nos. 79-4207, 78-3604 (Feb. 10, 1982).
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Improving Economic Efficiency
Judge Robert H. Bork, who has written one of the most thorough
analyses of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, contends that
the drafters of the Sherman Act were preoccupied with economic
efficiency rather than with any nonefficiency considerations.72 Judge
Bork argues that "[t]he whole task of antitrust can be summed up as
the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net
loss in consumer welfare."73 Judge Bork asserts that the sole purpose
of the Sherman Act was enhancement of "consumer welfare," a term
of art he defined as the "maximization of wealth or consumer want
satisfaction."74 This view of "consumer welfare" includes maximum
economic efficiency but excludes anything giving preference to
consumers over monopolists or any concern with "unfair" transfers of
wealth from consumers to monopolists. "Antitrust thus has a built-in
preference for material prosperity, but it has nothing to say about the
ways prosperity is distributed or used."75
Judge Bork asserts that this congressional mandate "requires
courts to distinguish between agreements or activities that increase
wealth through efficiency and those that decrease it through
restriction of output."76 He further asserts that there is "not a scintilla
of support" in the Act's legislative history for "broad social, political,
and ethical mandates," 77 and explicitly rejects distributive issues as a
possible area of antitrust concern.78
72. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 91.
73. Id.
74. Bork, supra note 66, at 7. The Court, beginning with Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), has condemned the misallocation of resources caused by
monopoly pricing. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), the Court cited Judge
Bork for the conclusion that the debates "suggest that Congress designed the Sherman
Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription."' Id. at 343. See the discussion of this case supra
note 2.
75. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 90.
76. Bork, supra note 66, at 7.
77. Id. at 10. The only other value that he believes can be identified in the legislative
history is the protection of small businessmen. He argues, however, that "this value was
given a complementary (or incidental) but not conflicting role in relation to the goal of
maximization of consumer welfare." Id.
78. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 111: "[flt seems clear the income distribution effects of
economic activity should be completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust
legality of the activity. It may be sufficient to note that the shift in income distribution
does not lessen total wealth, and a decision about it requires a choice between two groups
of consumers that should be made by the legislature rather than by the judiciary."
Interestingly, in his Sherman Act legislative history analysis, Bork observed that the
argument in Congress for a rule against monopolistic mergers "derived in large measure
from a desire to protect consumers from monopoly extortion.... Where producer and
consumer welfare might come into conflict... Congress chose consumer welfare as
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Judge Bork supports his conclusions by analyzing dozens of cita-
tions from the legislative history of the Act, relying most heavily upon
the views of Senator Sherman, its primary sponsor.79 These
statements reveal overwhelming congressional concern with the
activities of monopolies and trusts tending "to advance the price to
the consumer" 80  and with practices effectively "destroying
competition in production and thereby increasing prices to
consumers. '81 Judge Bork thus makes a convincing case that these
concerns were paramount and indeed represented the overwhelming
weight of congressional opinion.82
Judge Bork then examines the proposition that Congress was
concerned with "the preservation of efficiency, 8 3 and finds support
for the assertion that Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, did not
mean to destroy existing efficient production methods. 84 In particular,
decisive." Id. at 11. A concern with "monopoly extortion" would seem to be identical to
the concern with the income distribution effects of economic activity which Bork says
should be made by the legislature.
79. Judge Bork wrote that Senator Sherman "was by far the most articulate and thor-
ough speaker on the question of what goals antitrust should serve. Those who spoke over-
whelmingly agreed with his position on this issue. Disagreement was largely confirmed to
questions of remedies and the constitutional reach of Sherman's measure." Bork, supra
note 66, at 45. "Sherman was the prime mover in getting antitrust legislation considered
and pressed through the Senate... [and] though Sherman's bill was completely rephrased
by the Judiciary Committee, of which he was not a member, the final bill in its substantive
policy aspects, embodied Sherman's views." Id. at 14-15. For a description of the evolution
of Sherman's initial bill into the Sherman Act, see id. at 13 n.9.
80. Id. at 16 (quoting remarks of Sen. Sherman, 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890)). In an-
other example, Judge Bork cited § 1 of the bill that Sherman drafted. "[T]hat bill declared
illegal two classes of arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations: (1)
those made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition, and (2) those
designed, or which tend, to advance the cost to consumer of articles of commerce." IL at 15
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). Judge Bork analyzes this language in the following
manner: "Sherman employed these two criteria of illegality in every measure he presented
to the Senate. The first test, which subjects all firms to market forces, is hardly a means of
preserving social values that consumers are not willing to pay for. It can be reconciled only
with a consumer-welfare policy. The second test is even more explicit. The touchstone of
illegality is raising prices to consumers. There were no exceptions. Sherman wanted the
courts not merely to be influenced by the consumer interest but to be controlled
completely by it." Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
81. 21 CONG. REc. 2558 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Pugh).
82. Bork, supra note 66. Judge Posner cited Judge Bork approvingly in summing up
Congress' intent: "The framers of the Sherman Act appear to have been concerned mainly
with the price and output consequences of monopolies and cartels .... " R. POSNER, supra
note 4, at 23 (citing Bork, supra note 66).
83. Bork, supra note 66, at 26-31.
84. "Sherman took great pains to stress that his bill would in no way interfere with
efficiency.... '[The bill] does not in the least affect combinations in aid of production
where there is free and fair competition.' He stressed the legality of efficiency repeatedly,
citing partnerships and corporations as two forms of combination which were efficiency-
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he asserts that Congress did not intend to forbid monopolies attained
solely through efficiency.8 5 Criticizing the assertion that values other
than efficiency should play a role in Sherman Act interpretation, 86 he
concludes that "Congress' position with respect to efficiency cannot
be explained on any hypothesis other than that consumer welfare was
in all cases the controlling value under the Sherman Act." 7 In light of
his definition of "consumer welfare," Judge Bork contends that
Congress' only goal was to promote economic efficiency.88 In
summary, Judge Bork concluded that the Sherman Act was intended
to improve economic efficiency and does not reflect any congressional
concern with the effects of monopoly power on the distribution of
wealth and other nonefficiency goals.
creating and therefore lawful. He said corporations 'ought to be encouraged and protected
as tending to cheapen the cost of production.' He also praised the efficiency-creating
corporate merger.
"Not once did Sherman suggest that courts should blunt or discourage efficient size or
conduct in the interest of any social or political value. The only limit he urged to the crea-
tion of efficiency by combination was justified explicitly in terms of consumer welfare. He
thought combinations of monopolistic size would not pass their efficiencies on to
consumers:
"'It is sometimes said of these combinations [the monopolistic trusts] that they reduce
prices to the consumer by better methods of production, but all experience shows that this
saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer. The price to the consumer depends
upon the supply, which can be reduced at pleasure by the combination.' Here again
Sherman identified injury to consumers as occurring through restriction of output by firms
with market control." Id at 26-28 (citations omitted). Judge Bork's conclusions will be
analyzed throughout this paper.
85. Id. at 28-31.
86. Id. at 39-42. For example, Judge Bork examines Judge Hand's assertions in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), that the Sherman Act
should have as a goal the protection of small businessmen. He analyzes the legislative
statements that Judge Hand relied upon, and concludes that while Congress certainly
showed sympathy for small businesses insofar as they were hurt by the trusts, their
concern never constituted an affirmative desire that the Act should seek their protection
as an end in itself. Their protection, Judge Bork asserts, was thought to be an incidental
benefit of the Act. Bork, supra note 66, at 39-42.
Judge Bork found only a single occasion upon which he believed that the Senators
considered the preservation of small businesses as an end in itself, and concluded that "it is
impossible to find even colorable language suggesting most of the other broad social or
political purposes that have occasionally been suggested as relevant to the application of
the Sherman Act." Id at 41-42 (citation omitted). He backs up this assertion with a
footnote in which he examines a few additional legislative statements which might support
other nonefficiency goals and calls them "isolated remarks and shreds of casual rhetoric."
d at 43 n. 105. Judge Bork deliberately declines to consider the effects of the forces of
populism that provided much of the impetus for the passage of the Sherman Act. Id at 44
n.106.
87. Bork, supra note 66, at 26.
88. Id; see also R. BORK, supra note 2, at 90-91.
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Allocative Efficiency
The efficiency-oriented view of the Sherman Act, as propounded
by Judge Bork and others, 9 has initial appeal. No basis exists, how-
ever, for their contention that Congress was concerned only with allo-
cative efficiency. Indeed, it is unlikely that in 1890 many economists,
much less legislators, understood the impact of monopoly power on
allocative efficiency.
Judge Bork's review of the Sherman Act's legislative history con-
clusively demonstrates that Congress was preoccupied with the higher
prices facing consumers as a result of monopolistic pricing.90
89. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. Areeda and Turner appear to come to
essentially the same conclusion as Judge Bork, although they phrase it in less absolute
terms. They identify "fairness" and "populist" goals as the principal nonefficiency goals
that the antitrust laws might reach. But they conclude that "[a]s a goal of antitrust policy,
'fairness' is a vagrant claim applied to any value that one happens to favor. In our context,
it may connote competition or its absence." 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, at
21. They further conclude that these goals should play a role in antitrust analysis only
insofar as they affect the efficiency of our economy: "In one set of meanings, competition
promotes fair results in the sense of prices close to cost and multiple choices for buyers
and sellers. Competitive results are thus thought to be fair. Similarly, practices promoting
competition are fair while those impairing it are not.... The promotion of fairness in
these senses also promotes efficiency and progressiveness. But competitive processes and
results are also called unfair by those who wish higher returns than competition gives
them.... Here we note only that this conception of fairness is, of course, antithetical to
both competition and economic efficiency." Id at 21-22. They also asserted that "the
weighing and resolution of conflicting interests and objectives would involve the courts in
essentially political decisions for which there are no workable legal standards, and would
often place them in a regulatory or supervisory role for which they are ill-equipped." Id. at
13.
Although they find some support for nonefficiency goals, Areeda and Turner
nevertheless "concur with what we perceive to be the main thrust of the case law because
... neither the statutes nor the legislative histories compel or even strongly suggest a
different course of antitrust interpretation. If anything, they support the priority of
competition and its efficiency goals." Id. at 12-13. In their view, promoting "non-efficiency
goals over efficiency would be excessively costly, futile, and unadministrable." Id at 24.
They believe that "[o]nce antitrust rules are properly framed in terms of competitive and
efficiency considerations, there is little room left for non-conflicting, additional
prohibitions; and avoiding conflict would require difficult if not elusive efficiency
determinations that in many instances would otherwise be unnecessary. Accordingly, the
contribution to populist goals from rules specially created to promote them would be far
too small to warrant the inevitable legal difficulties, uncertainties, and enforcement costs
they *6uld involve." Id. at 30. Moreover, they think goals other than efficiency are
inappropriate as antitrust standards even if they do not conflict with efficiency objectives.
Areeda and Turner conclude that the Sherman Act's legislative history is vague, uncertain,
seldom on point, abounding with casual language, and deserving of relatively little weight.
Id. at 14-15. Interestingly, they do not appear to directly confront the wealth transfer issue.
Although their merger analysis, for example, "assumes that the income transfer from
consumers to producers is neutral," they do not directly discuss a possible concern with
distributional questions. Id. at 149 n.2.
90. See supra notes 80-82 & accompanying text.
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Although he is correct to conclude that Congress was concerned with
"consumer welfare," 91 he incorrectly restricts the definition of this key
term to economic efficiency.
The modem economist, Judge Bork asserts, knows that the only
harmful result of monopoly pricing is its adverse effects on allocative
efficiency;92 therefore, in the interest of consumer welfare, the
antitrust laws should be concerned only with improving allocative
efficiency.93 According to Judge Bork, the redistribution of wealth
from consumers to producers is not an appropriate focus because it
involves a value judgment and "could only rest upon a tenuous moral
ground. '94
Although modem economists often eschew economic value judg-
ments, the 1890 Congress may have been more willing to make them.
The legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates that Senator
Sherman and other legislators condemned trusts for raising prices and
restricting output,95 but no evidence has ever been found to suggest
that any legislator understood that monopoly pricing causes allocative
inefficiency. 96 It is extremely unlikely that the legislators' distaste for
monopoly pricing could have been based upon its impact on
allocative efficiency: the concept of allocative efficiency was, at best,
on the verge of discovery by leading economic theorists when the
Sherman Act was passedY7
91. Bork, supra note 66, at 16. Judge Bork noted that "[t]he legislators did not, of
course, speak of consumer welfare with the precision of a modem economist but their
meaning was unmistakable." Id. at 10. Judge Bork also stated that "[t]he rules implied by
the [consumer welfare] policy of [Congress] are alterable as economic analysis
progresses .... " Id at 47.
92. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 90-91, 111; Bork, supra note 66, at 7, 9.
93. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 90-91,111; Bork, supra note 66, at 7, 9.
94. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 111. Judge Bork writes that "consumer welfare has no
sumptuary or ethical component, but permits consumers to define by their expression of
wants in the market place what things they regard as wealth." Id at 90.
95. See supra notes 80-81.
96. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 66.
97. Alfred Marshall, for example, devoted seventeen pages of the 1890 edition of
Principles of Economics to a chapter entitled "The Theory of Monopolies" in which only
one footnote discussed either allocative inefficiency or any incipient version of this
concept. A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 466 n.1 (1890). Modem
understanding of allocative efficiency is based, inter alia, on the assumption of Pareto
optimality, first proposed in 1909. V. PARETO, supra note 34. Some of the precursors of
this concept can arguably be found in Pareto's first major work, Cours D'Economie
Politique, which was published in 1896-1897. See supra notes 33-35 & accompanying text.
Not until 1938 did the first modem and rigororous discussion of allocative efficiency
appear. Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to the Problems of Taxation and of
Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938). Even this path-breaking and
influential discussion, concerned with allocative inefficiency resulting from improper
taxation and incorrect railroad and public utility rate-setting, did not discuss the antitrust
implications of allocative inefficiency.
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More importantly, leading economists of the day had very little
influence on the passage of the Act.98 It is unlikely, then, that the
legislators who passed the early antitrust laws were aware that
monopoly pricing led to allocative inefficiency. 99 Nothing in the
legislative history of the Sherman Act suggests that they were. No
commentator has pointed to any economic testimony that referred to
a concept resembling "allocative efficiency," nor is there the slightest
evidence that any member of Congress was even remotely familiar
with this type of welfare loss.100
Given the state of economic theory at that time, the assertion
that legislators supporting the Sherman Act were influenced by
considerations involving allocative efficiency is without credibility.
Congressional distaste for the pricing and output consequences of
monopoly pricing must therefore be rooted in other concerns. These
concerns include the distribution of wealth between consumers and
producers and, secondarily, the maintenance of productive efficiency,
preservation of economic opportunities for small enterprises, and the
concentration of economic, social, and political power in a few hands.
Scherer noted that other nineteenth century economists discussed what we today
term allocative efficiency insofar as it related to taxation and the government regulation of
public utilities: "The notion of a 'deadweight welfare-loss triangle' entered the mainstream
of Anglo-American economics in the first edition of Marshall's Principles [citation
omitted]. An obscure English-language precursor was Jenkin, On the Principles Which
Regulate the Incidence of Taxes, reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
TAxATION 227,233 (R. Musgrave & C. Shoup eds. 1959) (originally published in 1871). A
variant of the concept can be traced to Dupuit, On the Measurement of the Utility of Public
Works, translated in 2 INT'L ECON. PAPERS 83, 108 (A. Peacock, et al. eds. 1952)
(originally published in French in 1844)." Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating
Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE LJ. 974, 977 n.20 (1977).
98. It is worth remembering that the antitrust laws were passed by politicians, not
economists. Professor Hofstadter observed that "It]he Sherman Act was framed and
debated in the pre-expert era, when economists as a professional group were not directly
consulted by legislators. But even if they had been, they would have given mixed and
uncertain advice." R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE, supra note 5, at 200.
Professor Stigler's conclusion is even more striking: "A careful student of the history of
economics would have searched long and hard, on July 2 of 1890, the day the Sherman Act
was signed by President Harrison, for any economist who had ever recommended the
policy of activity combatting collusion or monopolization in the economy at large."
Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. RV. 1, 3 (1982).
99. Indeed, the following analyses of the antitrust laws' legislative histories
demonstrates that not even the most recent major antitrust law, the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act of 1950, was passed to enhance allocative efficiency. See infra notes
255-65 & accompanying text.
100. See generally R. BORK, supra note 2; Bork, supra note 66. One could, however,
speculate about Congress' likely reaction had it known that trusts and monopolies caused
allocative inefficiency. It seems reasonable to conclude that they probably would have
used this as another reason to condemn them.
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Productive Efficiency
Although the legislative history of the Sherman Act never
alludes to any concept resembling allocative efficiency, it does
repeatedly praise corporate productive efficiency and recognize that
free competition leads to efficient competitors. The productive
efficiency of free competition was especially encouraged when gains
were passed on to consumers. Nevertheless, there is little basis for
suggesting that the Sherman Act was passed primarily to improve or
even to preserve productive efficiency; indeed, the trusts were viewed
as extremely efficient. Rather, Congress wanted to pass a law for
other purposes which hampered productive efficiency as little as
possible.
Many scholars have suggested that the trusts existing in 1890
were efficient at production.1 1 Even their harshest critics admit
this. 02 Senator Sherman appreciated the efficiencies of large
101. See, e.g., McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. &
ECON. 137 (1958); see also R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE, supra note 5; Koller,
The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105
(1971).
It is unclear how much of monopoly efficiency can be ascribed to the fact that
monopolies took the form of trusts, and how much merely came about because these
trusts were often combinations of large, efficient corporations. It is unclear, in other
words, how much of their productivity would have been lost if they were broken up. An
important question to ask is whether Congress believed that it would jeopardize significant
productive efficiencies when it broke up the trusts. Perhaps Congress wanted to achieve its
other goals out of a belief that it could substantially assist consumers and at the same time
only impair productive efficiency a modest amount.
102. Principally for this reason, some economists in the late 1800's believed that
monopolies were, in balance, beneficial for society. See Letwin, Congress and the Sherman
Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 221, 238-39 (1956); see also R.
HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE, supra note 5; Stigler, supra note 98. At the same
time, however, a minority of legislators held the belief that a lack of competition lowered
productive efficiency. For example, Representative Fithian stated his belief that "skill is
created and is stimulated by competition. A recent writer on political economy says:
'Wherever monopoly is dominant, the incentive for improvement and skill is deadened. It
is only when competitors contend with each other for the favor of the consumer that they
are stimulated to attract that consumer by presenting him with wares both skillfully and
cheaply made."' 21 CONG. REC. 4102 (1890). Representative Vest stated: "We know very
well that competition always reduces prices.... I say if you let these two manufacturing
interests compete together and create competition, you then secure lower prices to the
consumer. That is the law of trade and that is the law of manufactures [sic] the world
over." Id. at 2466.
Congress's dilemma became manifest in Mr. Dooley's comment on Teddy
Roosevelt's early attitude towards the trusts: "The 'trusts,' says [Roosevelt], 'are heejoous
monsthers built up be th' enlightened interprise iv th' men that have done so much to
advance progress in our beloved country,' he says. 'On wan hand I wud stamp thim undher
fut; on th' other hand not so fast."' H. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOsEVELT 172 (rev. ed.
1956).
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corporations generally:
Experience has shown that they are the most useful agencies of
modem civilization. They have enabled individuals to unite to
undertake enterprises only attempted in former times by powerful
governments. The good results of corporate power are shown in the
vast development of our railroads and the enormous increase of
business and production of all kinds.103
But congressional endorsement of trusts' efficient operations stopped
when consumer prices rose, and the legislature withheld approval
from combinations that, while yielding more efficient methods of
competition, also produced higher consumer prices. The trusts were
condemned despite their efficiency in large part because they kept the
fruits of such efficiency. As Senator Sherman pointed out in qualifica-
tion of his praise for efficiency, "It is sometimes said of these
combinations that they reduce prices to the consumer by better
methods of production, but all experience shows that this saving of
cost goes to the pockets of the producer."'1 4  Congressional
condemnation of monopolistic extractions of wealth was so strong
that it is even unlikely that Congress meant to provide an exception
for a monopoly based solely upon superior efficiency.10 5
103. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890). "When corporations unite merely to extend their
business, as connecting lines of a railway without interfering with competing lines, they are
proper and lawful." IL; see also remarks of Senator Sherman cited by Bork, supra note 84.
104. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (emphasis added). Senator Sherman and others ex-
pressed similar views elsewhere. The Senator, for example, commented that "[the courts]
will distinguish between lawful combinations in aid of production and unlawful combina-
tions to prevent competition and in restraint of trade .. " Id- at 2456. He also said, "If
they [the Standard Oil trust] conducted their business lawfully, without any attempt by
these combinations to raise the price of an article consumed by the people of the United
States, I would say let them pursue that business." Id. at 2469.
Representative Mason also condemned the trusts despite their efficiencies: "Some say
that the trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced prices; but if the price of oil, for
instance, were reduced to 1 cent a barrel it would not right the wrong done to the people
of this country by the "trusts" which have destroyed legitimate competition and driven
honest men from legitimate business enterprises." Id at 4100. A slightly different
sentiment was expressed by Senator Edmunds: "Although for the time being the sugar
trust has perhaps reduced the price of sugar, and the oil trust certainly has reduced the
price of oil immensely, that does not alter the wrong of the principle of any trust...
because in the long run, however seductive they may appear in lowering prices to the
consumer for the time being, all human experience and all human philosophy have proved
that they are destructive of public welfare and come to be tyrannies, grinding tyrannies,
that have sometimes in other countries produced riots, just riots in the moral sense, and so
on." ld. at 2726. Moreover, none of the citations to the legislative history presented by
Judge Bork confronted this tradeoff. None suggested allowing higher prices to consumers
in order to improve, or even to preserve, corporate efficiency. See supra note 84.
105. The controversy over whether Congress wanted to prohibit a monopoly achieved
entirely by skill and efficiency comes largely from an exchange at the very end of the Sher-
man Act debates. Senator Kenna asked: "Is it intended by the committee, as the section
seems to indicate, that if an individual ... by his own skill and energy, by the propriety of
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his conduct generally, shall pursue his calling in such a way as to monopolize a trade, his
action shall be a crime under this proposed act?...
"Suppose a citizen of Kentucky is dealing in shorthorn cattle and by virtue of his
superior skill in that particular product it turns out that he is the only one in the United
States to whom an order comes from Mexico for cattle of that stock for a considerable
period, so that he is conceded to have a monopoly of that trade with Mexico, is it intended
by the committee that the bill shall make that man a culprit?" 21 CONG. REC. 3151 (1890).
Senator Edmunds gave a direct response to Senator Kenna's hypothetical: "[In the
case stated the gentleman has not any monopoly at all. He has not got the possession of all
the homed cattle in the United States.... He has not done anything but compete with his
adversaries in trade, if he had any, to furnish the commodity for the lowest price. So I
assure my friend he need not be disturbed upon that subject." Id. at 3151-52. Senator
Edmunds' response indicates that he believed that no monopolization was involved in the
hypothetical, so he did not really consider the need for an exception for a firm that
achieved its monopoly solely by skill.
Senator Hoar then gave his well-known answer: "[I]n the case put [by Senator Kenna,
if] ... a man who merely by superior skill and intelligence, a breeder of horses or raiser of
cattle, or manufacturer or artisan of any kind, got the whole business because nobody
could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist, [unless] it involved something like the
use... [of unfair] competition, like the engrossing, the buying up of all other persons
engaged in the same business." Id. at 3152. Senator Edmunds then provided the final
answer to Senator Kenna's question: "I have only to say.., that this subject was not
lightly considered in the committee, and that we studied it with whatever little ability we
had, and the best answer I can make to both my friends is to read from Webster's
Dictionary the definition of the verb 'to monopolize': 1. To purchase or obtain possession
of the whole of, as a commodity or goods in market, with the view to appropriate or
control the exclusive sale of; as, to monopolize sugar or tea.
"Like the sugar trust. One man, if he had capital enough, could do it just as well as
two. 2. To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right of, especially the right of
trading to any place, or with any country or district; as, to monopolize the India or Levant
trade.
"... [We were not blind to the very suggestions which have been made, and we
thought we had done the right thing in providing, in the very phrase we did, that if one
person instead of two, by a combination, if one person alone, as we have heard about the
wheat market in Chicago, for instance, did it, it was just as offensive and injurious to the
public interest as if two had combined to do it." Id. The Sherman Act, forbidding any
person to "monopolize or attempt to monopolize," was then passed by the Senate. Id. at
3153.
This crucial segment of the debate deserves careful consideration. It would seem that
Senators Hoar and Edmunds provided opposite answers to Senator Kenna's question.
Senator Hoar clearly did not consider a firm to be guilty of "monopolization" if it "got the
whole business" by skill and efficiency alone. Senator Edmunds, however, defined "to
monopolize" as merely "[t]o engross or obtain by any means.... Edmunds intended that
"if one person.., did it, it was just as offensive and injurious to the public interest as if
two had combined to do it." Edmunds clearly condemned every monopoly, although by
his first response he did not consider the hypothetical situation given to describe a
monopoly. Thus, it would appear that these statements should be construed as offsetting
one another although, if a judgment had to be made, since Senator Edmunds spoke last
and was one of the main sponsors of the bill, his statements could perhaps be said to carry
greater weight. The fact that this discussion took place at the very end of the Sherman Act
debate could very well mean that it embodied Congress' final view on the subject.
However, these statements were also less able to be corrected or opposed by Senator
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Although Congress was aware that trusts and monopolies raised
prices and restricted output, the legislators were unaware that this
caused allocative inefficiency. 6 They thought that monopolies were
relatively efficient producers and that breaking them up could
decrease productive efficiency. °7 Yet, Congress enacted the Sherman
Act largely to prohibit and condemn them. 08 Clearly, the chief
economic concern was not productive efficiency;10 9 if Congress' main
goal was to encourage that form of industrial organization that was, in
1890, most efficient, it would have praised the trusts, not condemned
them. Rather, the Sherman Act was intended to insure that
consumers obtained their "fair share" of the benefits of free
Sherman or other legislators.
An alternative reading of this dialogue, which accepts Senator Hoar's comments and
distinguishes or downplays Senator Edmunds' reply is, of course, possible. Under this
interpretation, an exception would exist for monopolies achieved by efficiency alone. One
possibly could conclude that Congress' desire to avoid discouraging innovation and
industriousness outweighed its general distaste for monopoly pricing. Of course, Congress
would not extend this exception to firms that combined in order to generate productive
efficiencies, perhaps because its experiences with trusts led it to conclude that their true
motive was probably to eliminate competition, rather than increase efficiency.
In addition, single-firm monopolization based on superior efficiency often involves
lower prices to consumers during the period when the firm is attempting to increase its
market share. By contrast, monopolization by merger or conspiracy, not based upon
internally generated efficiencies, generally involves no short-term benefits to consumers.
Thus, the long-term monopoly overcharges might have weighed more heavily in the
multiple firm case and might have prompted Congress to condemn it even when it was
based upon superior efficiency.
Nevertheless, if the main thrust of the statute is kept in mind, including Congress'
basic condemnation of monopoly pricing despite a potential sacrifice of efficiency, the
Sherman Act does not appear to provide an exception for the efficient monopolist.
106. See supra notes 80-84, 95-100 & accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 101-03 & accompanying text. It is unclear just how much of a loss
in productivity Congress would have been willing to tolerate in order to break up the
trusts. An extreme case of the recognition that it might sometimes be necessary to sacrifice
productive efficiencies in order to achieve other goals is exemplified by the court's
divestiture order in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See Averitt, Section 5. Structural
Remedies in Competition Cases under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 40 OHIO ST. LJ.
781 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Averitt, Structural Remedies].
In a merger context the Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion: "Possible
economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some
mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in
favor of protecting competition." Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble, 385 U.S.
568,580 (1967).
108. A possible exception to this general desire to prohibit monopolies may have been
that provided for an "efficient monopolist." But see supra note 105.
109. It should be noted that while Congress was also concerned about small businesses,
this concern was based upon a preference for small businesses as an end in itself, rather
than upon the belief that protecting small businesses was a good way to increase the total
efficiency or wealth of the economy. See infra notes 143-53 & accompanying text.
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Protecting Consumers from Unfair Transfers of Wealth
In the legislative debates over the Sherman Act, Congress clearly
condemned the use of market power to raise prices and restrict out-
put."0 This condemnation, however, did not arise from concern with
allocative efficiency. The debates strongly suggest that Congress con-
demned trusts and monopolies because they had enough market
power to raise prices and "unfairly" extract wealth from consumers,
turning it into monopoly profits."'
In the legislative debates, Congress discussed at length price in
creases by trusts and the resulting higher consumer prices." 2 For
example, Senator Sherman, defending the bill's constitutionality,
asked that Congress protect the public from trusts that "restrain
commerce, turn it from its natural course, increase the price of
articles, and therefore diminish the amount of commerce.""13 From
this and other similar evidence Judge Bork correctly concluded, "The
touchstone of illegality is raising prices to consumers. There were no
exceptions. ' '114
110. See supra notes 80-84, 95-100 & accompanying text.
111. See 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890). On July 10, 1888, Sherman offered a resolution,
which was adopted without debate, condemning certain trusts and other business arrange-
ments which "tend to foster monopoly or to artificially advance the cost to the consumer
of necessary articles of human life. . . ." 19 CONG. REC. 6041 (1888). Sherman stated:
"This bill does not seek to cripple combinations of capital and labor, the formation of
partnerships or of corporations, but only to prevent and control combinations made with a
view to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to increase the profits of the
producer at the cost of the consumer." 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890); see also iL at 2461
(1890). Sherman added: "The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it
to disregard the interest of the consumer." Id. He termed consumers subject to
monopolistic pricing "unfortunate victims." Id.
Representative Heard stated: "We know that by such means the trusts which control
the markets on sugar, nails, oils, lead, and almost every other article of use in the
commerce of this country have advanced the cost of such articles to every consumer, and
that without rendering the slightest equivalent therefor these illegal conspiracies against
honest trade have stolen untold millions from the people." Id at 4101.
112. See supra note 84.
113. 21 CONG. REC. 2462 (1890). Sherman also stated: "The sole object of such a
combination is to make competition impossible. It can control the market, raise or lower
prices, as will best promote to selfish interests .... Its governing motive is to increase the
profits of the parties composing it. The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition,
compels it to disregard the interest of the consumer. It dictates terms to transportation
companies, it commands the price of labor without fear of strikes, for in its field it allows
no competitors. Such a combination is far more dangerous than any heretofore invented,
and, when it embraces the great body of all the corporations engaged in a particular
industry in all of the States of the Union, it tends to advance the price to the consumer of
any article produced." Id at 2457.
114. Bork, supra note 66, at 16.
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The debates strongly suggest that higher prices to consumers
were condemned because they unfairly extracted wealth from
consumers and turned it into monopoly profit. For example, during
the debates Senator Sherman termed monopolistic overcharges
"extortion which makes the people poor," and "extorted wealth."" 5
Congressman Coke referred to the overcharges as "robbery.""16
Representative Heard declared that the trusts, "without rendering the
slightest equivalent," have "stolen untold millions from the
people. 11 7 Congressman Wilson complained that the beef trust "robs
the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other.""18
Representative Fithian declared that the trusts were "impoverishing"
the people through "robbery."" 9 Senator Hoar declared that
monopolistic pricing was "a transaction the direct purpose of which is
to extort from the community... wealth which ought to be generally
diffused over the whole community.' ' 20 Senator George complained
that "They aggregate to themselves great enormous wealth by
extortion which makes the people poor. 1 21
115. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890). On July 10, 1888, Sherman had offered a resolution,
we adopted without debate, which condemned certain trusts and other business
arrangements which "tend to foster monopoly or to artificially advance the cost to the
consumer of necessary articles of human life...." 19 CONG. REC. 7 (1888). Sherman also
stated that "[t]his bill does not seek to cripple combinations of capital and labor, the
formation of partnerships is or of corporations, but only to prevent competition, or for the
restraint of trade, or to increase the profits of the producer at the cost of the consumer."
Md. at 2457. Sherman added: "The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels
it to disregard the interest of the consumer." Id. Sherman termed consumers subject to
monopolistic pricing "unfortunate victims." Id. at 2461.
116. Id. at 2614.
117. Id at 4101 (emphasis added). The full quotation reads: "We know that by such
means the trusts which control the markets on sugar, nails, lead, and almost every other
article of use in the commerce of this country have advanced the cost of such articles to
every consumer, and that without rendering the slightest equivalent therefore these illegal
conspiracies against honest trade have stolen untold millions from the people."
118. Id. at 4098.
119. Id. at 4103. (Fithian was reading, with apparent approval, a letter from a
constituent.)
120. 21 CONG. REC. 2728 (1890).
121. 21 CONG. REC. 1768. Senator George continued: "Then making this extorted
wealth the means of further extortion from their unfortunate victims, the people of the
United States, they pursue unmolested, unrestrained by law .... [They] have extorted
their ill-gotten gains from the poor and then used the money thus obtained to complete
the ruin of the people." d. Senator George also complained that consumers were being
robbed. Id. at 3150. He complained that the trusts were able to "fleece and rob the
people." Id.
The Supreme Court has also used similar language. In Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 153 (1967), the Court implied that it was an antitrust goal to "protect the public
from price gouging by firms with monopoly power... ." See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 339-43 (1979), discussed supra note 2. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 262
(1976), Justice White, in dicta in a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
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Congress condemned monopolistic overcharges in strong moral
terms, rather than because of their efficiency effects.122 Purchasers,
whether resellers'23 or ultimate consumers, were entitled to purchase
competitively priced products. Members of Congress also condemned
the unequal distribution of wealth resulting from monopolistic
overcharges. 2 4 The legislators decided that competitive prices were
"fair" whereas monopoly prices were not; therefore, consumers were
entitled to own that quantity of wealth known today as "consumer
surplus." The unfair prices, in effect, robbed consumers of that
wealth. As a result, Congress was willing to risk some immediate
efficiency losses in order to benefit consumers ultimately. Congress
was willing to pass the Sherman Act in large part in an attempt to
prevent such "unfair" transfers of wealth from consumers to
monopolies.
part, stated that "the antitrust laws are aimed at preventing monopoly profits and price
fixing, which gouge the consumer."
122. Perhaps Congress was expressing more concern about preventing redistributions
of wealth because they were relatively observable and certain. Efficiency gains, on the
other hand, were probably more speculative in nature, and there was no guarantee that
monopolists would pass them on to consumers.
123. Senator George, for example, recognized: "An advance in price to the middlemen
is not mentioned in the bill, for the obvious reason that no such advance would damnify
them; it would rather be a benefit, as it would increase the value of the goods he has on
hand. He buys to sell again. He buys only for profit on a subsequent sale. So whatever he
pays he receives when he sells, together with a profit on his investment; and so of all of
them, including the last, who sells directly to the consumer. The consumer, therefore,
paying all the increased price advanced by the middlemen and profits on the same, is the
party necessarily damnified or injured." 21 CONG. REC. at 1767. He complained however,
"The intent to advance the price to the wholesale or retail dealer alone will not do; it must
be to advance it to the consumer. This leaves unpunished and perfectly lawful all these
combinations which have proven so disastrous, that have for their object a decrease in the
price to be given to the producer, and also those speculative movements now so common
by which there shall be a temporary advance in the market, to last till a day not far off,
when there shall be a settlement." Id These quotations also suggest that the existence of
middlemen should not nullify consumers' right to purchase competitively priced goods.
124. 21 CONG. REc. 2728 (1890). Senator Sherman stated: "The popular mind is agi-
tated with problems that may disturb social order, and among them none is more threaten-
ing than the inequality of condition of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a
single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to control pro-
duction and trade and to break down competition." Id. at 2460.
Senator George expressed a similar concern: "Is production, is trade, to be taken away
from the great mass of the people concentrated in the hands of a few men who, I am
obliged to add, by the policies pursued by our Government, have been enabled to
aggregate to themselves large, enormous fortunes?" Id at 2598.
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Other Goals
Curbing the Social and Political Power of Trusts and Monopolies
Evidence also suggests that more than economic considerations
motivated Congress to curb the power of trusts and monopolies.
Although the concerns discussed thus far relate to the economic
power of monopolies and trusts, Congress was also motivated by a
desire to curb the social and political power of large businesses. This
additional purpose is demonstrated by analyzing the history of the
Sherman Act in light of the economic, social, and political context in
which the law was passed.
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress condemned
monopolies in part because they increased the cost of goods to
consumers. Logic would seem to indicate that pressure from
consumers burdened by higher prices contributed to the passage of
the Sherman Act. This cannot be the complete explanation, however,
because just prior to the passage of the Act, price levels in the United
States were stable or slowly decreasing.125 In 1890, American
consumers paid less for goods than at almost any time since the end of
the Civil War.126
Despite the then-recent rise of trusts, this phenomenon of falling
prices is easily explained. The first trusts of any significance probably
did not achieve their full power until a few years before passage of the
Act.127 Although some trusts did raise prices in the years immediately
before 1890, overall consumer prices decreased dramatically from the
end of the Civil War until approximately 1884, when they leveled
125. Prices were falling, whether measured by the consumer price index, the cost of
living index, or the wholesale price index. For example, in the generation between the end
of the Civil War and the enactment of the Sherman Act, the consumer price index went
down by 41%. Not only were prices failing on the average, they were falling for products
in many of the industries that were cartelized, such as fuel and lighting (by 66%), metal
and metal products (by 60%), textiles, chemicals and dyes, sugar, leather, food, spirits,
building materials, etc. 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 201-11
(Bicentennial ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF THE CENSUS].
126. Id.
127. W. LETWIN, supra note 24, at 69-70, picks 1887 as the year of the formation of the
first significant trusts. Other scholars pinpoint the start of the first. great trusts and merger
waves at different years. See, e.g., D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 4
(1959) (concluding that the movement started in 1879, with the formation of the Standard
Oil trust); OPPENHEIM & WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, CASES AND
COMMENTS 317-23 (1967) (concluding that the first "merger movement" began after
1890). Regardless of the precise date that the first significant trusts were formed, it is
generally agreed that they were stronger after 1890 than before it, and that the peak of the
merger movement occurred after 1890.
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off. 28 In addition, the last half of the nineteenth century witnessed a
great industrial revolution; 129 large-scale production, new technology,
and increased production speed resulted in tremendous efficiencies.
130
The industries that spawned some of the most notorious trusts also
benefitted most from the new efficiencies. As a consequence, prices
often fell despite the existence of the trusts.13'
Falling prices during this period in fact contributed to the forma-
tion of the trusts. Viewing falling prices and increased production
with alarm, producers sought to arrest this trend by combining or
entering agreements to stabilize or raise prices, restrict output, and
suppress competition.32 This trend was only beginning, however, by
1890. Most large and significant trusts were formed or achieved full
power after and in spite of the passage of the Sherman Act.
33
While prices might have fallen more rapidly had the trusts not at-
tempted to halt their decline,' 34 it seems unlikely that consumers
128. The consumer price index and the cost of living index reveal that prices had not, on
the average, started to increase by the time the Sherman Act was passed.
Consumer
Price Index Wholesale Price Indices
(1967= 100) Cost of Living Indices (1913=100) (1910-1914= 100)
Federal
Reserve Metals &
Board Burgess All Fuel & Metal
Estimate Estimate Commodities Lihting Products
1890 27 78 67.8 82 72 123
1889 27 78 67.8 81 71 116
1888 27 78 67.5 86 72 121
1887 27 76 65.4 85 70 119
1886 27 76 65.3 82 70 110
1885 27 75 64.6 85 72 109
1880 29 80 71.3 100 92 166
1875 33 86 81.2 118 128 175
1870 38 91 92.5 135 134 200
1865 46 102 108.1 185 214 306
1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 125, at 201-11.
129. The expansion of the railroads transformed the United States into one economic
entity. Industrial growth and innovation were rapid and immense, creating tremendous ad-
vances in transportation, communication and distribution. See A. CHANDLER, JR., THE
INVISIBLE HAND: THE MANEGERIAL REVOLUTION IN THE AMERICAN BUSINESS 250-59
(1977).
130. A. CHANDLER, JR., supra note 129, at 250-59.
131. See supra note 128. See also infra text accompanying note 133.
132. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM, ch. 6 (1969) [hereinafter cited as R.
HOFSTADTER, REFORM]; W. LETWIN, supra note 24, at 139.
133. See R HOFSTADTER, REFORM, supra note 132, ch. 6; W. LETWIN, supra note 24,
at 139.
134. It is uncertain whether in 1890, monopolies and trusts were responsible for more
price rises than price declines. They did bring capital, large-scale production, organization,
and modem technology to industry. Price reductions resulting from these efficiencies
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would strongly condemn the trusts only because prices were not
dropping as rapidly as they should have been.135 It is possible that
even though overall prices were stable or decreasing, Congress or the
public could have focused their attention on those prices that were
rising and concluded that trusts were, on the whole, causing higher
prices. It is more likely that other factors were at work. Consumers
probably were angered less by the reduction in their wealth than by
the way in which the wealth was extracted.
The legislative history reveals that a major factor leading to the
passage of the Sherman Act was a congressional desire to curb the
power of trusts. While Congress was concerned about the uses of this
power to raise prices and restrict output, it also desired, as an end in
itself, the prevention of accumulation of power by large corporations
and the men who controlled them. Alarm over corporate
aggrandizement of economic, social, and political power pervaded the
debate.136 The legislators feared not only the economic consequences
of monopoly power, but potential social disruptions as well. 137
could have outweighed the price increases resulting from their monopoly power.
135. Trust decisions to raise prices often achieved great notoriety. Their efficiency gains
were, of course, relatively invisible. In retrospect, it seems that a trust could have made a
good case that its existence was in the public interest by merely pointing to the consumer
price index.
136. As Senator Sherman warned, "[If] we will not endure a king as a political power
we should not endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the
necessaries of life. If we would not submit to an emperor we should not submit to an
autocrat of trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any
commodity." 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890). This theme runs throughout Senator Sherman's
opening remarks. "If the concentered powers of this combination are entrusted to a single
man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government, and should be
subject to the strong resistance of the State and national authorities." Id He framed the
issue in the following manner: "The point for us to consider is whether, on the whole, it is
safe in this country to leave the production of property, the transportation of our whole
country, to depend upon the will of a few men sitting at their council board in the city of
New York." Id. at 2570. Sherman further stated: "The popular mind is agitated with
problems that may disturb social order, and among them none is more threatening than
the inequality of condition of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single
generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production
and trade and to break down competition. These combinations already defy or control
powerful transportation corporations and reach state authorities. They reach out their
Briarean arms to every part of our country. They are imported from abroad, Congress
alone can deal with them, and if we are unwilling or unable there will soon be a trust for
every production and a master to fix the price for every necessity of life." Id- at 2460.
Senator George expressed a similar fear, asking, "Is production, is trade, to be taken away
from the great mass of the people and concentrated in the hands of a few men... ?" 21
CONG. REC. 2598 (1890).
137. Senator Hoar warned that "[tjhe complaint which has come from all parts and all
classes of the country of these great monopolies, which are becoming not only in some
cases an actual injury to the comfort of ordinary life, but are a menace to republican
institutions themselves, has induced Congress to take the matter up." Id. at 3146 (1890).
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Moreover, this apprehension has been recognized repeatedly by
courts interpreting the legislative history of the Act.138
A review of the social history of the period illuminates the
reasons underlying Congress' alarm. The post-Civil War period saw a
rural agricultural nation transformed into an increasingly urban and
industrial society. Work patterns changed. By the end of the Civil
War individual yeoman farmers had all but vanished. In their places
stood entrepreneurs and commercial farmers who shipped their goods
to markets and then used the resulting cash to purchase goods from
small businesses. 139 Thus, traditional independence gradually changed
into interdependence.
With the rise of trusts, interdependence became impotence.
See also supra text accompanying note 104.
Senator Sherman wanted to protect the "industrial liberty of the citizens," id. at 2457,
and believed that trusts caused inequality of wealth and opportunity that "may disturb so-
cial order." Id. at 2460. In his strongest statement expressing fear of corporate power, he
cautioned that "[t]hey had monopolies and mortmains of old, but never before such giants
as in our day. You must heed their appeal or be ready for the socialist, the communist, and
the nihilist. Society is now disturbed by forces never felt before." Id at 2457.
138. Perhaps the most famous expression of this recognition was Judge Hand's citation
to the above-quoted remarks of Senator Sherman, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945): "We have been speaking only of the economic rea-
sons which forbid monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are others, based upon
the belief that great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of
their economic results. In the debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself... showed
that among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them." Id at
428. In one of the first major Sherman Act cases, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911), Chief Justice White offered a similar explanation: "The debates ...
conclusively show.., that the main cause which led to the legislation was the thought that
it was required by the economic condition of the times, that is, the vast accumulation of
wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals, the enormous development of
corporate organization, the facility for combination which such organizations afforded, the
fact that the facility was being used, and that combinations known as trusts were being
multiplied, and the wide-spread impression that their power had been and would be
exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally." Il at 50; see also United
States v. South-Eastem Underwriters Ass'n, 332 U.S. 533, 553-54 (1944). Another early
Supreme Court interpretation of the Sherman Act's legislative history, United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), came to the same conclusion:
"[Trading combination] may even temporarily, or perhaps permanently, reduce the price
of the article traded in or manufactured....
"[I]t is not material that the price of an article may be lowered. It is in the power of
the combination to raise it.... Nor is it for the substantial interests of the country that any
one commodity should be within the sole power and subject to the sole will of one
powerful combination of capital." !eL at 323-24; see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933); United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 901 (D.
Md. 1916).
139. For a concise discussion of the myth of agrarian independence and the emergence
of industrial society, see R. HOFSTADTER, REFORM, supra note 132, chs. 1-2.
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Decisionmaking was transferred from traditional power centers to the
great industrialists. Self-reliant farmers, business owners, and local
leaders became dependent on the discretionary power of a few very
rich men. Local control of society ended as numerous small power
centers were swept away by the new class, one perceived as greedy
and evil.140 This transfer of power generated hostility towards the
trusts and resulted in political pressure on Congress to pass antitrust
legislation.141
The political and social evils of accumulated power, recited in the
legislative debates and reiterated by the cases and historians,
probably engendered more public resentment toward the trusts than
did an isolated rise in prices during an era of stable and declining
prices. 42 The congressional complaint, therefore, was directed not
140. Id ch. 6. Professor Letwin provides a concise description of the public attitude just
before the passage of the Sherman Act: "The great fervor against trusts... was for the
people living at the time nothing so sudden or strange. It was simply a familiar feeling
raised to a high pitch, intense because the speed with which new trusts were being hatched
made it seem that they would overrun everything unless some remedy were found soon.
The general disposition of the public was not in doubt. There were numerous objections to
the trusts.... Trusts, it was said, threatened liberty, because they corrupted civil servants
and bribed legislators; they enjoyed privileges such as protection by tariffs; they drove out
competitors by lowering prices, victimized consumers by raising prices, defrauded
investors by watering down stocks, put laborers out of work by closing down plants, and
somehow or other abused everyone. The kind of remedy that the public desired was also
clear enough; it wanted a law to destroy the power of the trusts." W. LETWIN, supra note
24, at 70.
141. Certain exceptions to the Sherman Act were almost certainly not enacted in order
to increase economic efficiency, but were probably provided in order to transfer power,
and perhaps wealth, toward unions and states and in order to curb the social and political
power of the trusts. See generally Noll, Antitrust Exemptions: An Economic Overview in
NCRALP REPORT, supra note 70, at 168-70. The exceptions have the overriding purpose
of promoting such political goals as federalism and the regulatory power of the states. See,
e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). One "exception" to the reach of the Sherman
Act concerns the right to petition the state legislatures by a combination attempting to
influence legislation and thereby produce a monopoly or other restraint of trade. See, e.g.,
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The antitrust laws also exempt labor unions from their
coverage. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 723-31
(1977).
142. See supra notes 125-26, 128 & accompanying text. A recent analogy might be
found in the reaction of the American public to the recent rise in the price of petroleum. If
the public had perceived that prices were rising because oil was getting scarce and
expensive to produce, the public certainly would have become unhappy insofar as this
meant that consumers would have to pay more for their gasoline and would, as a
consequence, be poorer. But it is difficult to feel anger if one believes that price increases
are caused "legitimately" by the impersonal factors of supply and demand. By contrast,
the fact that the petroleum price increases were dictated by a small group of men acting at
their own discretion angered people. The American public felt helpless before OPEC.
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solely at the effects of monopoly power-higher prices and poorer
consumers-but also at the process tat produced them. The Sherman
Act was intended not only to achieve competitive prices but also to
restructure the economy in ways insuring a "fair" process for
economic, social, and political decisionmaking by reducing the
unfairly accumulated power of the trusts.
Protecting Small Businesses
Congress also expressed concern for preserving business
opportunities for small firms. 143 The opportunity to compete has been
viewed as particularly important for small entrepreneurs, perhaps
because of their vulnerability to predatory activities. 144 Carrying this
There was great uncertainty over what OPEC might do next, and resentment that a small
group of men had the power to make decisions that drastically affected everyone's life.
The "unfairness" of the way that the price increases came about, in addition to their
amounts, helped cause the public anger towards OPEC.
143. In the opening debates on the Act, Senator Sherman stated: "It is the right of
every man to work, labor, and produce in any lawful vocation and to transport his
production on equal terms and conditions and under like circumstances. This is industrial
liberty and lies at the foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges....
"But, they say, competition is open to all; if you do not like our prices, establish
another combination or trust .... [But] when the combination already includes all or
nearly all the producers, what room is there for another?" 21 CONG. REC. 2457, 2460
(1890). This sympathy for the welfare of small businesses was also expressed in the
Sherman Act debates by Senator George: "It is a sad thought to the philanthropist that the
present system of production and of exchange is having that tendency which is sure at
some not very distant day to crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all small
enterprises.... So now the American Congress and the American people are brought face
to face with this sad, this great problem: Is production, is trade, to be taken away from the
great mass of the people and concentrated in the hands of a few men... ?" Id. at 2598.
Senator George also stated that "[b]y the use of this organized force of wealth and money
the small men engaged in competition with them are crushed out; and that is the great evil
at which all this legislation ought to be aimed." Id. at 3147. See also the remarks of
Senator Pugh concerning the freedom of competitive fairness as a policy to be furthered.
Id at 2558.
144. Hofstadter characterized this type of concern as one that was both "psychological
and moral. It sprang from the conviction that competition has a disciplinary value for char-
acter, quite aside from its strictly economic uses. America was thought to have been made
possible by the particular type of character that was forged by competitive individualism, a
type that had flourished in the United States because competitive opportunities had been
so widespread that alert men could hardly fail to see them, to grasp and use them, and
hence, to be shaped by them. The American male character was believed to have been
quickened and given discipline by the sight and pursuit of opportunity. For this process to
take place it was important that business be carried on fairly ... and that newcomers be
able to enter the game as entrepreneurs....
"The economic order was not merely an apparatus for the production of goods and
services; it was a set of rules for forging good conduct." R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID
STYLE, supra note 5, at 209.
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goal to its extreme, Representative Mason alone would have
condemned trusts even if they lowered prices to consumers because
they could financially ruin small businesses. 45
Judicial statements of congressional intention to assist small busi-
nesses have been frequent. 46 Courts have even occasionally viewed
congressional interest in protecting small businesses as overriding its
consumer-oriented goals. 147
145. "Some say that the trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced prices; but if
the price of oil, for instance, were reduced to 1 cent a barrel, it would not right the wrong
done to the people of this country by the 'trusts' which have destroyed legitimate competi-
tion and driven honest men from legitimate business enterprises." 21 CONG. REC. 4100
(1890).
146. For example, in Charles A. Ramsay v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512
(1922), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was
to secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public against evils commonly incident
to destruction of competition through monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade."
See also United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). This same general
purpose has also found expression in the doctrine that group boycotts and concerted
refusals by traders to deal with other traders constitute violations of the Sherman Act,
even if price competition is unaffected. See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359
U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457
(1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
It has also found expression in the Court's preferences for individual "enterprise and
sagacity." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945).
147. The most famous exposition of the view that the Sherman Act was passed in order
to preserve small businesses even if this might result in higher prices to consumers is
probably that put forth by Judge Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945): "[Congress in passing the Sherman Act] was not necessarily
actuated by economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral
effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own
skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the
direction of a few....
"Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of
their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible
cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other." Id. at 429 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The desire to preserve
opportunity for small businesses is perhaps explained by the belief that small businessmen
were "worthy men" who lived productive and honest lives. This sentiment was powerfully
expressed in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897),
where the Court stated: "Trade or commerce under [circumstances of artificially reduced
prices] may nevertheless be badly and unfortunately restrained by driving out of business
the small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein, and who might be
unable to readjust themselves to their altered surroundings. Mere reduction in the price of
the commodity dealt in might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class, and the
absorption of control over one commodity by an all-powerful combination of capital." See
also Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941);
An even more striking example of judicial interpretation occurred in a different
context in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), where the Court referred
to the congressional desire to protect "viable, small, locally owned businesses," even
though this might result in "occasional higher costs and prices." Id. at 344. See infra text
accompanying note 254.
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Despite clear judicial recognition, close examination reveals rela-
tively little support in the legislative history, beyond the few
references above, for the "small producer" rationale." s Although
there are a few statements suggesting that the protection of the
opportunity of small business to compete was one motivating factor
for the legislators, these statements do not imply that protection of
small businesses was meant to override other goals. 49 Congress
probably did not intend to go further than establishment of an
economic system providing free opportunities for entry and enough
producers to ensure vigorous competition, a system in which no
company became large enough to dominate.150
Additionally, the congressional intent to assist small businesses
can be interpreted as promoting distributive, rather than efficiency,
considerations. Passage of the Sherman Act may have been intended,
in part, to transfer wealth to small businesses. The legislative history
does not indicate, however, that Congress intended to help small busi-
nesses as a means of improving the overall efficiency of the economy.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44. The courts appear to cite repeatedly the
same few references. For example, to support the conclusion reprinted supra in note 147,
Judge Hand relied on the remarks of Senator Sherman and Senator George, supra note
143. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 428-29.
149. Only Representative Mason expressed an intent to protect small businesses at the
expense of consumers. See supra text accompanying note 145. There are perhaps a small
number of overlooked statements that support Representative Mason's view. In addition,
some of the proconsumer statements may have disguised the desires of a few members of
Congress who really favored aid to small businesses. But a few isolated statements do not
represent the intent of Congress. Nor can they establish the policy or spirit of the Sherman
Act. This is especially true because Representative Mason's views run counter to the
strong consumer orientation of the Sherman Act.
150. Of course, sentiments in the legislative history denouncing large trusts and monop-
olies and those praising small businesses are closely related. In the views of Professors
Kaysen and Turner, "The legislators were well aware of the common law on restraints of
trade, and of the power of monopolists to hurt the public by raising price, deteriorating
product, and restricting production. At the same time, there was at least equal concern
with the fate of small producers driven out of business, or deprived of the opportunity to
enter it, by 'all powerful aggregations of capital.' There was no obvious inconsistency in
these two interests. One could readily have identified free access and large numbers of
comparatively small producers with competitive processes, and in turn have identified
competitive processes derived from such market structures with beneficial economic
results for the public at large. Or, to short circuit the proposition, one could have equated
beneficial economic results with the protection of large numbers of small independent
producers." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTrrRUST POLIcY 19 (1959). Nevertheless, the
two concepts are not identical. For example, one might fear the economic, social, or
political power of IBM and desire that it be split into five parts. Each part would be a
multibillion dollar enterprise and one of the largest companies in a huge industry. Splitting
IBM into five companies could help small computer companies to compete. Alternatively,
however, the five new companies could drive smaller computer companies out of business.
One could desire to split up IBM because of its size and power, regardless of, or even in
spite of, the effect that this would have on small computer companies.
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The debate suggests only a possible intent to assist small businesses as
an end in itself, not as a means of increasing total economic output.151
Sympathetic to the plight of small businesses harmed by trusts,
Congress expressed a desire to create an environment in which small
businesses could effectively compete. It can fairly be said that one of
Congress' goals was to assist small businesses; although consumers'
interests were meant to be paramount, and conflicts between the
welfare of consumers and small businesses were generally to be
resolved in favor of consumers, Congress' desire to help small
businesses certainly extended to those circumstances in which small
businesses would be helped but consumers would not significantly
suffer.152 Despite the wishes of Representative Mason,153 however,
this expression of sympathy did not amount to a congressional
directive to assist small businesses in ways conflicting with the
essential purpose of the Act, the protection of consumers.
Summary
Congress passed the Sherman Act to further a number of goals.
Its main concern was with firms acquiring or possessing enough
market power to raise prices artificially and to restrict output.
151. Even large businesses were entitled to protection from predation. At one point
Senator George complained, "If some great manufacturer has been injured by an advance
in the price of his raw material he can sue, but the poor man, the consumer, the laborer,
the farmer, the mechanic, the country merchant, all that large class of American citizens
who constitute 80 per cent of our population and who are the real sufferers will have no
opportunity of redress, and the bill, so far as they are concerned, will be a snare and a
mere delusion." 21 CONG. REC. 3150 (1890).
152. Reconciliation of these interests can be illustrated through an analysis of a hypo-
thetical case of predatory pricing. Assume that a firm lowered prices to below marginal
cost in the short run, destroyed equally efficient competing small firms, and then increased
prices to the monopoly level for an extended period. Because successful predation would
hurt both consumers and small businesses, it would be condemned under either rationale.
Suppose, however, that the predation attempt was unsuccessful because, although the
below-cost pricing secured a monopoly position for the predator, as soon as it attempted
to price above cost new competitors entered the market and eroded its market power.
Unsuccessful predation would not hurt consumers; moreover, because they obtained
below-cost goods for a short term, they benefited. However, small firms in the industry
were destroyed by the unsuccessful predation attempt. While Congress desired that
consumers not pay monopoly prices, at no point did Congress desire for consumers to be
able to purchase goods below the competitive price. Consumers are entitled to
competitive prices, not low prices. Unsuccessful predation should, therefore, be
condemned out of a desire to protect small businesses.
For a legal and economic overview of predation, see Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial
Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L. REv. 63 (1982); Hurwitz,
Kovacic, Sheehan & Lande, Current Legal Standards of Predation, in STRATEGY,
PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (S. Salop ed. 1981), and the sources cited
therein.
153. See supra note 149.
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Congress' primary aim was to enable consumers to purchase products
at competitive prices. Artificially high prices were condemned not for
causing allocative inefficiency but for "unfairly" transforming
consumers' wealth into monopoly profits. All purchasers, whether
consumers or businesses, were given the right to purchase
competitively priced goods. All sellers were given the right to face
rivals selling at competitive prices.
Concurrently, Congress was interested in encouraging efficient
behavior in firms. Congress wanted a competitive economy to
encourage the greater efficiencies resulting from competition.
Efficiency gains were particularly desired when benefits passed
through directly to consumers. A concern with productive efficiency
could not, however, explain why Congress passed the Sherman Act.
Congress condemned the relatively efficient trusts and monopolies
for redistributive reasons. With the unlikely possibility of an
exception for the "efficient monopolist,"154 monopolizing conduct
was not permitted merely because it produced efficiency gains for the
monopolist.
The Act also involved efforts to decentralize economic, social,
and political decisionmaking to ensure that narrow private interests
would be unable to override the public good flowing from free
competition. The corporate power that the free market inadequately
curbed was the target of the Act. Thus, the Act was also aimed at
curbing the social and political power of large corporations and at
encouraging opportunities for small entrepreneurs to compete, both
thought to flow from the desired economic order as expressed in the
Act.
The Sherman Act, the first antitrust law, set the tone for future
antitrust legislation. Subsequent antitrust laws represented either ex-
tensions of the same ideas to different economic arenas, or attempts
to better implement the same fundamental principles.
The Federal Trade Commission Act
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act
proscribes "[u]nfair methods of competition,' 55 a largely undefined
prohibition against such traditional antitrust conduct as cartels and
monopolization, 156 and against such consumer protection problems as
fraudulent or coercive business practices. 57 Neither this phrase nor
154. See supra note 105.
155. FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
156. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C.L. REV. 227 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Averitt,
Unfair Methods].
157. Averitt, The Meaning of "UnfairActs or Practices" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade
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any of its component words, however, are defined in the Act. The
same controversy and uncertainty that arose over the goals of the
Sherman Act similarly cloud the meaning of "unfair methods of
competition." The dominant view is that the FTC Act and the
Sherman Act have identical, efficiency-oriented antitrust goals.158 A
minority of commentators, however, believe that the FTC Act was
passed for a variety of social and political purposes. 59
A third view is warranted. Although efficiency was a significant
concern of the FTC Act, this Article argues that the overriding goal
of section 5 was the prevention of transfers of wealth from consumers
resulting from "unfair methods of competition.' 160 For example, when
monopolies force consumers to pay more for their goods or when
fraudulent practices lead consumers to purchase goods they do not
really want, wealth is "unfairly" transferred from consumers to firms
with market power.161
The Congress that passed the FTC Act endorsed the Sherman
Act's prohibitions, but feared that that law was inadequate. 162 The re-
port of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce noted that
"[a]i agree that while the Sherman law is the foundation stone of our
policy on this question, additional legislation is necessary.' 163 Thus,
Commission Act, 70 GEo. LJ. 225 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Averitt, Unfair Acts or
Practices].
158. If both statutes were directed to maximize the economic efficiency of our economy
it stands to reason that the two statutes should be interpreted identically, and that they
would differ only in the scope of their coverage.
159. See supra notes 1, 11-16.
160. The framers of the FTC Act also had a variety of administrative goals, which will
not be discussed in this Article.
161. The case of In re Allied Corp., File No. 811 0191, FTC (Dec. 8, 1982), directly
confronted the wealth transfer issue. FTC Chairman James C. Miller stated that he en-
dorsed the proposition, advanced by agency economists, that elimination of potential mo-
nopoly overcharges should not be counted as a law enforcement "benefit" when the
agency does cost/benefit analyses. Such monopoly overcharges, said Miner, are merely
"revenue transfers." F.T.C. Watch No. 158, Jan. 14, 1983, at 1. Commissioner Clanton,
however, joined by Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk, stated his belief that
"preventing such transfers is one of the goals of the antitrust laws." Id. at 3.
162. The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce expressed this idea in its 1913 re-
port advocating additional antitrust legislation. The committee was of the opinion that the
Sherman Act "should stand as the fundamental law upon the subject, and that any supple-
mental legislation for more effectual control and regulation of interstate and foreign
commerce should be in harmony with the purpose of the existing statute." S. REP. No.
1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1913).
163. Report of the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1914). As a consequence, the FTC was empowered to implement the Sherman
Act. The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce stated: "The proper enforcement of
the Sherman Law also requires vigilant supervision which is most effectively obtained by a
body in continual touch with the business organizations in the various industries." Id. at 1.
This can also be illustrated by one of the final House debates involving Representative
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the objective of both statutes was the same: the prevention and
curtailment of monopoly power.164 The legislative history of the FTC
Act shows it was enacted to better accomplish the goals of the
Sherman Act,165 and to extend Sherman Act principles to one
significant new arena: "unfair" or "immoral" business behavior.166
The remainder of this section examines the legislative history of
the FTC Act to determine what Congress meant by "competition"
and by "unfair methods of competition." First, a review of the
evidence demonstrates that the FTC Act was directed at insuring that
corporate productive efficiency was both enhanced and passed on to
consumers. The Article next argues that Congress' primary goal was
prevention of "unfair" transfers of wealth caused by market power.
The evidence also shows that, on balance, Congress did not want its
distributive goals to be sacrificed for other objectives. Finally, the
evidence relating to morality goals, the goal of curbing the
noneconomic power of trusts and monopolies, and the goal of
promoting the competitive position of small businesses is examined.
Improving Economic Efficiency
The dominant view of the FTC Act goals proposes that the Act,
Frederick C. Stevens, a leading FTC sponsor:
REPRESENTATIVE MADDEN. Do the conferees understand, and wish to have the
House understand, that this does away with the Sherman Law?
REPRESENTATIVE STEVENS. Not at all; it expressly does not. It is a method of
enforcing it and making it more effective and preventing its misuse.
51 CONG. REC. 14,934 (1914).
The FTC was also charged with improving upon the Sherman Act's prohibitions by
preventing monopolies in their incipiency. See Averitt, Unfair Acts or Practices, supra note
157, at 242-51. The FTC Act also had the explicit goal of preventing those practices which
violated the spirit of the other antitrust laws. See id. at 251-71. See generally, Averitt,
Unfair Methods, supra note 156.
164. As Representative Morgan succinctly stated, "Monopoly is the evil we wish to con-
trol. Competition is the thing we wish to maintain." 51 CONG. REc. 8855 (1914). There
was, however, a vocal minority that advocated a mixture of cooperation and competition.
Senator Lippitt, for example, stated: "Cooperation in trade is a living, vital force that
cannot be neglected, and the problem therefore that has to be intelligently met in the
legislation on that subject if the situation is to be put upon a permanent basis is in some
way to clearly formulate into law the intermediate ground between an unlimited and
unregulated and destructive competition on the one side and an unregulated and
unlimited cooperation on the other." Id. at 13,216.
165. Representative Morgan offered a very comprehensive early view of the Act's
goals. Id. at 8854.
166. This prohibition on certain business behaviors, combined with the desire to
prevent particular transfers of wealth, gives rise to and provides the goals behind the
efforts of the Bureau of Consumer Protection. See infra text accompanying notes 213-15 &
221-28. Indeed, Congress' very use of the term "unfair" to modify "competition" strongly
suggests a purpose for the prohibition that may be desired as moral, social or political, but
in any case does not seem to be primarily efficiency oriented.
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properly construed, should be concerned only with maximizing "con-
sumer welfare," 167 that is, with encouraging productive efficiency and
with minimizing allocative inefficiency. Judge Bork states that the
mandated drive to enhance "consumer welfare" focuses on maximum
economic efficiency and excludes such distributive concerns as
"unfair" transfers of wealth from consumers to monopolists. 68
The prevailing view, however, is not supported by the record. Fa-
miliarity with allocative efficiency did not increase substantially from
1890 to 1914, even among economists, who had little influence on the
passage of the Act, much less among legislators.169 No mention of any
concept resembling allocative efficiency appears in the legislative his
tory of the FTC Act.170 On the other hand, the legislative history
167. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 51. Bork cautions, "We are compelled, I think, to
accept this definition of 'competition'.... Very likely this is the primary value Congress
had in mind when it used the word. Moreover, because 'competition' as a shorthand
expression for consumer welfare enables us to employ basic economic theory, it avoids the
pitfalls inherent in the other definitions surveyed.... [A]s will be shown... only this
reading is consistent with other indicia of congressional intent and with the requirements
of the judicial function." Id. at 61.
It is interesting to note that Bork considers and rejects four possible alternative
meanings of competition:
"1. 'Competition' may be read as the process of rivalry. This is a natural mode of
speech .... [Y]et it is a loose usage and invites the further, wholly erroneous conclusion
that the elimination of rivalry must always be illegal.
"But this identification of competition with rivalry will not do for antitrust purposes.
It makes rivalry an end in and of itself, no matter how many or how large the benefits
flowing from the elimination of rivalry.
"2. 'Competition' may be read as the absence of restraint over one person's or firm's
economic activities by any other person or firm. So viewed, competition is the absence
of... 'bondage'.... This is not a useful definition, however, for the preservation of
competition would then require the destruction of all commercial contracts and
obligations.
"3. 'Competition' may be read as that state of the market 'in which the individual
buyer or seller does not influence the price by his purchases or sales.... This is an enor-
mously useful model for economic theory, but it is utterly useless as a goal of law... For
the law to move either national markets ... or local markets ... as close as possible to the
model of perfect competition.., would entail an unbelievable loss in national wealth for
no particular purpose.'
"4. 'Competition' may be read, in a meaning closely related to the one just discussed,
as the existence of 'fragmented industries and markets' preserved 'through the protection
of viable, small, locally owned business."' Id. at 58-60.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 72-89.
169. While the concept was known to economists, the theoretical underpinnings of allo-
cative efficiency were mostly undeveloped in 1914. See supra notes 91-100 &
accompanying text; A. MARSHALL, supra note 26, at 395-410 (8th ed. 1920) (reprinted
1961). Professor Stigler, discussing the influence of economists on the 1914 legislation,
concluded, "I am unwilling to believe that economists... had any appreciable influence
on antitrust legistion." Stigler, supra note 98, at 6.
170. None of the scholars who advocate allocative efficiency as the goal of antitrust
laws have been able to point to any remarks in the Act's legislative history that indicate an
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places considerable emphasis on preserving and even increasing
corporate productive efficiency.' 71
Undoubtedly efficiency concerns were meant to play a major role
in section 5 analysis, but remarks of a number of legislators suggest
that efficiency was not Congress' sole objective. Their views imply
that Congress was primarily concerned with preserving those
efficiency benefits that flowed directly to consumers. 72 For example,
understanding of the concept.
171. The statement that perhaps most strongly supports a major role for efficiency in §
5 analysis came from Senator Hollis: "Fair competition is competition which is successful
through superior efficiency. Competition is unfair when it resorts to methods which shut
out competitors who, by reason of their efficiency, might otherwise be able to continue in
business and prosper. Without the use of unfair methods no corporation can grow beyond
the limits imposed upon it by the necessity of being as efficient as any competitor. The
mere size of a corporation which maintains its position solely through superior efficiency is
ordinarily no menace to the public interest." 51 CONG. REC. 12,146 (1914). It should be
noted that Senator Hollis was not one of the Act's principal sponsors. Nor did he explicitly
confront the problem that even efficient firms may charge monopolistic prices. Despite his
failure to confront the tradeoff between monopolistic overcharges and efficiency,
however, his statement nevertheless provides support for the view that efficiency should
play a strong role in § 5 analysis.
Senator Robinson, quoting William H.S. Stevens, a leading economist of the times,
provided a similar definition: "Nearly all normal business men can distinguish between
'fair competition' and 'unfair competition.' Efficiency is generally regarded as the
fundamental principle of the former-efficiency in producing and in selling, while
oppression or advantage obtained by deception or some questionable means is the
distinguishing characteristic of 'unfair competition."' Id. at 12,248. Professor Stevens
expressed a similar opinion shortly after the Act was passed: "[T]he interest of the public
lies in securing the best goods at the lowest prices or, translated into other terms, in a
competition of productive and/or selling efficiency. In other words, the power given to the
Trade Commission under section 5 is the power to prevent those methods which do not
constitute a competition or productive and/or selling efficiency." W. STEVENS, "UNFAIR
COMPETITION," A STUDY OF CERTAIN TRADE PRACTICES 236 (1917) (emphasis in
original). Stevens continued that "a competition of productive and selling efficiency is, in
the last analysis, practically synonymous with the public interest." Id.
Further, the 1913 Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce stated that it "believes
that the progress of the world depends in a large measure upon that fair, reasonable
rivalry among men which has hitherto characterized the advances of civilization. S. REP.
No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1913). Representative Morgan wanted the Act "[t]o
enable us to assure all the benefits and advantages of the large industrial unit and escape
the evils and dangers thereof... [t]o relieve doubt and uncertainty to business, develop
trade, encourage commerce, and promote enterprise .... 51 CONG. REC. 8854 (1914).
Additional concern for efficiency can be found in the earliest proceedings of the FTC,
which noted its desire in making rulings and orders "to promote business efficiency and,
within the limits of practicability, to cooperate with the business world in developing the
best standards of commercial ethics." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT
26 (1916).
172. One early exchange openly revealed a preference for consumers, and explicitly
stated that the purpose of the Act was not to help corporations:
MR. BARTLETr. [The bill for the creation of the Federal Trade Commission] is in
the interest of the people and not in the interest of the corporations.
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Senator Cummins, one of the bill's two main sponsors and the author
of the influential "Cummins Report, ' 173 applauded the efficiencies
associated with large firms. He warned, however, that "[w]hatever
those economies and efficiencies may be, they must.., stop short of
one thing, that is, the power to rule that field of commerce which they
attempt to occupy." 174
Even some opponents of the FC Act based their opposition on
the potentially negative impact on consumers of the inefficiencies that
the Act would require.1 75 The ultimate goal of the opposition was also
MR. STEVENS.... This must all be done with an eye single to the welfare of the
people, and not in the interest of anyone who may desire these modifications....
MR. BARTLETr. And the course which the gentlemen suggest is not a course that
is in the interest of the corporations, but in the interest of the people themselves.
51 CONG. REC. at 8852 (1914).
Representative Frederick C. Stevens, a House manager of the bill and a leading
member of the conference committee that produced the final version that was eventually
enacted, addressed this issue at the beginning of the debates: "The people have the right
to look to us to ascertain what evils there really are and what remedies may be necessary,
and at the same time preserve the inestimable blessings of our system of government and
the wonderful efficiency and progress of our business affairs. This measure-by regulating
efficiency of our organizations and institutions so that the people can get the benefit of that
efficiency, can maintain a prosperity for the masses of our people, can assure them that
their Government continues for their benefit, can assure stability and harmony and in such
way conduce to the general satisfaction with our institutions." Id. at 8852 (emphasis
added). This same interpretation also seems to be suggested by Representative Stevens
toward the end of the debate: "In the economic field the Commission should assist the
business concerns of this country along the lines demanded by the American people of
efficiency and fairness. Then, while it is done, the pubilc [sic] also wants to know that with
this efficiency will equally go fairness in the distribution of the benefits of such
organization and work." Id. at 14,938. Representative Stevens also stated: "[W]e want
these men who have accomplished so much and are capable of so much to realize that
there is a responsibility upon them as American citizens, that they receive a part of the
blessings of our institutions, and that they must yield something and do something for the
common welfare and not try to grab it all for themselves." Id. at 8853.
173. S. REP. No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913).
174. 51 CONG. REC. 11,456 (1914). Cummins continued, "[Tihere is no business field in
this country so small but that it ought to be occupied by at least two enterprises, whether
individual or corporate." Id. at 11,455-56; see also the remarks of Senator Newlands, 51
CONG. REc. 11,109 (1914).
The minority view expressed in the 1914 Report of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce seems to take a similar position. This view would seem
to allow corporations to keep the benefits from their efficiency advantages to the extent
that these profits are not attributable to harm to consumers: "Any advantage large
corporations have over small corporations or individuals through lower costs of
production they are entitled to, but they should be prevented from an unfair use of the
power that comes from their size alone." H.R. REP. No. 533, pt. 2, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1914).
175. Senator Lippitt extolled the efficiencies of monopolies because, in his opinion,
they resulted in lower prices for consumers: "I believe that they enable the farmer and the
consumer to buy goods at a cheaper price than they can be sold without some form of
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achieving the lowest possible prices for consumers. 176 They differed
with the sponsors of the FTC Act only about the method which would
best achieve this goal.
The legislative history of the FTC Act thus indicates that
Congress wanted efficiency to play a major role in section 5
analysis. 77 Several statements even suggest that efficiency was meant
to be the only goal of the Act, or, at least, should not be sacrificed in
the pursuit of any other goal.178 But most statements suggest that
economic efficiency was only one of the legislators' concerns and,
further, that Congress wanted to ensure that purchasers received their
"fair" share of these efficiency benefits. 79 The evidence suggests,
moreover, that the majority of the legislators subordinated their
appreciation for corporate efficiency to their distaste for monopoly
overcharges. The bulk of the legislative history indicates that
efficiency should be a factor in section 5 analysis only when its
benefits accrue primarily to consumers, and not to trust or
monopolies. That is, Congress was not willing to sacrifice consumers'
direct monetary interests in order that monopolists might become
richer. Thus, the 1914 Congress, like the Congress that passed the
Sherman Act, strongly limited the role of efficiency in antitrust
efficient organization." 51 CONG. REc. 13,306 (1914). Similarly, Senator Weeks stated that
"there are a great many combinations which have reduced prices as a result of the
combination, and that therefore they have been for the public good." Id at 12,732.
Senator Lippitt later stated that the FTC should not be created because it would achieve
the opposite of its stated goal. He believed that it would make corporations less efficient,
and that these losses would be passed on to consumers: "I have no doubt myself that it will
add millions and millions of dollars to the cost of production of the articles used in the
trade of the United States, and I am sorry that there is not somewhere some more definite
information to be obtained upon this very important phase: for the ultimate result of such
expenditures must undoubtedly be borne by the consumers of the articles as an addition to
the already burdensome cost of living." Id. at 13,213. Lippitt later quoted a speech by
Victor Morawetz, delivered at the second annual meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, Washington, February 12, 1914: "[Slome contracts and combinations of
that character are necessary to secure economy and efficiency in production and in trade
and to preserve strong and healthy competition at home and in foreign markets. If such
contracts or combinations involve no elements of oppression of others, and if they do not
put an end to healthy competition in any branch or [sic] trade or commerce, they should
not be prohibited." Id. at 13,218.
176. Id A cynic viewing these remarks, however, might speculate that they showed con-
cern for obtaining the lowest possible prices for consumers in part because this seemed to
be a useful tactic to prevent the creation of the FTC.
177. Congressional remarks concerned only productive efficiency. Although members
of Congress did not consider the problem, it seems reasonable to believe that they would
have been concerned with allocative inefficiency had they confronted it. See supra notes
89-100.
178. See supra note 171 and sources cited therein.
179. See supra notes 172,174-76 and sources cited therein.
April 1999]
analysis. 80
Protecting Consumers from Unfair Transfers of Wealth
The legislative history of the FTC Act makes clear that Congress
wanted to insure the existence of free competition and to prevent the
use of market power to extract unfairly the entitlements or property
rights Congress had decided belonged to consumers. Congress' domi-
nant interest was to allow consumers to purchase their goods at com-
petitive prices' 8' without sacrificing other consumer interests such as
optimal product quality. 82
Congressional motives in condemning artificially high consumer
prices were no different in 1914 than in 1890; Congress' redistributive
concerns were paramount. Senator Newlands, the Act's main sponsor
and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,
framed the issue as a concern for "unreasonable and extortionate
180. Although the debates show more discussion of efficiency in 1914 than in 1890, the
role of efficiency in § 5 analysis seems to be identical to the role it was intended to play in
Sherman Act analysis. See supra notes 95-108 & accompanying text. Under each statute
there are some statements which imply a very strong or even dominant role for efficiency.
The remarks by Senator Hoar in the Sherman Act debates, supra note 105, and Senators
Hollis and Robinson in the FrC Act debates suggest this view. See supra note 171. In each
statute's legislative history, however, the weight of the evidence suggests that efficiency
was meant to be only one factor in the overall welfare analysis, and that efficiency
concerns were not meant to prevail in those cases where they helped cause higher prices
for consumers. Under the majority view, Congress' goal was both to increase firms'
efficiency and to insure that the benefits of modem productivity were directly passed to
consumers.
181. The goals of "protecting consumers against the high prices and [guarding] the
interests of employees" were expressed by the House in H.R. REP. No. 533, pt. 1, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914) (quoting from the Preliminary Report of the Industrial
Commission, submitted to Congress in 1900). Senator McCumber even wondered if the
only goal of the FTC Act was to control unfair competition whether or not the public
obtained their goods "cheaper than they did before." 51 CONG. REc. 13,232 (1914). The
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce wanted to keep "within limited bounds the
activities of a multitude of price fixing associations in different branches of business,
which, together with the great trusts, have been potent causes of the present high cost of
living." S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1914).
Congress specified competitive rather than low prices out of a recognition that a
would be monopolist might attempt to use predatorily low prices to drive out competition
and then price at a monopoly level. Senator Reed presented a typical predatory pricing
hypothetical: "It has been charged that... [the Standard Oil Company] goes into a trade
territory which is occupied by a rival, drops the price of its products below their actual
cost, and thus crushes and destroys the competitor, meantime selling in other communities
at a higher price and gaining profits there, and out of those profits gained in other places
sustaining itself, while it is selling goods at a loss in the community where their rival' is
located. When he is crushed it puts up the price. Now, that could be condemned under the
provision I have drawn." 51 CONG. REC. 13,231 (1914). See infra notes 200 & 203.
182. See, e.g., remarks of Senators Cummins and Lippitt. 51 CONG. REC. 11, 106 (1914).
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prices. 183 Senator Lane identified the danger as
[t]he fraud and the theft which is being practiced upon the people
of this country... which mulct the people of this country out of
hundreds of millions of dollars each year... [The people] are also
being compelled to pay arbitrarily fixed and unjustly high prices for
what they consume, they are being robbed 
....  4
The Minority Report of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce complained that "[t]he common people are
staggering under the burden they bear as a result of contributing
extortionate profits to the trusts and monopolies." 185 Further, the
stated goals of Representative Morgan were "[t]o minimize the power
of the large industrial corporation to concentrate wealth, and to
maximize its power as an agency for the equitable distribution of
wealth [and] allay public suspicion and distrust, remove prejudice and
secure the people from unjust tribute levied by monopolistic
corporations.' 1 86
Even opponents of the Commission recognized redistribution as
a central goal.187 The legislative history indicates that opponents
hoped to secure competitively low prices for consumers, opposing the
bill in part because in their opinion it would cause productive
inefficiencies that would raise consumer prices. 188
These remarks suggest that Congress was overwhelmingly inter-
ested in securing competitive prices for consumers.189 Congress'
descriptive use of the terms "exactions," "extortionate profits,"
"theft," and "looting" is evidence of its great displeasure and suggests
congressional condemnation of supracompetitive prices not because
they caused allocative inefficiency, but rather because they "unfairly"
transferred wealth from consumers to producers. Although price was
the touchstone of congressional concern, Congress had broader aims
183. Report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Appendix: Statement by
Sen. Newlands, S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1914). Newlands also spoke in
terms of an "unfair or unreasonable price." Id.
184. 51 CONG. REc. 13,223 (1914).
185. H.R. REP. No. 533, pt. 3, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1914) (minority report) (Rep. Laf-
ferty's views).
186. 51 CONG. REc. 8854 (1914). See also supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
Even though Congress sought to protect consumers of particular products, it
sometimes was concerned with products that might be inputs for other products. Senator
Borah, referring to an instance of predatory pricing, explicitly named "those who should
be benefited under the law of competition-that is, the consumers or users of these
agricultural implements." Id at 11,232.
187. Senator Burton, for example, stated that "no one here-I can speak with
confidence for the entire Senate-would put one obstacle in the way of punishing
dishonesty, of preventing oppression, of prohibiting exactions." 51 CONG. REC. 14,792
(1914).
188. See supra remarks of Senator Lippitt in text accompanying note 175.
189. See exchange between Representatives Bartlett and Stevens, supra note 172.
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as well. 190 As the next section indicates, these goals were primarily
social and ethical in nature.
Other Goals of the FTC Act
Preventing Unethical Business Practices
Congressional use of the word "unfair" to describe the types of
competition it wanted to prohibit strongly suggests that the goals of
section 5 include moral or ethical elements. The Act's legislative his
tory strongly supports the conclusion that Congress wanted to prevent
certain practices not because of any effects on efficiency or wealth
distribution but because Congress considered them inherently unethi-
cal.191 The desire to eliminate immoral practices was based, in part, on
the belief that monopolies often resulted from immoral business
behavior.192 The FTC, it was believed, would become the "social
machinery which will protect the individual from oppression and
wrong."1 93 Even the bill's critics thought the prohibition was, in part,
an ethical one. 194 Thus, the legislative history leads to the conclusion
190. As Senator Cummins noted, prices were not Congress' only concern: "We often go
wrong, I believe, in assuming that because a great corporation, a vast aggregation of
wealth, can produce a given commodity more cheaply than can a smaller concern,
therefore it is for the welfare and the interest of the people of the country that the
commodity shall be produced at the lower cost. I do not accept that article of economic
faith. I think we can purchase cheapness at altogether too high a price, if it involves the
surrender of the individual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a single master
mind." 51 CONG. REc. 12,742 (1914).
191. Senator Newlands, for example, defined the parameters of "unfair competition" to
include "every practice and method between competitors upon the part of one against the
other that is against public morals .... Id at 11,112. Newlands wanted legislation to
prevent "practices that shock the universal conscience of mankind." Id. at 12,980.
Senator Newlands strongly believed in the desirability of establishing standards of
business ethics: "[I]t would be utterly impossible for Congress to define the numerous
practices which constitute unfair competition and which are against good morals in trade,
for we are beginning to realize that there is a standard of morals in trade or that there
ought to be." Id at 11,084. He stated the objective of Congress to be "simply to maintain
by law good morals in business as in other matters." Id. at 11,108.
192. "Monopoly commences in insidious ways, by practices that are against good morals
and constitute violations of individual rights for which the individual can have an action at
law or in equity, but rights which the individual, because of his poverty or of his insignifi-
cance is often unable to assert against these great organized powers." Id. at 12,030. New-
lands believed that his prohibition would cover everything Congress wanted and would
"have such an elastic character that it [would] meet every new condition and every new
practice that [might] be invented with a view to gradually bringing about monopoly
through unfair competition " Id. at 12,024.
193. Id at 11,109.
194. Senator Reed, a leading opponent of the Act, unsuccessfully proposed an amend-
ment to redefine § 5 as follows: "The term unfair competition is hereby defined to
embrace all these acts, devices, concealments, threats, coercions, deceits, frauds,
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that moral or ethical concerns helped inspire congressional use of the
term "unfair."
The debates list several trade practices or conditions that the
legislature considered "unfair;" monopolies created by unfair tactics
were only one such example. 9 5 Many of these practices could be con-
demned because they led to monopoly power and eventually to the
"unfair" extraction of wealth from consumers. Other practices could
be prohibited because they unfairly harmed small businesses. With re
spect to these practices, characterizing section 5 concerns in terms of
morality instead of consumer impact or small business protection
might be historically correct, but makes little or no difference in the
outcome of these cases.
Many of the practices mentioned in the debates might not lead to
monopoly power,196 but may have been considered malum in se.197
discriminations, dishonest practices, false representations, slanders of business, and all
other acts or devices, whether of like nature with those herein enumerated or not, done or
used with the intent or the effect of which is to destroy or unreasonably hinder the
business of another or prevent another from engaging in business, or to restrain trade or to
create a monopoly." Id. at 13,310.
195. Senator Robinson presented the longest list of unfair practices that appears in the
1914 debates:
1. Local price cutting.
2. Operation of bogus "independent" concerns.
3. Maintenance of "fighting ships" and "fighting brands."
4. Lease, sale, purchase, or use of certain articles as a condition of the lease,
sale, purchase, or use of other required articles.
5. Exclusive sales and purchase arrangements.
6. Rebates and preferential contracts.
7. Acquisition of exclusive or dominant control of machinery or goods used in
the manufacturing process.
8. Manipulation.
9. Black lists, boycotts, white lists, etc.
10. Espionage and use of detectives.
11. Coercion, threats, and intimidation.
Id. at 11,230.
In addition, the Democratic Platform of 1912 favored "the prevention of holding
companies, of interlocking directors, of stock watering, of discrimination in price, and the
control by any one corporation of so large a proportion of any industry as to make it a
menace to competitive conditions." REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN TEXTBOOK 1912 at 272
reprinted in G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 16-17 (1924). Similarly,
the Progressive Platform for that year favored strengthening the Sherman Law by
"prohibiting agreements to divide territory or limit output; refusing to sell to customers
who buy from business rivals; to sell below cost in certain areas while maintaining higher
prices in other places; using the power of transportation to aid or injure special business
concerns; and other unfair trade practices." T. ROOSEVELT, PROGRESSIVE PRINCIPLES,
appendix at 319, reprinted in G. HENDERSON, supra, at 17.
196. See supra note 195. Of course, § 5 has a strong incipiency mandate. See supra note
163 for a brief definition of incipiency mandate.
197. Some members of Congress may have viewed even cartels and monopolies them-
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Certain predatory practices, such as blowing up a competitor's plant
or industrial espionage, are as obviously immoral as fraud or
coercion,198 and were condemned without regard to their effects on
efficiency, distribution, small businesses, or consumers.
The primary impact of the ethical mandate of the statute has
been the creation of the Bureau of Consumer Protection. It is
possible to characterize this Bureau's concern with fraudulent,
deceptive, and coercive practices solely as another manifestation of
congressional condemnation of unfair transfers of wealth from
consumers to producers.199 It seems at least equally likely that
Congress considered conventional consumer protection problems to
be matters of morality and, for this reason, the object of
prohibition.200
As a practical matter, however, unethical or immoral conduct has
rarely been a factor in FTC antitrust enforcement.20 1 Only blatantly
selves as malum in se. Senator Newlands suggested that certain practices were against "the
laws of God." 51 CONG. REc. 11,086 (1914) (quoting State v. Central Lumber Co., 24 S.D.
136,153 (1909)).
198. The legislators often referred to blatantly predatory acts which are relatively rare
today. For example, early in the debates Senator Newlands stated that it had been proven
that the National Cash Register Company "had men in the employ of their rivals, that they
had every form of espionage and detection, and that they even resorted to bribery of the
employees of the rival concerns." Id at 11,108.
199. It should also be noted that these practices generally lower economic efficiency.
For example, coercive or fraudulent transactions can lower business confidence or individ-
ual incentive and might thus decrease the total stock of goods produced by the economy.
It must be emphasized, however, that such practices were not condemned because of their
efficiency effects.
200. This point is illustrated in the following exchange between Senator Lippitt and
Senator Cummins:
SENATOR LiPPmrr. [I]f the competition is of such high character as to reduce the
price to the public, it is going to be a very difficult question to say that it is injuri-
ous to the public. I presume he means it is unfair to the public, it is injurious, and
that because in some way it will ultimately result in higher prices to them, but if
the competition results in lower prices to the public, it is fair to them?
MR. CUMMINS. Not always-If one goes into a store and desires a certain thing
and through a misrepresentation, such as I have indicated, he takes another thing
he is injured, and the people generally are injured if the same thing is practiced
on them, without regard to the price, without regard to the quality of the goods
involved.
51 CONG. REC. 11,106 (1914).
201. Only in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1933), and
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233 (1972), did the Court rely
upon moral or ethical objections as the basis for finding an antitrust violation. In Sperry &
Hutchinson the Court referred with approval to the factors that the FTC may consider "in
determining whether a practice that is neither in violation of the antitrust laws nor
deceptive is nonetheless unfair: (1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes,
the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra
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unscrupulous practices, such as bribery or industrial sabotage, con-
demned by society under any circumstances, are challenged by the
FTC on ethical grounds alone.2°2 Otherwise, immoral or unethical
practices are challenged only when the practice is one that unfairly
transfers wealth from consumers to producers, unduly harms small
businesses, or causes economic inefficiency.2 3 As a prescriptive
matter, it rarely makes a difference whether congressional displeasure
with certain practices is characterized by distributive preferences for
consumers or small businesses, or by ethical considerations.2°4 Under
either explanation Congress has directed that these practices be
prohibited.205
Curbing the Social and Political Power of Trusts and Monopolies
The FTC Act also was inspired by congressional interest in curb-
ing the social and political power of large trusts and monopolies al-
though this factor is less significant than in the Sherman Act debates.
of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it
is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury
to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)." Id at 244-45 n.5. For a detailed
discussion of this case, see Averitt, Unfair Methods, supra note 156.
202- See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchison, 405 U.S. 233 (1972); Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1933).
203. The Act was also designed to help firms that were subjected to unfair business
practices. For example, Senator McCumber inquired, "Here are two manufacturers selling
their articles in competition with each other in a certain territory. One of the
manufacturers advertises that his goods are produced by the most modem methods, that
they are in every respect as good or better than those of his competitor, and that he will
sell them 25 per cent cheaper than his competitor. We will assume that that public
statement is false and untrue, that it is absolutely unfair, but the result has been that the
competitor in that field has reduced the price of his product to meet the competition, and
the public are getting his goods 25 per cent cheaper than they did before. Under that
condition can not the man or corporation who has been compelled to reduce the price of
his product by reason of that competition go before this commission and insist that his
competitor's goods are not as good as his and that the competition is unfair, and ask an
injunction against the continuance of that claim for the goods of the competitor?" 51
CONG. REc. 13,232 (1914). Senator Reed answered: "Certainly ... the Senator has stated
a very strong case, a case in which bad morals were involved, in which falsehood was
involved, and yet the effect was to promote competition, and hence promote the general
welfare." Id Even though prices would fall in the short term, the behavior described by
Senator Reed would probably not promote long-term competition and general welfare.
204. For certain immoral acts, however, differences would still remain. If the acts were
blatantly immoral, such as industrial espionage, murder, or destroying a competitor's
plant, it seems doubtful that the FTC should even allow the defendant to attempt to justify
its actions on economic grounds. The FTC should be able to ban such blatantly immoral
practices by a per se approach.
205. Although there were certainly views to the contrary, the legislative history also
seems to suggest that Congress meant to condemn immoral practices in part because they
harmed other businesses. In addition to the quotations presented in this section, some of
the statements infra in notes 210-11 & accompanying text suggest this.
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Nevertheless, as historian Richard Hofstadter has noted, the trusts
and monopolies inspired "a fear founded in political realities-the
fear that the great business combinations, being the only centers of
wealth and power, would be able to lord it over all other interests and
thus to put an end to traditional American democracy. '206 One
Minority Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce deplored the "unfortunate state of the Union" because
"[f]ifty men in the United States control, through interlocking
directorates, 40 percent of the wealth of the country. '"207
This fear was echoed throughout the debates.2 8 Congressman
F.C. Stevens stated:
Vast wealth has been accumulated, especially in the hands of a few,
irresponsible except to their own consciences and sense of justice
and patriotism, and these powers have become so concentrated and
involved that disentanglement is extremely difficult.
From this situation the great mass of our people have a very just
apprehension that this wealth, and power growing out of it, may be
not only used to the detriment but also may be a potential source of
injury and oppression.
He also advocated the creation of the FTC because "[t]he people will
not be afraid of mere size if it knows that an able and wise and
powerful commission is guarding their interests .... -209
Strong statements by Congress notwithstanding, the strident
rhetoric that pervaded the Sherman Act debate was largely missing.
Because the FTC Act was, in large part, an attempt more effectively
to accomplish the Sherman Act's goals, it is not surprising that most
speakers debated ways to fine-tune existing antitrust law, rather than
declare that Congress should do something about the powerful trusts.
206. See R. HOFSTADTER, REFORM, supra note 132, at 277. "At bottom, the central
fear was fear of power and the greater the strength of an organized interest the greater
anxiety it aroused. Hence it was the trusts, the investment banking houses, the interlocking
directorates, the swollen private fortunes that were most criticized." Id. at 241.
207. H.R. REP. No. 533, pt. 3, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1914) (minority report) (Rep. Laf-
ferty's views).
208. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 8850 (1914). Senator Newlands, commenting on the
"Cummins Report," S. REP. No. 1326, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. xii (1913), added that "we find
that the trusts are more powerful today than when the antitrust act was passed and that
the evils have grown up so interwoven with the general business of the country as to make
men tremble at the consequence of their disruption." S. REP. No. 1326, 63d Cong., 3rd
Sess. 19 (1914) (additional views of Sen. Newlands, quoting a speech he made in the
Senate, Jan. 11, 1911). For a discussion of the "Cummins Report," see Averitt, Unfair
Methods, supra note 156, at 231-32. Senator Kenyon feared that "[i]f we are going to
concede, after all these years, that this Government is powerless to destroy monopoly,
then we have got to concede that monopoly is powerful enough to destroy this
Government...." CONG. REc. 13,158 (1914); see also id. at 13,211 (remarks of Sen.
Lippitt); id. at 8850 (remarks of Rep. F.C. Stevens).
209. 51 CONG. REc. 14,938 (1914).
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The same problems may have existed in both 1914 and 1890, but the
contemplated solution in 1914 was more ameliorative than innovative.
Protecting Small Businesses
A number of statements in the legislative history of the FTC Act
imply that direct protection of small businesses was an explicit goal
of the Act.210 There were also suggestions that competition was the
only object of the statute.211 It seems most likely that Congress'
210. For example, Senator Newlands expressed a desire to stop any practice that tended
"to injury of a competitor unfairly." Id. at 12,980. Senator Reed articulated the purposes
underlying the FTC Act as follows: "We are trying to keep the doors of competition open
in this land. We are trying to keep the highways of opportunity unobstructed. We are
trying to keep it so that the feet of the men of today may travel along an open path, so that
all may have a fair chance to gain a livelihood and to embark in business." Id. at 13,231;
see also iL at 13,232 (statement of Sen. McCumber), 12,932-33 (statement of Sen. Lewis).
Congressman F.C. Stevens stated, "Vast wealth has been accumulated, especially in
the hands of a few, irresponsible except to their own consciences and sense of justice and
patriotism, and these powers have become so concentrated and involved that
disentanglement is extremely difficult. "From this situation the great mass of our people
have a very just apprehension that this wealth, and power growing out of it, may be not
only used to the detriment but also may be a potential source of injury and oppression."
Id. at 8850. Further, he advocated the creation of the FTC because "[tihe people will not
be afraid of mere size if it knows that an able and wise and powerful and patriotic
commission is guarding their interests . . . ." Id. at 14,938.
Senator Lane feared that if the proposed legislation were not artfully crafted, "every
small and honorable dealer may be put to intentional and infinite annoyance or driven out
of business by his larger or more crafty rival." Id. at 13,223. Senator Burton felt, "In our
business life there must be a free field for all, and along with this tendency toward opera-
tions on an enormous scale no policy should be adopted or allowed under which equality
of opportunity shall be destroyed or the deserving competitor driven out of business." Id.
at 14,792; see also id. at 12,980 (remarks of Sen. Newlands).
These quotations suggesting a moral objective to the Act also show that businesses, in
addition to consumers, were objects of the Act's protections. See supra notes 191-205 &
accompanying text.
211. "Where there is a practice or a class of practices which has for its main purpose an
injury to the public by eliminating competition which ought to exist in the public interest,
in such cases it is a fraud on the public, both as to purpose and results. If it be for the
public interest to preserve healthful competition, then it is our duty to provide the means
for it." 51 CoNG. REC. 14,937 (1914) (statement of Rep. Stevens); see also id. at 14,936-38.
Senator McCumber agreed with Representatives Stevens and Bartlett, see their
discussion supra note 172, about the intended beneficiaries of the Act: "I would like to
vote for a trades commission bill the object of which would be to facilitate trade, insure
honest competition, and insure a competition that would be beneficial to the public and
not interfere with any competition that does not concern the public at large." Mt at 13,303.
Senator Cummins emphasized the specific aims of the Act: "The unfairness must be
tinctured with unfairness to the public, not merely with unfairness to the rival or competi-
tor .... We are not simply trying to protect the people of the United States, and of course,
there must be in the imposture or in the vicious practice or method something that has a
tendency to affect the people of the country or be injurious to their welfare." It at 11,105.
This cannot, however, be fully reconciled with Senator Cummins' later statement that "we
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primary goal was preventing harm to the general public by
prohibiting those practices that harmed small businesses to the
extent that the practices harmed competition in general. Congress
was certainly concerned with providing equal opportunity for small
entrepreneurs and with condemning unfair business methods, in
part, because of the effect of such methods on small businesses.212
Although some members of Congress supported the protection
of small businesses as an end in itself, it appears that Congress did not
intend to protect small businesses if higher prices for consumers re-
sulted. Interpreting the statute as a directive to aid small businesses
only when this aid does not interfere with any of Congress' other
goals is more consistent with the general import of the FTC and
Sherman Acts.
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Synthesis
As previously discussed, the antitrust concerns embodied in the
FTC Act were based primarily upon distributive concerns.213 A
similar argument can be made concerning Congress' consumer
protection goals. That is, Congress did not condemn practices such as
fraud because they were inefficient;214 rather, it considered them to
be unfair transfers of wealth from purchasers to sellers.215
Congress' intentions perhaps could be characterized as an
implicit and unconscious attempt to promote competition by
preventing specific types of market failures. This characterization is
appropriate because a basic assumption underlying the Act was that
must do something to preserve the independence of the man as distinguished from the
power of the corporation; that we must do something to perpetuate the individual
initiative. We often go wrong, I believe, in assuming that because a great corporation, a
vast aggregation of wealth, can produce a given commodity more cheaply than can a
smaller concern, therefore it is for the welfare and the interest of the people of the country
that the commodity shall be produced at a lower cost. I do not accept that article of
economic faith. I think we can purchase cheapness at altogether too high a price, if it
involves the surrender of the individual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a
single master mind." Id. at 12,742.
212. The first stages of a monopolization plan often harm small businesses and aid con-
sumers. Only the advanced stages of monopolization, when prices have been raised above
competitive levels, are likely to harm consumers. Condemnation of monopolization in its
incipiency thus primarily stems from a concern with the welfare of small businesses. See
also supra note 156.
213. See supra notes 181-89 & accompanying text.
214. Of course, one could justify a prohibition against fraud on efficiency grounds. See,
e.g., Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON.
67 (1973). The important point, however, is that Congress did not do so.
215. For example, Senator Reed referred to a case in which one man had "copied an
other man's goods" and concluded that the copier "was taking advantage of the other
man's art and genius and ability. He was, in effect, stealing the other man's ideas." 51
CONG. REC. 12,023 (1914); see also remarks of Senator Reed, id. at 12,026.
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the free market, when functioning properly, would best structure and
"regulate" the American economy.216 While in the long run the
operation of the free market might erode every cartel or monopoly,
or force companies engaging in fraud or other anticompetitive
practices to go out of business, by 1914 Congress recognized that, in
the short run, the free market did not always function perfectly. With
the advantage of hindsight, one might well conclude that the FTC was
established because of a congressional belief that such factors as false
information,217 imperfect or incomplete information, 218 free rider
216. Senator Newlands, in an appendix to the 1914 Report of the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce, stated that Congress "desires to maintain by governmental action if
need be, the full competitive system and to rely chiefly on competition as the regulator of
corporate business." S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1914) (appendix). See also
the comment by Representative Morgan, supra in the text accompanying note 190. In his
address of January 20, 1914, President Wilson gave his early view that the FTC should be
established so that it would function "only as an indispensable instrument of information
and publicity, as a clearing house for the facts by which both the public mind and the man-
agers of great business undertakings should be guided, and as an instrumentality for doing
justice to business where the processes of the courts or the natural forces of correction
outside the courts are inadequate to adjust the remedy to the wrong in a way that will
meet all the equities and circumstances of the case." Address by President Wilson on
Trusts and Monopolies, H.R. Doc. No. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1914). Wilson was
saying that the FTC should act only when the "natural forces of correction" were
inadequate due, to use his example, to imperfect information, which is an example of and
cause of market failure.
Representative R.B. Stevens also framed the issues in these terms: "[I]f we are to rely
on the theory of competition to protect the public from the power of large corporations, it
is imperative that the Government shall see to it that competition is on fair and equal
terms." Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP.
No. 533, pt. 2, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914) (minority views, delivered by Rep. Stevens). In
addition, the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce noted in its February 26, 1913
report: "Interference with free competition was generally but not necessarily a restraint of
trade, for there were some restrictions that could be put upon competition and upon
competitors that left the competitive force as an adequate protection to the people." S.
REP. No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1913).
217. The 1914 House Commerce Committee report stated: "The publicity secured by
the governmental agency should be such as will prevent the deception of the public
through secrecy in the organization and management of industrial combinations or
through false information. Such agency would also have at its command the best sources
of information regarding special privileges or discriminations, of whatever nature, by
which industrial combinations secure monopoly or become dangerous to the public
welfare." Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP.
No. 533, pt. 1, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1914) (quoting the Final Report of the Industrial
Commission, submitted to Congress in 1902, vol. 19, at 650-51); see also the views of
President Wilson, supra note 216.
218. Congress believed that if the FTC provided the necessary information, imperfect
markets would often correct themselves. The House Report on the bill that later became
the FTC Act suggested that publication of excessively high business profits would
encourage other firms to enter the industry, thus lowering prices. H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1914). One businessman testified that the publication of profit levels
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problems,219 or insufficient resources220 caused the free market to
protect inadequately consumer welfare in the short term. Congress
believed that in these circumstances FTC intervention to correct
market failures, performed prudently, could prevent unfair transfers
of wealth from consumers to producers, improve economic efficiency,
and otherwise improve "consumer welfare."
With the one prohibition against "unfair methods of
competition" of section 5, Congress attempted to stop "unfair"
would cause businesses to keep prices low in order to avoid attracting new competition.
Testimony of Wadill Catchings, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1914). Other members of Congress also stated
their belief that the publication of profit information would invite entry, thereby obviating
the need for antitrust enforcement. Id. at 65, 204-05, 220. It was also stated that the
publication of the "special privileges or discriminations" used to gain monopolies would
ensure private actions which would bring them to an end. See H.R. REP. No. 533 at 4-5;
see also 51 CONG. REC. 8843, 8858. 8980-81, 8983, 8985 (1914). The 1914 House
Commerce Committee Report stated that reports issued by the FTC would lead to an
"elevated business standard and a better busincss stability." Report of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 533. pt. 1, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1914). Congress also quoted, with approval, the preliminary Report of the
Industrial Commission, submitted to Congress in 1900: "The larger corporations-the
so-called trusts-should be required to publish annually a properly audited report showing
in reasonable detail their assets and liabilities, with profit and loss; such reports and audit
under oath to be subject to Government inspection. The purpose of such publicity is to
encourage competition when profits become excessive, thus protecting consumers against
too high prices and to guard the interests of employees by a knowledge of the financial
condition of the business in which they are employed." Id at 4.
219. In Federal Trade Comm'n v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929), the Court held that "[t]o
justify filing a complaint the public interest must be specific and substantial.... Some-
times, because, although the aggregate of the loss entailed may be so serious and
widespread as to make the matter one of public consequence, no private suit would be
brought to stop the unfair conduct, since the loss to each of the individuals affected is too
small to warrant it." Id. at 28. For the FTC's proceedings, see 5 F.T.C. 24 (1922).
In the Sherman Act debates, Senator George challenged the practical effect of such
consumer protectionism: "Will any single one of those men who have been thus wronged
to the amount of ten, fifteen, twenty, or fifty dollars bring a separate suit? How can he
maintain it? He is to employ a lawyer; he has to go to a distance of from 100 to 500 miles,
perhaps to a distant State, to maintain his suit. Who will do it? I ask Senators to stop and
reflect who will do it? Not one of them. If some great manufacturer has been injured by an
advance in the price of his raw material he can sue, but the poor man, the consumer, the
laborer, the farmer, the mechanic, the country merchant, all that large class of American
citizens who constitute 90 percent of our population and who are the real sufferers will
have no opportunity of redress, and the bill, so far as they are concerned, will be a snare
and a mere delusion." 21 CONG. REC. 3150 (1890). For a definition of the "free rider"
problem used in the context of an important area of antitrust concern, resale price
maintenance, see Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86,
91-92 (1964).
220. Senator Newlands, for example, stated his belief that private antitrust suits would
not eliminate unfair competition because "[t]he suit of an individual against a strong
combination is the contest of a lilliputian against a giant." 51 CONG. REc. 11,083 (1914).
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transfers of wealth caused by such divergent practices as predation
and fraud.2 1 The market failures that section 5 was meant to correct,
however, can be classified into two general categories, a distinction
developed in collaboration with my colleague, Neil Averitt.222
Congress was primarily concerned with market failures that were
external to consumers and restricted or distorted consumers'
available options. Those are the traditional antitrust concerns and are
the responsibility of the Bureau of Competition of the FTC.2 3 At the
same time, however, Congress wanted to prevent market failures that
occurred internally to consumers and affected their ability to choose
freely and rationally among the options the market presented. This
latter category is the area of concern of the FTC's Bureau of
Consumer Protection.224 These two main departments of the FTC
221. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717. The statute was
subsequently amended to add the prohibition against "unfair acts or practices." Id (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)). Interestingly, Congress did not always use
such terms as "fraud," "predation," and "price discrimination" to stand for totally separate
problems. The following exchange, which occurred toward the end of the House debates,
illustrates the close linkage between the competition and consumer protection missions of
the statute.
MR. COOPER. Suppose a corporation worth $100,000,000 should advertise that it
would sell and that it does actually sell its product to one consumer in a certain
town for 50 cents, and should advertise that it would not sell and does refuse to
sell to any other in that town or in that State for less than $1?
MR. STEVENS OF MINNESOTA. That is clearly fraud .... [S]uch an act might have
a result to greatly injure the public by interfering and destroying competition,
which the public needs, and that is the purpose of such discrimination. To that
extent the injury and intent and result would be a fraud upon the public, now
known to the law and under the jurisdiction of this bill.
51 CONG. REC. 14,936 (1914). A short time later Representative Cooper inquired whether
there would be any fraud if a corporation "sells its product below cost throughout a
certain county or perhaps an entire State, but does not increase the cost of the product to
consumers in any other community or State." Representative Stevens replied: "Mr.
Speaker, our bill does meet the situation, in this way: Where there is a practice or a class
of practices which has for its main purpose an injury to the public by eliminating
competition which ought to exist in the public interest, in such cases it is a fraud on the
public, both as to purpose and results." lId at 14,937.
Because of our current view that fraud and these antitrust concerns are separate
problems, Representative Stevens' views might seem somewhat puzzling. Perhaps he was
condemning both types of action as a "fraud on the public" because each "unfairly" took
consumers' property.
222. See Averitt, Unfair Acts or Practices, supra note 157, at 281-84.
223. The work of the Bureau of Competition (BC) comes under the broad heading of
antitrust; it deals with monopolization, cartels, resale price maintenance, mergers, and
similar issues. See generally, Averitt, Unfair Methods, supra note 156.
224. The Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP) prevents or redresses a number of
practices that directly injure consumers, such as fraud, deception, the provision of
insufficient consumer information and unfair credit practices. See generally Averitt, Unfair
Acts or Practices, supra note 157.
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were designed to work together to provide two levels of protection
for consumers, addressing both internal and external market failures,
thereby ensuring that consumers received the full benefits flowing
from a competitive market.225 No consumer choices were to be
artificially impeded.
The Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion normally are thought of as performing substantially different
functions. It is tempting to think of these functions as being very
different and only related on the most general and abstract level,
insofar as both Bureaus ultimately attempt to improve consumer
welfare. Both the antitrust and consumer protection missions,
however, were originally authorized by the single prohibition against
"unfair methods of competition." The Congress that used this single
phrase to establish one Commission to deal with both kinds of
problems surely considered them to be closely related.
Both the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer
Protection were created to prevent certain "unfair" transfers of
225. It should be noted that these two levels of protection do not perfectly correspond
to the respective functions of the BC and the BCP that have evolved over time.
The following chart attempts to illustrate the synthesis of the FTC's purpose with the
advantage of hindsight. A modem observer might state that the goals of both the BC and
the BCP are virtually identical, including, primarily, the prevention of certain "unfair"
transfers of wealth and, secondarily, the enhancement of economic efficiency and other
goals.
A UNIFIED APPROACH To § 5
Goals (The same for each When? Whenever there is What should be prevented
half of the statute) a market failure or corrected?
-prevent unfair transfers
of "consumers' surplus"
-encourage economic
efficiency, especially if
the benefits accrue to
consumers
-prevent immoral business
competition
-promote entrepreneurial
opportunity
Bureau of Competition
external to the consumer, A. The manifestations
and caused by -monopolies
-imperfect -cartel, etc.
information B. The market failure
-free rider should be directly
problems corrected
-others
Bureau of Consumer Protection
internal to the consumer, A. The manifestations
and caused by -fraud
-imperfect -coercion, etc.
information B. The market failure
-free rider should be directly
problems corrected
-a lack of
free will
-others
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wealth and to enhance economic efficiency.226 These goals are sought
whenever there are market failures that interfere with the operations
of the free market.22 7 In these cases the FTC may either correct the
market failure directly or intervene in the market and undo the
anticompetitive effect of the failure. 228
Congress' overall mission in passing the FTC Act was to
strengthen and improve the Sherman Act, and to better implement its
competition goals. Congress viewed "competition" as the rule of the
marketplace that would best achieve and enhance "consumer
welfare," as Congress defined the term. Congress charged the FTC
with carrying out its wishes in a faithful manner, subject to a crucial
constraint: the FTC can act only when the free market does not
function properly, and only when the FTC, by acting, is likely to
improve consumer welfare.
The FTC Act is a more forward-looking and flexible statute than
is the Sherman Act. It also encompasses a more expansive range of
trade practices, such as unethical or fraudulent business practices. But
its ultimate goals were identical to those of the Sherman Act.
The Clayton and Celler-Kefauver Acts
Experience with the Sherman Act and the Supreme Court
decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States229 led Congress to
conclude that additional antitrust legislation was necessary.230 In
enacting the FTC and Clayton Acts, Congress made two virtually
simultaneous responses.231 The FTC Act, as we have seen, reflected
226. The primary difference is that the BC is also concerned with reducing the social
and political power of large corporations. The other goals overlap. For example, even
though the prevention of immoral acts is normally thought of as a BCP concern, immoral
acts can also constitute predatory practices.
227. Many market failures, such as imperfect information, can trigger violations of
either half of the statute, corresponding to both the BC and the BCP. Others, however,
such as the absence of free will, seem more closely linked to only one half, either the BC
or the BCP.
228. For example, suppose that a monopoly has arisen through "unfair methods of com-
petition." The FTC might be forced to intervene directly into the marketplace and impose
structural relief. But if, to use the suggestion often made in the legislative history, see
supra note 218, publishing the profits earned by the monopolist would be likely to cause
entry into the market which would erode the monopoly, structural relief might not be
necessary.
229. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
230. For a more detailed discussion of the effect of this case, see Averitt, Unfair Meth-
ods, supra note 156.
231. The FTC Act was enacted September 16, 1914, and the Clayton Act, October 15,
1914. In the FTC Act debates Senator Lippitt stated: "Here is the judiciary bill, the
Clayton bill; they are all involved together. The instant you pass this bill you have got to
go on and consider the Clayton bill, which is interlocked with it." 51 CONG. REC. 13,164
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the belief that since it was impossible fully to specify in advance all of
those practices which might harm competition, it was necessary to
enact a broad prohibition and to leave the implementation specifics to
an administrative agency.232  The Clayton Act233  reflected a
congressional desire to prohibit specific practices believed to be
harmful. Several legislators believed that the Clayton Act was
duplicative and unnecessary because the broad prohibitions of the
FTC Act encompassed all the specific interdictions contained in the
Clayton Act.3 4 Nevertheless, the prevailing view was that the Clayton
Act was justified as a way of insuring that a number of particular
practices would be banned.235 This approach also led, in 1950, to the
primary restatement and extension of the Act, the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act.236
(1914).
232. As Justice Brandeis eloquently observed in a dissenting opinion in Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 434 (1920), "The Clayton Act ... was framed largely with
a view to making more effective the remedies given by the Sherman Law. The Federal
Trade Commission Act... created an administrative tribunal, largely with a view to regu-
lating competition."
The passage of the Clayton Act was an election promise of the Democratic Party
under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson who stated in 1913 that society was sufficiently
familiar with the processes and methods of monopoly and restraints of trade so that
legislation could be passed to deal with price discrimination and other unfair trade
practices. See W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACr 7 (1968).
233. 16 U.S.C. § 12 (1914). For a more detailed account of the legislative history of the
Clayton Act, see W. LETWIN, supra note 24, ch. 7; D. MARTIN, supra note 127; 2 A.
TOULMIN, supra note 62, ch. 1.
234. For example, Senator Newlands, the principal sponsor of the FTC Act, stated:
"[The Judiciary Committee] can, if it chooses, taking the view that is entertained by the
Interstate Commerce Committee, conclude that section 5 covers all the various practices
that in the common vernacular are termed 'unfair competition,' and having come to that
conclusion, the Judiciary Committee can, if it chooses, leave out all legislation with
reference to specific practices which are today regarded as unfair competition, or they can
put them in, according to their pleasure." 51 CONG. REc. 12,030 (1914); see also id. at
15,829 (remarks of Sens. Borah and Culberson).
235. Senator Clapp expressed what very well might have been Congress' final opinion
on this proposition: "[T]hose things that may be made plain, upon which we are generally
agreed, should be prohibited. We should prohibit them, and then leave the Commission
with that territory to work in which we are unable to cover by specific cases." l at 14,259.
236. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1950). Another major amendment was the Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936), which prohibited certain forms of non-cost-justified price dis-
crimination between businesses that purchase the same goods where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.
Space does not permit a full examination of the goals of the Robinson-Patman Act. It is
relatively certain, however, that the Act was not passed solely to increase economic effi-
ciency, although efficiency was mentioned as a legislative goal. See, e.g., Committee on the
Judiciary, H.R. REP. NO. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 306, 368 (1936). The legislators also
stated that their intent was not to cause higher prices for consumers. Id. at 368-69.
Congress was probably more concerned, however, with the financial status of small
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The Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prevents firms from acquiring rival
companies where "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."' ' 7 The
overall purpose of the Act, stated in the Senate Judiciary
Committee's report on the final bill, was to prevent such mergers in
their incipiency.238 The legislators explicitly expressed their desire for
competition.239 Congress, in other words, wanted to implement
essentially the same goals as those embodied in the Sherman and FTC
Acts.
More specifically, Congress wanted to stop the formation of mo-
nopolies that might engage in supracompetitive pricing that, in Con-
gress' opinion, unfairly transferred consumers' wealth to monopolists.
Some advocates pressed for passage of the Clayton Act because some
firms otherwise would have "the power to arbitrarily control prices
and thus exact unjust profits from the people."240 The remarks of one
Senator expressed a desire to protect consumers and to encourage
corporate efficiency in the belief that these benefits would be passed
on to consumers: "The chief purpose of antitrust legislation is for the
protection of the public, to protect it from extortion practiced by the
trust, but at the same time not to take away from it any advantages of
cheapness or better service which honest, intelligent cooperation may
bring."241
Thus, Congress remained preoccupied, as it was when it passed
the Sherman and FTC Acts, with the redistributive effects of market
power. While it wanted to achieve its direct consumer impact goals,
Congress wanted to accomplish them in a manner that did not unduly
businesses.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914).
238. "Briefly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies,
seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and in
themselves, are not covered by the Act of July 2, 1890, or other existing anti-trust acts, and
thus, by making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and
monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation." Senate Judiciary Report,
quoted in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 264 F. 138, 162 (E.D. Mo. 1920),
affd, 258 U.S. 451 (1921).
239. For example, Representative Morgan stated that "the one thing we wish to main-
tain, and retain and sustain, is competition. We want to destroy monopoly and restore and
maintain competition." 51 CONG. Rac. 9265 (1914).
240. Id Representative Hamlin stated: "The only reason why trusts and combinations
are declared illegal is because they are organized and operated for the express purpose of
more effectively exploiting the people by taking advantage of their necessities and control
ling the price of those necessities to the consumers, as well as the purchase price which
they have to pay for the raw material." IL at 9556. Senator Cummins wanted to protect
"the people against the rapacity and the avarice of monopoly... ." Id- at 14,256.
241. Id. at 14,223 (remarks of Sen. Thompson).
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sacrifice corporate efficiencies, largely because that sacrifice could
harm the public. This evidence, 42 although somewhat limited, when
analyzed in light of the general proconsumer, procompetition goals of
the antimerger laws, suggests that a merger should be prohibited,
despite potential gains in efficiency, if that merger is likely to create a
firm with market power that could adversely affect consumers.
Other evidence suggests that Congress was also motivated by
concern for the social and political power possessed by large
corporations, based on the fear that the mere existence of this power
had the potential to cause social disruption. One Representative, for
example, condemned the discretionary political power of men like
J.P. Morgan:
[A]ll of the power represented by this wealth is lodged in the hands
of a few men. Can anyone doubt the danger which such concentra-
tion permits?
... It is useless to say that the power represented will never be used
to the detriment of the American people.... [I]t is too great a
power to be concentrated-it affords too great a temptation to frail
humanity.243
Congress also worried that the concentrated wealth and power of
those who controlled large corporations could threaten the very fabric
of the nation. The House Committee Report accompanying section 8,
which deals with interlocking directorships, warned that "[t]he
concentration of wealth, money, and property in the United States
under the control and in the hands of a few individuals or great
corporations has grown to such an enormous extent that unless
checked it will ultimately threaten the perpetuity of our
institutions. ''244 Acknowledging the possibility that antimerger
242. See supra text accompanying note 241. In addition, see infra text accompanying
note 245 (remarks of Sen. Borah).
243. 51 CONG. REC. 9186 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Helvering). See also remarks of Sen-
ator Cummins, Id at 14,536.
244. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914). Representative Kelly echoed
this fear: "Enterprises with great capital have deliberately sought not only industrial
domination but political supremacy as well.... Great combinations of capital for many
years have flaunted their power in the face of the citizenship, they have forced their way
into politics and government, they have dictated the making of laws or scorned the laws
they did not like, they have prevented the free and just administration of law. In doing this
they have become a menace to free institutions and must be dealt with in patriotic spirit
without fear or favor." 51 CONG. REC. 9086 (1914). Representative Madden expressed the
same concern, but in stronger language: "[T]he invisible Government which has controlled
the visible government in this Nation for many years has been unscrupulous big
business.... If this Nation is to be a Government of the people by crooked big business,
the doom of our free institutions is assured." Id. at 9087.
Representative Nelson used equally striking words: "As surely and rapidly as the
properties of all the people pass into the hands of a few trust magnates, public sentiment,
rapidly forming, when once fully aroused, will multiply the socialistic vote as a protest
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legislation might sacrifice corporate efficiency, one Senator
nevertheless strongly condemned monopolies and trusts because they
"divide our people into classes, breed discontent and hatred, and in
the end riot, bloodshed, and French revolutions."2 45 This brief
examination of the Clayton Act's legislative history suggests that its
substantive goals were identical to those of the Sherman and FTC
Acts; the desire to prevent transfers of wealth from consumers to pro-
ducers caused by monopoly pricing was Congress' paramount, but not
exclusive, goal. A more detailed analysis of the Clayton Act's primary
amendment and restatement, the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act,
reveals similar concerns.
The Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act
Section 7 of the original Clayton Act prevented companies from
purchasing the stock of rival companies if the acquisition of that stock
might lessen competition.246 A large number of companies evaded the
prohibitions of the Act, however, by accomplishing mergers through
asset acquisition.247
A 1948 study by the FTC describing the post-World War II
merger movement248 concluded that corporate acquisitions from 1940
to 1947 had caused the disappearance of almost 2,500 firms with total
assets of more than five billion dollars, representing approximately
5.5% of all manufacturing assets in the United States at the time.249
The report warned:
[N]o great stretch of the imagination is required to foresee that if
nothing is done to check the growth in concentration, either the
giant corporations will ultimately take over the country, or the
Government will be impelled to step in and impose some form of
against monopoly privilege. And the day when the people must choose between public
ownership of trusts for the benefit of all and the private ownership of the trusts for the
privileges of the few, will witness the final triumph of socialism in this country. Therefore,
we should act in our days of grace, while we are yet masters of our national destiny." I at
9167.
245. I& at 15,955 (remarks of Sen. Borah).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914).
247. See Arrow-Hart Hegeman Elec. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 291 U.S. 587
(1934); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
248. FTC, REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT V (1948).
249. Id. at 17. For a more detailed discussion of the FTC report and other studies of the
period on corporate mergers, see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of
Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226,230-33 (1961), and the sources cited therein.
Many of the citations and references in this section of the paper are from Bok's article.
For other discussions of the legislative history, see D. MARTIN, supra note 127, ch. 7;
Muffs, The Effciency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 381 (1980); Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 766 (1952).
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direct regulation in the public interest.250
In recognition of this increased concentration,25' the Celler-Kefauver
Act was enacted to ensure that the antimerger laws applied to acquisi-
tion of assets as well as stock.252
The most comprehensive judicial expression of the goals of the
amendment is the famous statement by Chief Justice Warren in
Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States:' 53
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the
1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising
tide of economic concentration in the American economy....
Other considerations cited in support of the bill were the
desirability of retaining "local control" over industry and the
protection of small businesses. Throughout the recorded discussion
may be found examples of Congress' fear not only of accelerated
concentration of economic power on economic grounds, but also of
the threat to othervalues a trend toward concentration was thought
to pose.254
The following section examines the Celler-Kefauver Act's
legislative history to find support for the Chief Justice's conclusion. It
250. lFTC, REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT V, at 68.
251. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (quoted in Brown Shoe v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962)).
Although Congress believed that the nation was experiencing a great increase in
industrial concentration, this perception was probably false. One study of the time, and
several subsequent studies, have largely confirmed the conclusion that the merger wave of
this period was relatively harmless, and that industrial concentration was not growing
during this period. See E. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY
PROBLEM 16-43 (1957); Bok, supra note 249, at 231-33. Even if Congress' perception was
incorrect, however, "Congress relied heavily upon the Commission report in enacting the
amended section 7, and no judge can overlook this point in carrying out the task of
interpreting the statute in accordance with the intentions and desires of its framers. This is
not to say that every legislative misconception must be rigorously applied until it is
formally retracted. But even in the foggy world of antitrust, it is no simple thing for a court
to overrule a major premise of Congress by appeal to the supervening authority of the
Review of Economics and Statistics. Thus, if we are to gain an understanding of the outer
limits of the court's discretion under section 7, we must turn to the reports and debates
which culminated in the passage of the amendment." Id. at 234. (footnotes omitted).
252. In most respects the fundamental purposes of the Act were redebated.
Representative Celler, for example, stated: "I feel that most of the gentlemen who oppose
the bill would like to repeal the Clayton Act in its entirety. That is the import of their
argument, it strikes me." 95 CONG. REc. 11,489 (1949). Representative Keating added:
"Mr. Speaker, the issue is very clear. Either we should repeal the Clayton Act entirely or
we should amend it to make it effective." Id. See also Muris, supra note 249, at 393 n.47.
253. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
254. Id. at 315. The first sentence was later quoted in United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). The Senate Report stated that a primary purpose of
the Act was "to limit future increases in the level of economic concentration resulting
from corporate mergers and acquisitions .... S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1950).
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examines, in turn, the legislators' efficiency, distributive or consumer
impact, and other goals.
Improving Economic Efficiency
The quoted passage from Brown Shoe did not mention economic
efficiency as one of Congress' central objectives. Nor does Professor
Bok find in the legislative record much evidence of a congressional
concern for efficiency. He noted that
none of the justifications for mergers by big companies were
accorded any significance by Congress. Efficiency, expansion, and
the like were ignored or simply brushed aside in the deliberations.
Even opponents of the bill did not seek to argue that the interests
of largest companies would be infringed unwisely or unfairly by the
bill.255
He therefore concluded that improved efficiency was not a central
goal of the Celler-Kefauver Act. 56 Of course, other commentators
believe that, in amending section 7, Congress had significant
efficiency goals.25 7 These scholars, however, are impeded by their
inability to point to a sufficient amount of evidence in the legislative
history indicating that economic efficiency figured significantly in the
debates leading to the 1950 amendment.258
255. Bok, supra note 249, at 307.
256. Bok's observations imply that Congress did not mean to provide an efficiencies
defense in merger cases: "There is little basis for concluding that the achievement of lower
costs as such should give rise to favored treatment under Section 7. The possibility of
lower costs was brushed aside in the legislative deliberations and there is every reason to
believe that Congress preferred the noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated markets
to limited reductions in the cost of operations." Id at 318 (citations omitted). See also id.
at 236-37. The conclusion that Congress was disinclined to permit an efficiencies defense
was adopted, by the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (quoting Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344
(1962)): "Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware
that some mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the
balance in favor of protecting competition."
257. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, at subch. 9E; Muris, supra note 249,
at 393-402. This interpretation opens the door to the assertion that a merger likely to lead
to increased efficiency should not be illegal.
258. For the most comprehensive analysis of the legislative history of the Celler-
Kefauver Antimerger Act which advocates the conclusion that Congress had strong effi-
ciency goals and did not mean to preclude an efficiencies defense in merger cases, see
Muris, supra note 249, at 393-402.
Professor Muris provides four categories of direct evidence that Congress indicated
that increased efficiency should point towards the legality of mergers:
1. Evidence from the legislative history of prior bills on the same subject which
Congress chose not to enact. However, Muris noted that the first serious efforts to amend
the Clayton Act began in 1941. 1l at 393. Between 1943 and 1949 sixteen bills to amend
the Clayton Act were introduced in Congress. See D. MARTIN, supra note 127, at 221.
Thus, quotations from the legislative record of a selected number of these bills, none of
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Despite the recent vintage of this amendment, a search of its
legislative history reveals no evidence of congressional concern with
allocative inefficiency. Nor do those scholars advocating a strong
which were enacted, provide only very indirect insight into the motivations of the
Congress that, years later, passed the Celler-Kefauver Act.
2. Mergers between relatively small firms were permitted. This probably only meant,
however, that Congress exempted small mergers because there was little chance that they
would lead to a firm with a monopoly power, even if they resulted in a firm that was more
efficient and more competitive.
3. The "failing company" exception. The wealth redistribution and efficiency effects
of this exception are complex and uncertain. Since the failing company exception can save
the costs of bankruptcy proceedings, and the management best able to utilize the failing
assets will often be a horizontal competitor, the failing company exception could be
justified from an efficiency perspective. The exception also, however, has clear distributive
effects. It could enable the stockholders and creditors of the acquired company to receive
more for their assets. It could also cause a transfer of wealth to the acquiring company if,
through the addition of the productive facilities of the failing company, it increased its
market power.
The failing company exception could also result in benefits to consumers, for without
it there could be a short-term under-supply of the failing company's product. This could
result in higher prices to consumers in the short term. Further, if a high level of industry
instability increased the cost of capital to businesses in that industry, consumer prices
could go up in the long term.
Although Bok recognized that Congress had a number of motivations, he concluded
that "Congress's general unconcern with efficiency would indicate that this factor cannot
be accorded much importance in accounting for the exception." Bok, supra note 249, at
340 (footnote omitted). For a full analysis of the failing company exception, see id. at
339-47. Further, the goals of an exception to an Act cannot necessarily be attributed to
the rest of the Act.
4. Professor Muris quotes a discussion between Senator Kefauver and Senator
O'Connor involving two newspapers that might want to save costs by having "an arrange-
ment by which one plant would print both newspapers, with each one following its own
editorial policy." Muris, supra note 249, at 400-01 (citing 96 CONG. REC. 16,456 (1950)).
The discussion concluded that such a proposal would violate the law only where "'it would
result in a substantial lessening of competition.... It may well be that by effecting a better
arrangement for a more profitable undertaking, in the manner described, competition would
be stimulated rather than lessened.' Id. (quoting Sen. O'Connor) (emphasis added by
Muris).
Despite his contention that this dialogue evidences an intent to allow efficiency de-
fenses, the venture was to be allowed only if it did not result in a "substantial lessening of
competition." Thus, the joint venture was not to be allowed, despite its
efficiency-enhancing possibilities, if it might lead to a firm with market power. This
exchange probably means that the Act was passed to stop the formulation of firms with
market power, and that efficiencies are to be considered only if the merger would not be
likely to lead to a significant chance of a lessening of competition or to higher prices for
consumers. But, if a merger is not likely to lead to a lessening of competition or to higher
prices for consumers, then it should not be prohibited by § 7. Even if the author's and
Professor Muris' examinations of the legislative history failed to uncover every reference
to a congressional desire for efficiency, it seems fair to conclude that Congress' principal
concerns lay elsewhere.
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efficiency orientation to the Act present such evidence.2 9 The record
does contain, however, considerable discussion of productive
efficiency.
It should come as no surprise that opponents of the bill asserted
that it would inhibit the efficiency of both large and small firms.
2 60
Even the Act's proponents admitted that efficiency was important.
261
Their view, however, was that the Act would help, not hinder, corpo-
rate efficiency. As one Representative stated, "[w]hen three or four
producers take the place of 20 or 30 the chances are great that price
competition will be crippled-that the big concerns will adopt a live
and-let-live policy towards each other at the sacrifice of their
efficiency and their progress. '262 To Representative Celler, "bigness"
did not "mean efficiency, a better product, or lower prices. '263 Rather,
the "main reason for antitrust laws is that we believe the competitive
system is more efficient than monopoly. '1264 Moreover, he deprecated
"the idea that efficiency and lower prices only come with bigness. We
now know that in many lines the middle-sized concerns are either
more efficient than the big ones, or else they are of no positive
difference. And lower prices do not always accompany bigness. '265
259. See discussion of Muris, supra note 258.
260. For example, Representative Goodwin stated: "By preventing harmless and rea-
sonable mergers among small and medium-sized concerns, this bill by freezing them to
their present status of size will foreclose the chance that they may by consolidation or
acquisition ever approximate either the size or efficiency that the big competitors have
already achieved. Thus we will hurt small business and help big business." 95 CONG. REC.
11,487 (1949); see also Hearings before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 140 (1950) (statement of the National Tool & Die
Mfg. Ass'n) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; see also Hearings Before House
Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1949) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings] (statement of Gilbert Montague): "[T]hese bills will handicap the small and
medium-sized corporation, and will protect the large corporation, and will lay the dead
hand of arrested development upon the entire national economy." Cf. id. at 83: "[A]n
acquisition of this type could be justified in the public interest only if there were some
economies resulting, if there was some improvement in efficiency resulting therefrom."
(statement of John M. Blair, assistant chief economist, FTC).
261. Senator Donelly, for example, was concerned with the bill's "effect on prices, the
effect on productive efficiency." Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 308.
262. 95 CONG. REC. 11,723 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Yates).
263. Id at 11,717 (1949); see also id. at 11,496 (statement of Rep. Boggs).
264. House Hearings, supra note 260, at 61.
265. Id at 64. Further, Representative Carroll stated that "[flree competition safe-
guards not only the consuming public; it also encourages small business and the develop-
ment of new types of business and industry." 95 CONG. REC. 11,493 (1949).
Representative Yates wrote, "When three or four producers take the places of 20 or 30,
the chances are great that price competition will be crippled, that declining markets will be
dealt with by restriction of output instead of by price reduction, that the big concerns will
adopt a live-and-let-live policy towards each other at the sacrifice of their efficiency and
their progress. . . ." Id.
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Thus, Congress' efficiency concerns in passing the
Celler-Kefauver Act were substantially identical to its goals in 1914
and in 1890. Allocative efficiency was not a motivating factor, but
productive efficiency was a goal of legislators on both sides of the
debates. Given the legislators' passion for "competition," it seems
clear that they were willing to risk some efficiency losses in order to
prevent the possible rise of market power. We can be certain that
Congress wanted to err on the side of losing productive efficiency
rather than risk the formation of market power. It is, however,
unclear how far Congress would have been willing to go. There is no
indication that Congress chose to impose large and certain efficiency
losses to gain small and speculative market power benefits. Given
Congress' general desire to encourage efficiency in antimerger
legislation, categories of mergers likely to result in large and certain
efficiency gains should not be prevented short of a substantial risk
that the firms might acquire more than an insignificant degree of
market power.266
Protecting Consumers from Unfair Transfers of Wealth
In enacting the Celler-Kefauver Act, Congress was principally
concerned that mergers would create or increase market power
leading to supracompetitive pricing which directly harmed consumers.
Proponents of the legislation framed the economic issues in terms of
protecting consumers from monopolistic exploitation. One
Representative predicted that the legislation would help "to preserve
the chances of the average man to make a place for himself in
business and [protect] the consuming public from unfair
266. There was apparently no explicit analysis of the possible tradeoffs involved in im-
plementing actions that simultaneously increase efficiency and raise prices to consumers.
A very close case was presented when an economist who testified in favor of the
legislation stated that mergers should be permitted up until the point where scale
economies in that industry were exhausted. See testimony of Dr. John D. Clark, member,
Council of Economic Advisors, House Hearings, supra note 260, at 37: "I am sure that you
would find, with respect to any of those companies that you have mentioned, that the
actual advantage of cost of production ceased to grow at a point of size far less than that
they have now reached. In other words, for example, I do not know the steel industry, but
supposing [sic] a $25,000,000 plant exhausted the opportunity for further reduction in unit
costs. That gives you a datum point from which to start in determining how far you ought
to permit the steel firms to grow in order to attain social advantage." As he stated that this
point would come at lower levels of concentration than existed at that time, he did not
seem to be advocating increased efficiency as justifying higher prices for consumers.
Although Bok does not believe that efficiency was one of Congress' primary goals, see
supra notes 255-56, he nevertheless wrote, "Perhaps more explicit guidance should be
demanded from Congress before adopting an interpretation which could block really
important increases in efficiency." Bok, supra note 249, at 318.
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exploitation. 267 Another accused certain companies of "maintaining
high prices which injure the consumer" and called monopoly prices
"outrageous. '268 Quoting with approval from the FTC's report, a
Representative perceived that "under competitive capitalism
consumers are protected from high prices by the constant rivalry
among numerous firms for a greater share of the market. '269 A
Senator castigated opponents of the bill:
The whole trouble with you folks is, a lot of you forget there is such
a thing as the consumer, as the great American buyer, the fellow
who keeps these beloved corporations you love so much alive, and
makes them profitable and sometimes the Government of the
United States has to think about that great group of 140,000,000
consumers, and protect them against unjust exploitation. 270
One Representative recognized that a prophylactic action was
required because, once a company becomes a monopoly, "[t]he
protection that surrounds property rights has become attached to the
monopoly property."27'
Even opponents of the legislation framed the issues in terms of
harm to consumers, arguing, however, that there was no substantial
risk of exploitation of consumers. One opponent stated that the
merger bill was not needed because he did "not subscribe to the
doctrine that the businessmen of our country are crooks and that
those who carry on their business through the instrumentality of
corporations are out to fleece and extort higher and higher prices
from their customers." 272 Witnesses who testified against the
legislation also framed the issues in terms of benefits to consumers.273
267. 95 CONG. REC. 11,506 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Bennett).
268. Id at 11,492 (remarks of Rep. Carroll). Carroll also stated: "We all know that if
there is free competition the public will be protected from unduly high prices and artificial
scarcities .... [C]ompetition keeps prices low and quality high." ICE at 11,722.
269. Id at 11,506 (remarks of Rep. Byrne).
270. Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 180 (remarks of Sen.. Kilgore); see also 95
CONG. REC. 8147 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Patman).
271. 95 CONG. REC. 11,493 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Yates).
272. Id. at 11,490-91 (remarks of Rep. Goodwin).
273. James L. Donnelly, former Vice-President of the Illinois Manufacturing Associa-
tion, referred to "the customers' and consumers' interest which, of course, is paramount in
all these considerations.. . ." Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 30. Benjamin C. Marsh,
Executive Secretary, People's Lobby, Inc., stated: "The assumption seems to be that
competition and absence of monopoly will alone improve the quality of goods and reduce
the price, and so benefit consumers .... [T]his assumption is not justified ..... Id at 251.
One opponent of the bill even argued against the amendment on the ground that the
existing distribution of wealth in society was fair or, if anything, skewed unduly against the
fair and necessary interests of businesspersons. He presented excerpts from works by
Professor Slichter of Harvard University at the House Hearings, attempting to
demonstrate that a fair distribution of income resulted from technological progress: "[T]he
gains of technological progress have not gone in the main to capitalists, as Marx thought
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In summary, both supporters and opponents of the amendment
wanted to prevent consumers from paying artificially high prices. The
prevailing legislators feared higher prices due to market power so
much that they wanted to stop trends towards concentration in their
incipiency.27 4
Additional Goals
An analysis of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act
leads to the conclusion that the implications of rising industrial
concentrations in the American economy were Congress' dominant
concern.275 Congress of course was concerned with concentration in
particular markets and the amendment was worded to apply to all
mergers that might affect competition "in any line of commerce. '276
It is unlikely, however, that Congress was concerned only with
such economic matters as efficiency and the distribution of wealth.277
Congress also feared that high levels of economic concentration might
they would, or even to consumers, but to employees.... Does the economy distribute its
product widely and fairly? ... There is no basis for the oft-expressed fears that incomes
are becoming concentrated in the hands of property owners.... [S]erious inequities in the
distribution of income are inadequate compensation for pioneering and risk taking and
inadequate compensation for holders of fixed-income securities." House Hearings, supra
note 260, at 107-08 (remarks of Mr. Montague); see also discussion between Sen. Wiley
and Sen. Kefauver, 95 CONG. RP-C. 16,490 (1949).
274. As the Court stated in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), "[A]
keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw was the rising tide of economic
concentration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time when the trend
to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency. Congress saw
the process of concentration in American business as a dynamic force; it sought to assure
the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this force at its outset
and before it gathered momentum." Id at 317-18 (footnotes omitted).
275. So great was the congressional fear of industrial concentration that it mandated
changes in the standards of proof of mergers' anticompetitive consequences. For example,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), held
that "[t]his intense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants
dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or
probable anticompetitive effects." Id at 363. The Court went on to state: "Such a test
lightens the burden of proving illegality only with respect to mergers whose size makes
them inherently suspect in light of Congress' design in § 7 to prevent undue
concentration." Id The Brown Shoe Court noted "[t]hat § 7 was intended to apply to all
mergers-horizontal, vertical or conglomerate .... Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 317 n.31 (1962) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949)).
Members of Congress made numerous references to conglomerate mergers. Congressman
Boggs, for example, stated that the Act should apply to conglomerate acquisitions because
"this is one of the most detrimental movements to a free enterprise economy .... This is
the type which carries the activities of giant corporations into all sorts of fields, often
completely unrelated to their normal operations." 95 CONG. REc. 11,496 (1949).
276. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1951).
277. See supra notes 255-56 & accompanying text.
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have disquieting political and social ramifications. Many of the ex-
pressed misgivings regarding undue corporate aggrandizement of
power were relatively mild and ambiguous.278 Other warnings,
however, were chilling, drawing analogies to the alarming
consequences of concentration abroad.279 Senator Kefauver, one
leading sponsor of the bill, stated:
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in
other nations where mergers and concentrations have placed
economic control in the hands of very few people is too clear to
pass over easily. A point is eventually reached, and we are rapidly
reaching that point in this country, where the public steps in to take
over when concentration and monopoly gain too much power. The
taking over by the public through its government always follows
one or two methods and has one or two political results. It either
results in a Fascist state or the nationalization of industries and
thereafter a Socialist or Communist state280
278. One Representative cautioned that "[t]here has been a growing trend toward eco-
nomic concentration in the United States... which has reached the stage at which it
constitutes a vital threat to the American way of life." 95 CONG. REC. 11,497 (1949)
(remarks by Rep. Boggs). Equally mild was the observation by Representative Celler that
"[b]igness does not mean efficiency, a better product, or lower prices." Id at 11,486
(1949).
279. Id at 11,486 (remarks of Rep. Celler): "I want to point out the danger of this trend
toward more and better combines. I read from a report filed with former Secretary of War
Royall as to the history of the cartelization and concentration of industry in Germany:
'Germany under the Nazi set-up built up a great series of industrial monopolies in steel,
rubber, coal and other materials. The monopolies soon got control of Germany, brought
Hitler to power and forced virtually the whole world into war.' " It should be noted that
Representative Celler's interpretation of the historical events which led to Hitler's rise to
power is by no means universally shared. See, e.g., A. BULLOCK, HITLER: A STUDY IN
TYRANNY (1962).
280. 96 CONG. REc. 16,452 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Kefauver). These strong views were
not expressed only by the principal sponsors of the amendment. See, e.g., id at 16,446
(remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney: "Collectivism is moving forward apace throughout the
world, and industrial collectivism leads inevitably to political collectivism. That I would
like to avoid."), 16,503-04 (remarks of Sen. Aiken: "All of us know too well what has
happened in countries where opportunity has been vested in the hands of a few. The result
has been that either socialization or a totalitarian form of government has taken
over .... ).
Years earlier, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a proposal to Congress entitled
Recommendations to the Congress to Curb Monopolies and the Concentration of
Economic Power: April 24, 1938, proposing the creation of a Temporary National
Economic Committee. IL, reprinted in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 1941 (1938 volume), at 305-32. Roosevelt began his message to
Congress with the warning, "[T]he liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate
the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic
state itself.... Among us today a concentration of private power without equal in history
is growing.
"This concentration is seriously impairing the economic effectiveness of private
enterprise as a way of providing employment for labor and capital and as a way of assuring
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More than a generation after the end of World War II it is tempt-
ing to dismiss these statements as mere rhetoric. The sentiments,
however, differ only in degree from those expressed throughout the
Sherman,281 FTC,282 and Clayton Act 283 debates. The perceived rise in
industrial concentration in 1950 merely provided another occasion for
congressional repetition of the alarm regarding the increased social
and political power of big business.284
a more equitable distribution of income and earnings among the people of the Nation as a
whole." Id at 305-06. Professor Pitofsky, supra note 15, at 1064, concluded: "Virtually all
proponents of the bill who spoke asserted that the merger trend must be blocked because
concentrated economic power would lead to increased government control, because
freedom would corrode and totalitarianism prosper, and because absentee ownership by
large corporations would diminish local initiative and civic responsibility." (Footnote
omitted.) Bok expressed a similar view in his analysis of the legislative history of the
amendment. He concluded that "there emerges a common definition of the problem at
hand, a common philosophy as to its import, and a common notion, on a very general
plane, of what the new act could do about it .... This situation was appraised in the same
Jeffersonian, egalitarian fashion by almost all who spoke for the bill.... In the minds of
the Congressmen, the growth of these large economic groups could lead only to increasing
government control; freedom would corrode, and the nation would drift into some form of
totalitarianism." Bok, supra note 249, at 234-36 (footnote omitted).
281. See supra notes 136-42 & accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 206-09 & accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 240-45 & accompanying text.
284. Numerous statements in the legislative history display concern for the possible so-
cial and political implications of unduly high concentration levels. With the exception of
the statements mentioning conglomerate mergers, however, see supra note 275, it is
unclear whether this manifest anxiety is attributable to concentration within individual
markets or to aggregate levels of concentration. For example, Congress' references to
"economic concentration," "carteization and concentration," and "concentration and
monopoly" are ambiguous on this point. In light of the fact that Congress worded the final
bill in terms of "lines of commerce," Congress possibly was concerned only with
concentration levels within markets. Nevertheless, a large conglomerate might possess
almost as much social and political power as a similarly sized monopoly, and this country
could be taken over by large conglomerates as easily as by large monopolists. In light of
the fact that the merger problem facing Congress in 1950 primarily concerned mergers
within markets, it is not surprising that Congress paid very little attention to conglomerate
mergers. Nevertheless, if Congress had confronted this issue, see supra note 61 &
accompanying text, it might have been concerned also with aggregate levels of industrial
concentration in 1950.
An interesting unanswered question is whether the strong statements that condemned
the corporate aggrandizement of social and political power should make any difference in
merger cases. What difference would it make, in other words, if, as the Court stated in
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963), there are mergers
"whose size makes them inherently suspect in light of Congress' design in § 7 to prevent
undue concentration"? Should the horizontal merger guidelines be lowered when large
mergers are involved?
Even though § 7 was ultimately cast in terms of competition within markets, the
amendment was intended to apply to conglomerate mergers. See supra text accompanying
notes 277-78. Suppose that there were a large conglomerate merger that had no net effect
on individual markets. Could the FTC in carrying out its mission to enforce the "policy" or
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The debates also show a concern for the welfare of small busi-
nesses. In Brown Shoe, Chief Justice Warren characterized Congress'
desire to protect small businesses as going further than a directive to
assist them in borderline cases where so doing would be unlikely to
result in higher prices for consumers. 85 Although the debates do
evidence a desire to assist small businesses, it is doubtful that
Congress meant to do so if this would result in higher prices to
consumers?-%
"spirit" of the other antitrust laws, see supra note 163, use the congressional fear of
increased aggregate concentration levels (expressed in the legislative history of the
Sherman Act, the FTC Act, and the original Clayton Act, as well as in that of the
Celler-Kefauver amendmcnt) to halt a pure conglomerate merger that was neutral in its
economic effects? The question is, for now, unanswered.
285. Chief Justice Warren wrote, "It is competition, not competitors, which the Act
protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that
occasionally higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of
decentralization." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,344 (1962).
286. For example, in the Senate Hearings Senator O'Connor asked, "There are some
who contend that in instances where a closely held business with a very limited number of
principals might by reason of one of a number of causes wish to sell, wish to dispose of its
assets, whether they might be prevented from doing so, or be prevented from getting as
advantageous a consideration if this enactment is put through, rather than under existing
circumstances when they can negotiate possibly with another concern just about of the
same size, possibly, nearby, and whether you think it would in the end have any effect."
Rep. Patman replied, "I think the public interest is paramount. If this would be injurious
to the public I think it should be prevented, even though the owner would probably not
get as much. It is the public interest that is involved, and we should not permit these
consolidations and mergers to the extent that it will lessen competition or create
monopoly, looking at the public interest as No. 1." Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 131.
In the Senate debates Senator Keon asked: "[A] small-businessman can now sell to a large
competitor, whereas, from what the Senator says, if the bill became law, he would be
foreclosed from doing so." Senator O'Connor replied: "Not necessarily. It would all
depend upon whether or not the sale would have the effect of substantially lessening
competition." 96 CONG. REc. 16,441 (1950).
Another goal was to encourage corporate expansion through internal growth rather
than through merger. As the Court stated in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 370 (1963): "[S]urely one premise of an antimerger statute such as § 7 is that
corporate growth by internal expansion is socially preferable to growth by acquisition. See
also United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 947 (S.D.N.Y.
1965): "An underlying premise of the Clayton Act... is that internal expansion is more
healthy for the economy than expansion by merger."
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the Court suggested reasons
why Congress preferred internal corporate expansion rather than expansion by merger:
"A company's history of expansion through mergers presents a different economic picture
than a history of expansion through unilateral growth. Internal expansion is more likely to
be the result of increased demand for the company's products and is more likely to
provide increased investment in plants, more jobs and greater output. Conversely,
expansion through merger is more likely to reduce available consumer choice while
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Summary
The primary goals of the Clayton Act were virtually identical to
those of the Sherman and FTC Acts. The Clayton Act was passed pri-
marily to prevent mergers that might lead to the creation of corpora-
tions with sufficient market power to extract wealth unfairly from
consumers. The legislative record also evidences a congressional
desire to curb the growth of the social and political power of these
corporations and to protect small businesses, and suggests that
Congress wanted to encourage corporate efficiency. Although the
precise role that efficiency was intended to play in Clayton Act
analyses is unclear, the debates suggest that this Act, like the
Sherman and FTC Acts, is primarily concerned with the efficiency
benefits directly passed through to consumers. Congress did not
exhibit a desire to forego redistributive goals in order to give nascent
monopolists the profits that might flow from increased productive
efficiency. Thus, the Clayton Act, together with the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act, manifests the same proconsumer, antimonopoly,
anti-corporate power and pro-market control bias present in the
earlier legislation.
Despite the large number of factors influencing the passage of
the antimerger laws, Congress' central purpose deserves emphasis.
The antimerger statutes were passed primarily to benefit consumers
directly. The overriding economic purpose was the prevention of
consumer exploitation through supracompetitive pricing, a likely
consequence of merger-created market power. The concept of
allocative efficiency does not figure significantly in the legislative
record and no significant evidence exists that Congress was willing to
forego its market power concerns in order to increase corporate
efficiency. Congress hoped to preserve and achieve corporate
efficiencies, to be sure, but not at the cost of allowing significant
providing no increase in industry capacity, jobs or output. It was for these reasons, among
others, Congress expressed its disapproval of successive acquisitions." Id. at 345 n.72.
The assertion that there are sound economic reasons to prefer corporate growth by
internal expansion to growth through merger could be the subject of a lengthy discussion.
Regardless, the opinion of Congress should prevail; we must proceed upon the assumption
that corporate growth by internal expansion is socially preferable to growth by merger.
Moreover, this judgment may not have reflected any desire to sacrifice significant
productive efficiencies. While Congress has condemned the power of large companies, it
also encourages the growth of our economy. One way to reconcile these two beliefs is to
prefer corporate growth by internal expansion. By making mergers difficult, Congress may
have hoped to encourage more of this kind of growth. Perhaps Congress, in expressing this
preference, was making the judgment that there were few advantages to consumers that
resulted from corporate growth by merger. Congress may have passed the 1950
Amendment in part because it wanted the advantages that came from economic growth
but saw few advantages to consumers from mergers and many dangers that might instead
result.
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increases in market power. The legislative history suggests that
resolution of otherwise doubtful or ambiguous situations should be in
favor of a strict antimerger policy. Congress was willing to forego
relatively large efficiency gains in order to be very sure that it
prevented corporate acquisitions of market power, unless the re-
sulting efficiency gains would be both large and certain and the risk of
significant market power slight.
The implications of Congress' noneconomic concerns, however,
are less clear. It is extremely difficult to determine how, and to what
extent, to implement in an antitrust analysis the fervently expressed
congressional goal of preventing corporate aggrandizement of
political and social power or the congressional directive to assist small
businesses in ways that do not result in artificially high prices for
consumers. That determination is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, the use of Congress' economic goals-its distributive and
efficiency concerns-can be illustrated relatively easily. The next
section of this Article briefly analyzes a horizontal merger resulting in
a firm with monopoly power. This simplified analysis considers the
differences that might arise if redistributive goals, in addition to or
instead of efficiency goals, were taken into account in antitrust
decisionmaking.
Comparison of Efficiency and Wealth Transfer Goals: Analysis
of a Horizontal Merger
Distributive and efficiency goals often work in perfect harmony.
Monopoly pricing causes both allocative inefficiency and transfers of
wealth from consumers to producers; therefore, firms acquiring
monopoly power are viewed negatively from either a distributive or
efficiency perspective, at least initially. Similarly, business practices
that do not give rise to or take advantage of market power and thus
do not harm consumers would not be prohibited under either view of
the goals of the antitrust laws.287 Nevertheless, it often makes a
considerable difference whether wealth transfer goals, in addition to
or instead of efficiency goals, are ascribed to the antitrust laws.
An illustration of these differences is provided by a brief
examination of the economic consequences of a horizontal merger.288
287. This assumes that the practices neither harm consumers as a group nor "unfairly"
redistribute property rights among consumers.
288. This analysis omits any explicit consideration of the effects of the merger on small
businesses or on the social and political power of trusts or monopolies. The discussion is
based upon an analysis first proposed by Professor Williamson in Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Williamson, Economies]. It is often used by advocates of an efficiency orientation
to the antitrust laws as a guide to focus attention on the relevant issues. For example,
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Suppose the FTC, or a court, is deciding whether to prohibit a
horizontal merger, and there is a significant chance that this merger
might give the resulting firm substantial, persistent monopoly power.
If the new firm were able to restrict output and to charge monopoly
prices, both allocative inefficiency and the transfer of wealth from
consumers to the monopolist would result.289 Further, suppose that
the merger would also create significant efficiencies in production.
The wealth transfer and efficiency effects of this merger can be
illustrated by the following well-known diagram:290
P2
W A,: allocative ineffiency loss
Wealth Transfer
Price PI AC1
A2: AC2
cost savings
Q, Q2
Quantity
Judge Bork stated that this form of analysis "can be used to illustrate all antitrust
problems, since it shows the relationship of the only two factors involved, allocative
inefficiency and productive efficiency. The existence of these two elements and their
respective amounts are the real issues in every properly decided antitrust case. They are
what we have to estimate-whether the case is about the dissolution of a monopolistic
firm, a conglomerate merger, a requirements contract, or a price-fixing agreement." R.
BORK, supra note 2, at 108. For a more detailed discussion of the maximization of
allocative and productive efficiency in a horizontal merger context, see id., ch. 5, and
Muris, supra note 249, at 384-93. For a cogent analysis of the influence of politics on
antitrust enforcement, see Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional
Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587 (1982).
289. See supra notes 30-36 & accompanying text. This analysis assumes the existence of
significant barriers to entry, and ignores, for the sake of simplicity, many topics such as
incentives to innovate. For a detailed exposition of these assumptions and other issues in-
volved in the tradeoff, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 39, at -.
290. For a more detailed explanation of this diagram, see R. BORK, supra note 2, ch. 5
(citing Wiliamson, Economies, supra note 288).
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Under the theory that Congress was motivated by efficiency con-
siderations alone, Judge Bork interpreted the diagram, explaining
that
[t]he diagram assumes that the merger reduces the long-run
average costs of the two firms from AC, to AC2 but that the
increased market power created by the merger results in a
restriction of output so that the rate moves from Q1 to Q,. We then
see that consumers have lost output-for which they would have
been willing to pay an amount above cost equal to the area labeled
A-and have gained in resource savings an amount equal to the
area A,. Obviously, if A,, the cost savings, is larger than A,, the
dead-weight loss, the merger represents a net gain to all consumers.
If A, is larger than A,, a net loss results.291
Two additional points concerning this diagram should be ex-
plained. First, Judge Bork wrote that the area A2 represents a gain to
consumers. The direct effects of the merger, however, will not
produce this result. Because the monopolist charges the monopoly
price P2, and because A2 is below this line, all of the cost savings
directly accrue to the monopolist. Consumers might, of course,
receive some of these benefits indirectly,292 or in the long run,2gs but it
is also possible that part or all of these benefits will be wasted by the
monopolist in an effort to obtain or protect its monopoly.294 The
direct effect of the merger, however, is to give the cost savings, shown
as A,, to the monopolist as part of its monopoly profits.
More importantly, Judge Bork's discussion does not consider the
wealth that, without the merger, would have been consumer surplus,
but was transferred to the monopolist as a result of the merger.2 95 In
291. Id at 108.
292. The area, A2, which directly accrues to the monopolist, represents another compo-
nent of its monopoly profit. This portion of the monopoly profit, however, can be said not
to "cost" consumers of the product anything, unlike area W, because it did not exist before
the merger. It represents a loss to consumers only if the productivity gains could be
realized (perhaps after some period of time) without the merger. Moreover, since area A2
represents efficiency gains, fewer resources will go into making the product. These
resources will be freed for other uses and will accrue to society as a whole. Of course, it is
not possible to be sure that all or even most of the A, benefits will be passed on to
consumers of the product in question, or even to similarly situated consumers.
Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that part of the A, benefits should indirectly be passed
on to some consumers. See id- at 107-10.
293. See infra note 305. Further, consumers will be directly benefited if the efficiencies
are so large that prices decrease.
294. Judge Posner wrote: "[T]he expected profits of the merger will generate an
equivalent amount of costs as the firms vie to make such mergers or, after they are made,
to engross the profits generated by the high postmerger price through service, competition
or whatever." Posner, supra note 57, at 821. If this did happen, then the rectangle A2
should not be counted as a benefit of the merger. See Muris, supra note 249, at 392 n.41
for a discussion of Posner's arguments.
295. Judge Posner argues that because firms will compete to obtain monopoly profits,
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the diagram, the striped rectangle, W, represents the property that,
under the theory espoused by this Article, Congress meant to provide
to consumers, but that was obtained by the monopolist as a result of
the merger.
If a court viewed maximum economic efficiency as the only goal
of the antitrust laws, the merger would be prevented if and only if
area A 1, the allocative efficiency loss, exceeded area A2, the
productive efficiency gain.296 Alternatively, if the decisionmaker
believed that Congress cared only about preventing "unfair" transfers
of wealth from consumers to producers caused by market power, the
probable existence of area W would always require prohibiting the
merger.
A number of approaches, however, consider both efficiency and
redistribution, thus remaining faithful to Congress' design. For exam-
ple, the total "negative effects" of the merger-the allocative ineffi-
ciency (A1) plus the redistribution of wealth (W)-could be balanced
against the "positive" effects of the merger-the productive efficiency
gains (A2). The merger would be prevented only if the negative
effects of the merger were likely to outweigh its positive
consequences. 297
Another decisional rule that finds considerable support in the
part or all of this monopoly profit could be dissipated by wasteful non-price competition to
achieve or protect the monopoly. See supra note 54 & accompanying text. If the deci-
sionmaker believed that this were likely to occur, part or all of area W should be counted
as an efficiency loss. If, as this paper asserts, "consumers' surplus" was intended by
Congress to be the entitlement or property of consumers, and if, as a practical matter,
compensating side payments cannot be made, any merger analysis that only considered
efficiency would violate Pareto optimality. The consumers will suffer the allocative
inefficiency losses, area A1 and the loss of wealth, area W. The monopolist, and, indirectly,
consumers, and still other members of society will obtain the productive efficiency gains.
See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 108. Since these groups are not identical, even if area A2
exceeded the combined area of A1 and W, if the decisionmaker were to allow the merger,
one result of this welfare tradeoff would be to give wealth to some people and take wealth
away from others. Since, as a practical matter, no compensating side payments will ever be
made, the tradeoff calculation proposed by this model would violate Pareto optimality.
We might still, of course, subjectively wish to allow such a merger despite the fact that it
violates Pareto optimality.
296. This conclusion ignores Posner's contributions, supra notes 54 & 295. If the deci-
sionmakers were persuaded that Posner was correct a high proportion of the time and that
the conversion of monopoly profits to costs was significant and long lasting, area A2 would
not be entered into the analysis as a positive factor because both areas A, and W would
instead be counted as losses to society. The merger would, accordingly, be stopped in any
case in which the decisionmaker believed that area A,, A,, or R was likely to exist.
297. Moreover, this balancing could be done in a number of ways. If the decisionmaker
believed that Congress cared equally about efficiency and redistribution, they should be
weighed equally. If, as this Article asserts, it was believed that Congress cared much more
about wealth transfers, efficiency concerns could only be counted to break a tie or when
the wealth transfer was uncertain.
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antitrust laws' legislative histories would use the price paid by
consumers as the standard and condemn any merger likely to lead to
higher price for consumers. A price standard would probably come
closest to faithfully carrying out legislative intent, since Congress'
overriding concern was with preventing consumers from paying
supracompetitive prices. 298 In cases where price is unlikely to increase
there would be no wealth transfer from consumers to firms with
market power. This standard would consider only those efficiency
gains that accrued directly to consumers. Such gains would occur only
when the efficiency gains were so large that they resulted in
downward price pressure greater than the upward pressure resulting
from increased market power.299 This rule would not consider any
benefits of the merger directly retained by the monopolist. If it were
applied in the merger hypothetical, the resulting increase in
productive efficiency, A2, would not be counted because these
benefits accrue directly to the monopolist. Therefore, if either of the
negative consequences of the merger, areas A1, or W, are likely to
arise, the merger would be prevented. More concretely, if the
product's price is likely to increase, the merger should be prohibited.
If the price to consumers is unlikely to increase, however, the merger
would be allowed.3°
These are not the only possible ways to implement efficiency and
wealth transfer considerations in merger analysis. The important
point is to emphasize that the decision as to which goals are important
is crucial, and that the holdings in merger cases and other types of
298. See supra notes 80-82, 180-81, 240-41 & 267-72.
299. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 239, at-.
300. This would mean that those mergers creating market power which would result in
efficiencies so large that they lead to lower prices for consumers should be permitted. The
resulting monopoly profits would be allowed because they were not extracted from
consumers, who were made better off by the merger. In these cases the merging firms
would be allowed to keep all of their efficiency gains. Adoption of this standard would
imply that even though a more complex tradeoff might in some circumstances be
warranted, because Congress considered these other circumstances unlikely or too
difficult to predict or analyze, for simplicity it used prices-to-consumers as the standard.
As a practical matter, of course, this approach is best implemented when merger
guidelines are established, not on a case-by-case basis.
One critical determination would be of the proper burden of proof. For example, if
one believed that the redistributive concerns of the statute were paramount and that an
efficiency defense was appropriate, the very heavy burden of proving efficiency benefits
from a merger could be placed upon the defending party. As has been proposed by
Areeda and Turner, the decisionmaker could only count efficiency gains when they exceed
some threshold level. 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, at 148-50. Alternatively,
if one believed, contrary to the arguments presented in this Article, that the efficiency
goals of the statute were central, redistribution could only be permitted to count, for
example, as a "tipping" factor when the competing allocative and productive efficiency
considerations were roughly equal.
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antitrust actions will vary considerably under the different
approaches.301  Professor Williamson, commenting upon the
horizontal merger example, points out that "[i]nasmuch as the income
distribution which occurs is usually large relative to the size of the
dead-weight loss, attaching even a slight weight to income distribution
effects can sometimes influence the overall valuation significantly. '
'3°2
Judge Bork also acknowledges that if distributive effects were
counted in a horizontal merger analysis, "the results of trade-off
calculations would be significantly altered. '303 Indeed, even if the
wealth transfer is only assumed to be twice as large as the allocative
inefficiency, a very conservative assumption, the inclusion of this
factor in antitrust analysis would have a profound effect. A rule that
includes only efficiency considerations would permit far more
mergers than one considering both efficiency and redistributive
effects. Conversely, an approach considering only redistributive
effects would prevent far more mergers.
This analysis contains only a summary of the most direct and ob-
vious efficiency and distributive effects of a horizontal merger.3°4 A
301. For example, tying arrangements and attempts to monopolize produce obvious re-
distributive and efficiency effects. Tying arrangements are sometimes used by monopolists
as a way to price discriminate and thereby acquire purchasers' surplus. See R. POSNER,
supra note 4, at 176-80. A particularly dramatic monopolization illustration would occur if
a firm monopolized the insulin market because this could result in virtually no allocative
inefficiency yet create a large wealth transfer. The results of actions in these areas of anti-
trust concern would change substantially if distributive concerns were included in the deci-
sionmakers' analysis.
More generally, other types of economic regulation might not be in the public interest
if only efficiency goals were considered, but would be in society's interest if distributive
goals were also a concern.
302. Williamson, Economies, supra note 288, at 28. Professor Williamson later wrote
that "a product-specific claim that user and producer interests should be weighted
unequally.., does not vitiate the partial equilibrium model. It merely requires that the
appropriate weights be specified. To the extent that purchaser interests are given greater
weight than supplier interests, the economies burden is increased, ceteris paribus."
Williamson, Economies Revisited, supra note 40, at 711. Although Williamson recognizes
that his model could certainly incorporate distributive concerns, he states his belief that
these concerns should be ignored. Id at 710-11.
303. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 110.
304. Indirect, long-run, or dynamic effects also could be examined if the decisionmaker
believed that this would further Congress' ultimate goals. Differences in outcomes under
the approaches might be particularly pronounced if, in application, only direct effects are
considered. Yet, consideration of indirect, long-run or dynamic factors would vastly, and
perhaps impossibly, complicate the analysis. For example, if the problem were considered
in a dynamic context it would be necessary to compare the present value of resource
savings that would occur due to the efficiency gains in a competitive situation with the
present value of the net efficiency gain (A2-A,) that would occur if the firms merge and
produce a monopoly. These savings are affected over time by the rate at which entry
occurs or the monopoly power erodes, the expenditure of resources by the monopolist to
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realistic merger enforcement policy must consider severe and
potentially overwhelming implementation problems. This is
particularly true when enforcers attempt to implement a case-by-case
application of theoretical economic concepts to real-world situations
that are extremely conjectural. These difficulties include problems in
estimating how high the monopoly might be able to raise its prices,
how much more efficient the resulting firm might be, what kinds of
problems might arise from the uncertainty and unavailability of
data,30 5 and decisions concerning which economic assumptions to
apply.3°6 These difficulties occur to varying degrees under each of the
approaches that explicitly consider efficiency and/or transfers of
wealth. At best, they significantly weaken the soundness and
predictability of the analyses; at worst, they transform all of these
analyses when applied on a case-by-case basis into mere theoretical
exercises.
These practical problems support arguments against employing a
rule-of-reason analysis to evaluate mergers 30 7 or many other types of
prevent the erosion of its monopoly power, see supra notes 54 & 295, the possibility that
the monopoly will, on the average, engage in less than the socially optimal level of
research and innovation, see supra note 55, and the amount of resources that the
monopolist might waste due to X-inefficiency, see supra text accompanying note 54.
Similarly, the decisionmaker might want to ask why the same efficiencies could not be
achieved by means of internal expansion, how soon this might happen, and a large number
of other questions.
305. For example, it would seem to be virtually impossible to measure the area of any
of the triangles or rectangles presented in the diagram. As one commentator said, "One
might assert a general theory of the second best as follows: 'If a state of affairs is the
product of n variables, and you have knowledge of or control over less than n variables, if
you think you know what's going to happen when you vary "your" variables, you're a
booby.' That is, in complex processes (which most social processes are) a move in the right
direction is not necessarily the right move. To pick a simple illustration, if I am on a desert
island, subsisting solely on cocoanuts and oysters and beginning to hate it a lot, and across
the bay from me there is another island, lush and fertile, I do not improve my position in
life by swimming half way across." Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451,476 (1974); see R. BORK, supra note 2, at 125-27.
306. Conventional microeconomic analysis necessarily rests upon a large number of as-
sumptions. Precise, well-developed prescriptive as well as descriptive models taking these
factors into account are a necessity before any analysis can begin, for the violation of any
of these assumptions renders the analysis, to some degree, invalid. These assumptions,
which are crucial to the competitive operation of the free market, involve the presence or
absence of perfect information, the working of the capital market, barriers to entry,
economies of scale, immobility of resources, product differentiation, and externalities. The
presence of any of these factors complicates economic analysis, and a failure to take them
into account can render an economic analysis useless. See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 4, at 282-318 for a summary of the debate regarding the theoretical
and empirical significance of these and similar factors.
307. These practical considerations do not, however, mean that a direct consumer im-
pact characterization of the goals of the antitrust laws, perhaps with price to consumers as
its benchmark, cannot be implemented, or that its implementation would be more difficult
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antitrust violations. The better approach is to develop rules that give
rise to simplified and predictable antitrust analysis, 3°8 incorporating
both efficiency and distributive considerations into the formulation of
the merger guidelines.
Despite the critical problem of developing administrative ap-
proaches to antitrust analysis, it must be recalled that "when the law-
making power speaks upon a particular subject, over which it has
constitutional power to legislate, public policy in such a case is what
the statute enacts. ' '309  Congress never promised that the
than the implementation of an efficiency-based analysis. A rule that considered both
efficiency and distribution concerns would be no more complex than a rule that only
considered efficiency, since both would require the same prediction concerning market
power and economies. Further, an approach that only considered redistributive effects, or
an approach that considered efficiency effects only when they were directly passed on to
consumers, would be relatively simple. It would not, in the merger example, at least,
involve a balancing of competing considerations. If, and only if, the decisionmaker
determined that there was a significant chance that the merger might result in a significant
transfer of wealth from consumers to a monopolist, te., if and only if there were a
significant chance that prices to consumers would be raised, would the merger be
prevented.
308. Professor Turner concluded in his seminal 1965 article, Conglomerate Mergers and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313 (1965): "In theory, the ideal
regulatory policy would be one that discriminated carefully on a case-by-case basis
between those mergers that threaten substantial anticompetitive consequences and those
that do not. In fact, it seems almost impossible to carry out any such policy and still have
an effective antimerger statute....
"Taken literally, section 7 asks for a predictive economic judgment, a conclusion as to
the probability of various possible economic consequences of a merger, and an assessment
of the substantiality of those effects. Except in the most obvious cases, economic theory
simply does not permit confident judgments on these issues even when all the
economically relevant facts have been duly assembled. Thus, broadening the range of
factual inquiry in each case beyond certain limits gives little or no hope of promoting
rational decisionmaking. But even if this were not so, the effectiveness of the statute
would largely be destroyed if the outcome of cases turned on a review of all the economic
facts. With limited enforcement resources, few cases could be brought. With a wide variety
of fact situations, the precedential value of particular decisions-their value as guides to
the legality of other mergers-would be limited. Inevitably, the number of mergers with
substantial anticompetitive effects would tend to increase. Consequently, there is little to
be lost and much to be gained by directing the law toward rationally based general rules
that are framed in terms of what seem to be particularly significant factual issues, capable
of easy resolution." Id. at 1318-19 (footnote citing Professor Bok's article, supra note 249,
omitted).
309. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,340 (1897). The Court
also reasoned: "[W]e are asked to read into the act by way of judicial legislation an excep-
tion that is not placed there by the lawmaking branch of the Government, and this is to be
done upon the theory that the impolicy of such legislation is so clear that it cannot be sup-
posed Congress intended the natural import of the language it used. This we cannot and
ought not to do. That impolicy is not so clear, nor are the reasons for the exception so
potent as to permit us to interpolate an exception into the language of the act, and to thus
materially alter its meaning and effect. It may be that the policy evidenced by the passage
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administration of the antitrust laws would be easy.310 It had definite
goals that it wanted to accomplish when it enacted the antitrust laws.
The primary obligation of the FTC and the courts is determining
Congress' basic objectives. Only then does their task become that of
formulating implementation approaches that come as close as is
practicable to carrying out these goals. Thus, decisionmakers have
latitude in deciding precisely how to incorporate both efficiency and
distributive considerations in antitrust analysis. To ignore either,
however, would contravene congressional desires.
This Article suggests that both distributive and efficiency
considerations are meant to play a role in antitrust analysis. Because
many antitrust violations cause both economic inefficiency and wealth
transfer from consumers to firms with market power, in many
antitrust cases no conflict between these goals would arise.
Conversely, if the firm or firms in question were unlikely to achieve
market power, the activity in question probably would not violate the
antitrust laws under any view of the antitrust laws' goals.
Nevertheless, the merger example presented in this section illustrates
the sort of case in which antitrust results depend greatly upon the
goals employed in the analysis.
Conclusion
This examination of the legislative histories of the antitrust laws
shows that Congress had a limited number of specific goals. The same
small list provides the underpinnings of each of the Acts. The exami-
nation of each Act's legislative history in light of the relevant social
and economic context has attempted to shed some light on these
goals.
Each antitrust law grew in part out of a desire to define and
protect consumers' property rights, an antipathy toward corporate
aggregations of economic, social, and political power, and a concern
for small entrepreneurs. The concern at the end of the nineteenth
of the act itself will, if carried out, result in disaster to the roads and in a failure to secure
the advantages sought from such legislation. Whether that will be the result or not we do
not know and cannot predict." Id.; cf. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 69: "There must surely be
a canon of statutory construction holding that, other things being equal, courts should
attribute to the legislature a policy intent which, because of the scope and nature of a body
of law, makes that law effective in achieving its goals, renders the law internally consistent,
and makes for ease of judicial administration." (Emphasis added.)
310. Senator Cummins, for example, anticipated difficulty in analysis performed under
§ 5 of the FTC Act: "I have not a bit of doubt of the difficulty of the cases. We have
never ... accomplished anything good yet without great difficulty. If those who passed the
antitrust law and those who passed the interstate commerce law had been appalled
because they were difficult of administration, we would have yet been without any
regulation of interstate commerce." 51 CONG. Rac. 11,106 (1914).
April 1999]
century focused on the excessive power of trusts and of the
industrialists who controlled them, primarily as this power was used
to harm consumers. Congress also had efficiency goals and resented
trusts because they had the power to determine whether or not
individuals had a fair opportunity to compete. Discontent existed
over the potential political power resulting from control over
thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in assets and over potential
disruptions to society that might occur unless these aggregations of
power were curbed.
As the United States entered the twentieth century, great
increases in industrial concentration occurred, despite the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act. The FTC and Clayton Acts were
intended to refine and extend the Sherman Act and better implement
its basic goals by filling in the gaps in its coverage. In particular, the
FTC was given a mandate to prevent "unfair methods of
competition." Congress intended this phrase to include such disparate
acts as fraud and monopolization primarily because each caused
"unfair" transfers of wealth from consumers to producers.
The Celler-Kefauver amendment was born largely in the shadow
of World War II. Reminded of the high and rising level of industrial
concentration, Congress believed it was necessary to strengthen the
Clayton Act. Congress recognized the need for efficient, large-scale
economic production, but feared the social unrest, or worse, that
could be precipitated by concentrated corporate power. The dramatic
statements in the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act probably reflect less a fear of imminent fascism than
a desire to curb increases in industrial concentration for a large
number of social and political reasons.
These congressional value judgments were the motivations
underlying the antitrust laws. The effects of market power on
allocative efficiency caused little or no concern in even the most
recent major antitrust statutes. Of course, in every one of the antitrust
laws' legislative histories Congress applauded the productive
efficiency of modem corporations. Stressing the benefits resulting
from free competition, Congress wanted to provide incentives that
would help firms compete vigorously. Congress wanted to encourage
economic efficiency and to ensure that the fruits of this efficiency
were passed on to consumers, but efficiency was never its primary
goal. Congress attempted to accomplish its overriding redistributive
aims in such a way that the benefits of modem productivity would still
be substantially realized. The evidence does not suggest, however,
that Congress wanted the antitrust laws to allow increases in
corporate efficiency at the cost of undermining its basic redistributive
goals.
The antitrust laws were enacted to become broad and flexible
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economic mandates to improve "consumer welfare," as Congress
defined this term. Recent advances in economic theory provide the
methodology that can help determine when market power is likely to
harm consumers, as opposed to those times when free market forces
that will best ensure consumers' protection are operating. This
sophistication should lead to increasingly precise implementations of
Congress' commands that all purchasers, whether consumers or
businesses, be given the right to purchase products priced at no more
than the competitive level and that all sellers be given the right to
compete against products priced at no less than that level.

